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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal tax expenditures (i.e., subsidies and incentives provided
through the federal income tax system) are an important feature of
the American fiscal system that has grown even more significant in
recent years. For example, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office estimated that tax expenditures in fiscal year 2004 were
equivalent to $896 billion of direct expenditures and concluded that,
since 1988, tax expenditures have often exceeded direct, discretionary
federal spending.' As a result, it is no surprise that debates regarding
tax expenditures (including the magnitude and proper role of such
expenditures) are a significant part of tax policy analysis.
For practical purposes, these debates began in earnest in the
United States when the late Professor Stanley Surrey, then Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, gave a November 1967
speech in which he famously argued that if a tax provision effectively
delivers a subsidy or incentive for a discrete income source or
taxpayer group, it is the equivalent of a direct government cash
payment and, by implication, should be subjected to the same scrutiny
as an explicit outlay of money.2 Consistent with this approach, Surrey
See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, TAX EXPENDITURES
REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED
8, 35 n.43, 36 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05690.pdf. In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department
has estimated that if all corporate tax expenditures were repealed, effective January 1,
2008, $1.24 trillion of additional revenue would be raised over the 2008-2017 period.
See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS
TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 10-11 (July 23, 2007) [hereinafter U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/reports/07230% 20r.pdf. For a commentary that classifies and analyzes
the growth of tax expenditures, see JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 288-98 (1985).
2 Stanley S. Surrey, The United States Income Tax System - The Need for Full
Accounting, in TAX POLICY AND TAX REFORM: SELECTED SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY
OF STANLEY S. SURREY 575, 575-85 (William F. Helimuth & Oliver Oldman eds.,
1973) [hereinafter Surrey, Full Accounting]; see also STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS
TO TAX REFORM 33 (1973) [hereinafter SURREY, PATHWAYS]; STANLEY S. SURREY &
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 88 (1985) [hereinafter SURREY &
2008]
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gave the name "tax expenditure" to features of the tax law that
• • 3
provide subsidies or incentives, thus bringing tax expenditure analysis
(TEA) into American tax policy consciousness.4 During his remaining
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES]. For another commentator who supports the tax
expenditure theory, see Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a
Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 89 (1980) ("Logic suggests that tax
expenditures should be subjected to the same kinds of cost/benefit scrutiny and
political tradeoffs applicable to functionally equivalent direct spending programs.").
Although this analytical approach would seem to support a First Amendment
Establishment Clause attack on both the federal income tax exemption for religious
organizations and the income tax deduction for contributions to these organizations,
see, e.g., SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra, at 132-37; Donna D.
Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax
Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855,
912-14 (1993), the relevant U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence is generally
understood to support the proposition that the exemption and deduction are not
ordinarily vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge. See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Tax
Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 460-72
(1999) ("[I]t is clear that the economic equivalence of tax benefits and direct spending
is not the most important factor to consider in establishment clause analysis.");
Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192-93 (1993)
[hereinafter Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures] (arguing that the
First Amendment distinction between tax and direct subsidies is "more compelling
procedurally" than many commentators believe); see also Boris I. Bittker, Churches,
Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax
"Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379
(1998).
3 See Surrey, Full Accounting, supra note 2, at 576-78; see also STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURE REVIEWS 1 (Nov.
2007), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2007/tax-expenditures/tax expenditures-
1107.pdf (defining tax expenditures as "features of the tax code - including credits,
deductions, exclusions, and exemptions - that enable a targeted set of taxpayers to
reduce their taxes relative to what they would pay under what policymakers perceive
to be a 'basic' or 'normal' tax-law structure"); C. EUGENE STEUERLE,
CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 297 (2004) [hereinafter STEUERLE,
CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY] (defining tax expenditures as "[s]pending programs
channeled through the tax system"); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Tax
Incentives and Economists, 111 TAX NOTES 20 (Apr. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Tax Incentives] (defining tax expenditures as "deliberate departures from neutral
taxation directed at a particular group of taxpayers").
4 Although Surrey scored a rhetorical coup with his popularization of the
phrase "tax expenditure," others had earlier called attention to the many subsidies
delivered through the tax system and the issues they present, which was the essence of
Surrey's concern in promoting tax expenditure analysis (TEA). See, e.g., Walter J.
Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Tax Base, in 1
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 77,83 (Comm. Print
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fourteen months in government service, Surrey oversaw the creation
of Treasury's first tax expenditure budget5 and, following his return to
the Harvard Law School faculty, he wrote or co-authored (mostly with
Professor Paul McDaniel) a series of books and articles forcefully
promoting TEA as a tool for formulating sound governmental policy,
primarily federal income tax policy. 6 This work succeeded in making
TEA a fixture in American income tax debates.
Surrey argued that tax expenditures suffered from certain
inherent defects that almost always made them inferior to analogous
cash outlays.7 Indeed, for Surrey, the list of acceptable tax
1959) [hereinafter Blum, Preferential Provisions] ("[S]ubsidies through the income tax
are likely to be especially pernicious .... All in all, a less desirable form of
administering a subsidy is not easily imagined."); Bernard Wolfman, Federal Tax
Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 186 (1965) ("The sums
federally allocated by tax preferences and special relief provisions should be reflected
in the federal budget and accounts."); see also WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 18 (1947) (describing the favorable federal income tax
treatment of home ownership as an inefficient subsidy). For a discussion of the history
of the tax expenditure concept, see Jonathan Barry Forman, Origins of the Tax
Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537 (Feb. 10, 1986).
5 See U.S. Treas. Dep't, The Tax Expenditure Budget: A Conceptual Analysis, in
TAX POLICY AND TAX REFORM: SELECTED SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY OF STANLEY S.
SURREY 587, 587-612 (William F. Hellmuth & Oliver Oldman eds., 1973) [hereinafter
U.S. Treas. Dep't, Conceptual Analysis]; Forman, supra note 4, at 539-41.
6 See, e.g., SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 2; Paul R. McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Expenditures: How to Identify Them; How to Control Them, 15 TAX NOTES 595 (May
24, 1982); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches
Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84
HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Government Assistance: The Choice
Between Direct Programs and Tax Expenditures, 8 TAX NOTES 507 (Apr. 30, 1979);
Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970)
[hereinafter Surrey, Implementing Government Policy]; Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Subsidies as a Device for Implementing Government Policy, 3 TAX ADVISER 196
(1972); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the
Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679 (1976); Stanley S.
Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Legislative
Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 123 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin
eds., 1980) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF TAXATION]; Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R.
McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging
Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225 (1979) [hereinafter Surrey & McDaniel, Current
Developments]. For a work by Professor Surrey on special interest tax legislation that
pre-dated his TEA scholarship, see Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax
Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1957).
7 See Surrey, Full Accounting, supra note 2, at 579, 583; Surrey, Implementing
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expenditures was so short that the practical effect of TEA was to
reject almost any income tax provision characterized as a tax
• 8
expenditure. Automatic outcomes derived from formulas or
definitions are rendered suspect, however, by the baroque complexity
of the federal income tax system's structure and effects. For many
analysts and commentators, this complexity dictates the need to "do
tax policy" by identifying relevant criteria, applying the criteria to tax
policy issues, and weighing answers resulting from the individual
criteria against each other when the answers conflict. 9 Since the
answers frequently do conflict, tax policy decisions taken under this
Government Policy, supra note 6, at 726-32; Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth,
The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528
(1969).
8 Surrey, however, insisted that classifying a tax provision as a tax expenditure
should not cause its automatic rejection, see SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 5-6, and that the label "tax expenditure" did not
carry an inherently negative connotation. See U.S. Treas. Dep't, Conceptual Analysis,
supra note 5, at 588-89; Surrey, Full Accounting, supra note 2, at 578-79. However,
his work was so broadly critical of tax expenditures, see, e.g., SURREY, PATHWAYS,
supra note 2, at 134-49; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at
71-97, that TEA is widely understood as attaching a pejorative label to tax
expenditures and as generally arguing for their elimination. See Bruce Bartlett, The
End of Tax Expenditures As We Know Them?, 92 TAX NOTES 413, 414 (July 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Bartlett, The End]; Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax
Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1662-63 (Mar. 30, 1992);
Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 603, 612 (2003); Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal
Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 201-02 (2004); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A
Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1165 (1988); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim,
The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 976 (2004). Surrey
was not alone, however, in regarding tax expenditures as usually objectionable. See,
e.g., Blum, Preferential Provisions, supra note 4, at 83 ("[A] less desirable form of
administering a subsidy is not easily imagined."); Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending
- Does It Make a Difference?, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 361, 362 (2000) ("By the usual
standards of tax policy analysis, tax expenditures make the tax system worse .... ").
9 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP,
UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE: BACKGROUND, CRITERIA, &
QUESTIONS 24-52 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d051009sp.pdf; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, 1 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 13-19 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX
REFORM], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/tax-reform;
JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & DEBORAH A. GEIER, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 119-35 (3d ed. 2004); JOEL
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 55-188, 231 (3d ed. 2004); see also
JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (5th ed. 1987); Joseph T. Sneed, The
Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1965).
442
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multi-factor approach typically involve a substantial degree of
judgment. Controversies are frequent and automatic outcomes are
few.
Consequently, there is considerable resistance to touchstones and
formulas in the federal income tax world ° and it is no surprise that
TEA was rigorously criticized from its inception and continues to
draw negative reviews. 1  Notwithstanding this criticism, the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
requires the President's annual budget submission to contain a list of
tax expenditures," and Congress's Joint Committee on Taxation has
produced its own tax expenditure list each year since 1972.1' Although
TEA has not restrained or reversed the growth of tax expenditures as
10 As an example, Professor Charlotte Crane has stated,
[T]here is not - and probably cannot be - an ideal concept of an income
tax that is worth using as a starting point. There are simply too many
compromises that must be made in translating any concept into a workable
tax base, and too much room for arguing about which are expedients
necessary to make the tax administrable and which are the result of a
perceived need to respond to political pressure to lower tax burdens.
Charlotte Crane, The Income Tax and the Burden of Perfection, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
171, 185 (2006); see also Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 976 ("There is no such
thing as a normative tax base."). Contra authorities cited infra note 56.
11 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8; Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal
"Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969) [hereinafter
Bittker, Accounting]; Crane, supra note 10, at 184 (characterizing TEA as an
academic obsession); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the
Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345-66 (1989) (arguing, in part, that Surrey's tax
expenditure model is not grounded on any principle of distributive justice); Kahn &
Lehman, supra note 8; Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology,
99 HARV. L. REV. 491 (1985) (reviewing SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra note 2); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation
of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 1026-33 (1986) [hereinafter Zelinsky, The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives]; Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures, supra note 2; Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax
Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 257 (1991); Edward
A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans, Tax Expenditures, and the
Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 VA. TAX REV. 591 (1994); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax
Reform Act of 1986: A Response to Professor Yorio and His Vision of the Future of the
Internal Revenue Code, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 889-94 (1987) [hereinafter
Zelinsky, Response]; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A
Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1988).
12 See Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 601, 88 Stat. 297, 323 (1974).
13 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007-2011, at 1 n.2 (Joint Comm.
Print 2007) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2007 ESTIMATES].
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Surrey had hoped it would, 4 TEA continues to play a major role in
tax policy debates to the chagrin of its detractors 5
Even though TEA is familiar to most tax lawyers and scholars, we
will provide a necessary illustration in Part II of this article. This
discussion will set the stage for the analysis that follows and also
provide a device for structuring that analysis.
The persistence of TEA in a hostile environment suggests that it
has meaningful substance regardless of the criticism it receives. In Part
III of this article, we will undertake to show that TEA is both a logical
consequence of, and a device for implementing, the principle of
ability-to-pay, the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income, and the
tax policy principle of neutrality.
In Part IV, we will expand on Surrey's point that the tax
expenditure characterization does not make an income tax provision
bad per se. Instead, affixing the tax expenditure label triggers a
14 See GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 19-42; U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1028T, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX POLICY:
STREAMLINING, SIMPLIFICATION, AND ADDITIONAL REFORMS ARE DESIRABLE 9-10
(Aug. 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061028t.pdf; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD/AIMD-94-122, TAX POLICY: TAX EXPENDITURES
DESERVE MORE SCRUTINY 33-35, 50 (June 1994).
Although the total amount of tax expenditures has not been reduced, their
composition in recent years has shifted away from benefits for businesses and towards
benefits for individuals. See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at
43-44; Toder, supra note 8, at 362.
is See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE,
FAIR, & PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 27, 53, 57 (2005)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS],
available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report (utilizing TEA in the
development of tax reform proposals); Griffith, supra note 11, at 349 (stating that
TEA "has had a significant impact on the formulation of tax policy"); Joann M.
Weiner, Tax Expenditures and the Federal Budget, 118 TAX NOTES 586 (Feb. 4, 2008);
see also WITTE, supra note 1, at 269 (discussing the influence of TEA on the tax
policymaking process); Shaviro, supra note 8, at 187 ("At least 14 countries release
tax expenditure data .. "). One critic of TEA, Professor Edward Zelinsky, has
described the influence of TEA in the following way:
Few academic doctrines can claim the intellectual and political success of
tax expenditure analysis. In roughly a generation's time, Professor Surrey's
procedural and substantive critique of tax subsidies has become entrenched
in the law school curriculum and in legal scholarship. More impressively,
the tax expenditure concept has been enshrined in federal law and become
part of the daily discourse of the national budget process.
Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures, supra note 2, at 1165 (footnotes
omitted).
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requirement that the provision in question must be recast and
examined as a direct expenditure analogue and then must go through
a cost/benefit analysis. Indeed, we regard TEA's principal purpose
and justification to be its role as a triggering mechanism for
mandatory recasting and cost/benefit analysis. 16 Under this form of
scrutiny, tax policymakers first ask whether the tax expenditure in
question would pass muster if it were proposed as an equivalent direct
expenditure program.17 For a tax expenditure that survives this
inquiry, the next questions are whether it yields net benefits and, if so,
whether the benefits could be better achieved through a direct
expenditure program. A tax provision that successfully endures this
analytical approach gets a passing grade even though it bears the tax
expenditure label. Of course, many, perhaps most, tax expenditures
will receive failing marks when scrutinized in this fashion - but this is
due to their inherent weaknesses and not because TEA amounts to a
rule of automatic disqualification.
One of Surrey's objectives in advocating TEA was to force
recognition of both the revenue costs of individual tax expendituresS 18
and the aggregate revenue cost of all tax expenditures. Critics have
contended that flaws in the revenue estimation process make TEA
useless for this purpose. In Part IV, we will argue that these criticisms
are overbroad. Our central theme in this article, however, is that even
if these and certain other objections are valid, TEA is an important
tool for identifying tax provisions that should be subjected to recasting
and to cost/benefit scrutiny. We will also address other criticisms of
TEA in Part IV and argue that these objections are either misguided,
deal with marginal matters, or are outside the realm of practical tax
policy concerns.
In Part V, we will provide a brief explanation of the evaluative
method that we believe should be applied to tax expenditures. In Part
VI, we will examine several important features of the U.S.
international income tax system - deferral, cross-crediting, and the
export sales source rule. In our judgment, all of these features involve
tax expenditures that receive failing marks under the recasting and
cost/benefit analysis explained in Part V. Part VII will summarize our
overall conclusions.
16 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 5-6.17 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 36-40.
18 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 6, 25, 233.
2008]
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II. A SIMPLE, BUT NECESSARY, ILLUSTRATION
At its core, TEA is the essence of simplicity. We can illustrate the
basic idea by considering a simplified version of a longstanding TEA
target:' 9 the section 103 exclusion for interest on public purpose state
and municipal government bonds.2°
Assume that the U.S. federal income tax has only one rate, 35%,
bonds issued by corporations are paying 10% per annum taxable
interest, and interest received on state and local government bonds is
excluded from gross income. An investor who buys a corporate bond
paying 10% interest before tax will have only 6.5% interest after
paying a 35% income tax.21 As a result, tax-free state and local
government bonds that pay only 6.5% interest will be competitive
with 10% corporate bonds of equal quality and governmental issuers
of the tax-free bonds will be able to borrow at a cost that is 35 % less
22
than the borrowing cost of corporations.
At this point, it is useful to note that the purchasers of the tax-
23
exempt bonds in this example are said to pay a 35% implicit tax
because that is the percentage difference between the 6.5% exempt
interest they will receive24 and the 10% before-tax interest that they
would have received if there had been no interest tax exemption and
they had purchased bonds paying taxable interest.2' This 35 % implicit
19 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 83-84.
20 See I.R.C. § 103.
21 10% x (1 - 0.35) = 6.5%.
22 (0.10 - 0.065) - 0.10 = 0.35.
23 (10% - 6.5%) - 10% = 35%. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM 84 (Jan. 17, 1977) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS],
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/blueprints; SLEMROD &
BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 75. For general explanations of the implicit tax concept, see
MYRON S. SCHOLES, MARK A. WOLFSON, MERLE ERICKSON, EDWARD L. MAYDEW &
TERRY SHEVLIN, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 121-22, 125-27 (3d ed. 2005);
Harry Watson, Implicit Taxes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY
185 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]. For an article that argues that consideration of the
effects of implicit taxes should pay a greater role in federal income tax policy analysis
and a response to that article, see Charlotte Crane, Some Explicit Thinking About
Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV. 339 (1999); David A. Weisbach, Implications of
Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV. 373 (1999) (responding to Professor Crane's article).
14 See supra note 21.
25 (0.10 - 0.065) + 0.10 = 0.35. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note
23, at 84; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 75, 230; Bartlett, The End, supra note
8, at 418.
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tax is identical to both (1) the 35% interest savings garnered by the
state and local governments as a result of being able to issue bonds
that pay 6.5% exempt interest instead of 10% taxable interest, and (2)
the federal government's loss of the 35% tax that would have been
collected if there had been no tax exemption for the interest and the
purchasers of the exempt state and local government bonds had
instead invested in bonds paying 10% taxable interest. In other words,
the state and local government bond issuers, the 35% bracket
investors in the exempt-interest bonds, and the federal government
are all in the same positions they would occupy if the investors had
paid a 35% federal tax on receipts of 10% interest and the federal
government had then sent checks to the state and local government
issuers equal to 35% of their 10% interest cost.2 6 Accordingly, the
exemption can be viewed as equivalent to the government acting as a
conduit by taking 35% of the 10% bond interest from the recipients
and transferring it through the appropriations process to the state and
21local government issuers of the bonds.
An exemption for interest paid on state and local government
bonds, however, unlike a deduction for business expenses, is not a
28required feature of a normatively correct income tax base.
26 See SCHOLES, WOLFSON, ERICKSON, MAYDEW & SHEVLIN, supra note 23, at
126 ("To whom is the implicit tax paid? In our tax-exempt municipal bond example, it
is paid to the issuers of the tax-exempt securities. The issuing municipalities receive
an implicit subsidy by way of a lower cost of capital."); Calvin H. Johnson, A
Thermometer for the Tax System: The Overall Health of the Tax System as Measured
by Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 13, 16 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Thermometer].
As stated by Professor Walter Blum: "There is thus a constructive receipt by the
government. Lastly, this imputed [tax] revenue is assumed to be spent by the
government .... Such a constructive expenditure is the other side of a constructive
receipt." Walter J. Blum, Book Review, 1 J. CORP. TAX'N 486 (1975) [hereinafter
Blum, Book Review].
27 See SCHOLES, WOLFSON, ERICKSON, MAYDEW & SHEVLIN, supra note 23, at
126 ("This taxing scheme, which uses implicit taxes to subsidize municipal spending
programs, is similar to an alternative scheme in which all bonds (including municipal
bonds) are fully taxable at the federal level and the federal government remits the tax
collected on municipal bonds to each issuing authority."). Tax aficionados know that
in the real world, the progressive rates of the federal income tax cause the benefit
realized by the state and local government bond issuers to be substantially less than
the federal government's loss of tax revenue. We have avoided that problem in this
example by stipulating that the income tax has only one rate - 35%. In Part IV.A,
this article discusses the effect of progressive rates on the exemption for interest paid
on state and local government public purpose bonds.
28 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 124; 1 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 135; U.S.
20081
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Consequently, the only reason the federal government functions as a
conduit here is because Congress elected to give up the 35% explicit
tax on interest paid to investors in the state and local government
bonds. For that reason, the constructive transfer to state and local
governments in this example was not made by the investors; it was
actually funded by the federal government with revenue forgone at
the direction of Congress. As a result, TEA labels the interest
exclusion in this example a tax expenditure, 9 i.e., a federal
government outlay made through the income tax regime instead of
through the federal government's cash expenditure system. TEA then
requires that this exclusion/tax exemption be recast into the form of
an equivalent direct expenditure as illustrated above.3 ° If the
equivalent direct expenditure is not unacceptable per se, it should next
be subjected to cost/benefit analysis."
TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 84; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 209-10.
29 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2007 ESTIMATES, supra note 13, at
5, 24-35; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES 287 (2007) [hereinafter 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES]; OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2007, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 287 (2006) [hereinafter 2007
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES].
30 Professors David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have argued that for this
purpose, a tax expenditure should be compared with the direct expenditure program
that is most likely to be adopted to accomplish the tax expenditure's goals rather than
with a direct expenditure program that precisely mimics the features of the tax
expenditure. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 982. We disagree because it is
important to know whether a direct expenditure program would be acceptable if it
possessed all the significant features of a particular tax expenditure. If the direct
expenditure program would not be acceptable on these terms, then it becomes critical
to ask why the objections would be cured by implementing the program as a tax
expenditure. This important question will go unanswered, and a fundamental benefit
of TEA will be lost, unless tax expenditures are compared with direct expenditure
programs having the same major characteristics as the respective tax expenditures.
31 In hindsight, the entire exercise seems so obvious that when this article was
presented in draft form at a faculty research colloquium, an audience member was
amazed to learn that TEA was not common knowledge in the United States before
Surrey's work. With respect to the earlier development of TEA in Germany, see
Harry A. Shannon III, The Tax Expenditure Concept in the United States and
Germany: A Comparison, 33 TAX NOTES 201 (Oct. 13, 1986). For a cataloguing of tax
expenditures in five other countries, see PAUL R. MCDANIEL & STANLEY S. SURREY,
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1985).
For discussions of tax expenditures in countries that are members of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), see OECD, A REVIEW OF
ISSUES AND COUNTRY PRACTICES (1984); OECD, TAX EXPENDITURES: RECENT
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The Bush administration's Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) recently criticized TEA for failing to accept the fact that tax
expenditure programs and direct expenditure programs often function
very differently. OMB's argument was stated as follows: "Although
tax expenditures can often be thought of as tax subsidies, they are
frequently unlike any of the subsidies found on the spending side of
the budget. The differences can be so great that comparing the two
types of subsidy is like comparing apples with oranges.
3 2
We agree that tax expenditures and direct expenditure programs
often look different with respect to the rigor of their eligibility criteria,
application procedures, and administrative management. The likely
explanation for these differences, however, is that the cash outlay
feature of direct expenditure programs causes a demand for higher
levels of justification, targeting, and management than apply to
government spending hidden in the tax system.33 It is difficult,
however, to find a rational basis for applying lower standards of
program design, management, and scrutiny to tax expenditures. By
forcing recognition of the economic equivalence of tax expenditures
and direct expenditures, TEA also forces an examination of whether
the looser eligibility, application, and management/administrative
approaches that often characterize tax expenditure programs are
justifiable. Stated more broadly, TEA is an important tool for
spotlighting hidden government spending and subjecting it to a more
rigorous analysis than it would otherwise receive.
EXPERIENCES (1996). For a paper discussing more recent work by the OECD on tax
expenditures, see Dirk-Jan Kraan, Off-budget and Tax Expenditures, 4 OECD J.
BUDGETING 121 (2004). For a discussion of the application of TEA to lesser
developed countries' tax systems, see Lotfi Maktouf & Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Expenditure Analysis and Tax and Budgetary Reform in Less Developed Countries, 15
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 739 (1983).
32 See Letter of James D. Foster, Associate Director of Economic Policy, Office
of Management and Budget 2 (Sept. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Foster Letter], in GAO,
FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 83.
33 For speculation as to why this is the case, see Poh Eng Hin, Fiscal
Misperceptions Associated with Tax Expenditure Spending: The Case of Pronatalist
Tax Incentives in Singapore, 5 EJOURNAL OF TAX RES. 5, 10 (2007), available at
http://www.atax.unsw.edu.au/ejtr/; Calvin H. Johnson, Tax Incentives Are Always the
Wrong Way to Go, 111 TAX NOTES 90, 92 (Apr. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Wrong
Way]; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 220; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 970. But see
Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures, supra note 2, at 1179-80.
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III. IS TEA MORE THAN RHETORIC?
If tax policy tools, such as TEA, are to have normative force, they
must possess a principled basis. Otherwise, their power depends
entirely on their effectiveness as rhetoric in the world of raw politics.
34
This is an important point because TEA is sometimes discussed as if it
were merely an unprincipled rhetorical device, cunningly created to
serve the political agenda of those who oppose subsidies and
incentives delivered through the tax system.35 Closer examination,
however, shows that this criticism is incorrect because TEA is actually
grounded in three fundamental tax policy principles - ability-to-pay,
the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income, and neutrality.
A. Ability-to-Pay and SHS
In Part II, we concluded that the state and local governmental
bond interest exclusion is a federal government outlay made through
the tax system. This conclusion is valid, however, only if the interest
paid on state and local government bonds properly belongs in the
income tax base - i.e., some norm requires all interest receipts to be
treated as income - so that the interest exclusion is elective and
deviant on the part of Congress. Surrey peremptorily declared that the
proper baseline for this purpose is the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition
36
of income, modified to incorporate widely accepted business
34 As Professor Daniel Goldberg has observed regarding the tax system
generally:
Without a theoretical standard based upon fundamental principles of
taxation uniformly applied, the system will be cast loose from its moorings.
No provisions would have a stronger claim based on principle than any
other provision motivated by a specific identified perceived benefit. Under
such a system, future tax legislation will become simply a test of political
power.
Daniel S. Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not Revolution, 57 TAX
LAW. 1, 29 (2003).
35 See Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1663 (asserting that tax expenditure
budgets "create only an illusion of value-free scientific precision in a heavily
politicized domain"); Shaviro, supra note 8, at 188 (characterizing TEA as "a mere
fiscal language innovation"). But see Martin Feldstein, A Contribution to the Theory
of Tax Expenditures: The Case of Charitable Giving, in ECONOMICS OF TAXATION,
supra note 6, at 102 (critic of TEA making clear that "rejection of the presumption
that all tax expenditures are bad implies no criticism of the valuable idea of the 'tax
expenditure budget"').
36 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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accounting standards and the generally accepted structure of an
income tax.37 In our view, however, an understanding of TEA's
normative baseline requires a brief explanation of a more
fundamental concept - the principle of ability-to-pay.
The parameters of a normatively correct income tax base are
usually determined by applying an array of widely accepted tax policy
38
criteria, one of the most important of which is the proposition that
the income tax burden should be allocated among resident taxpayers
in relation to their taxpaying capacities, often referred to as the
principle of ability-to-pay. 9 Indeed, it is fair to regard this
37 See id. at 4; Thuronyi, supra note 8, at 1164-65.
31 See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 9, at 117-50.
39 See Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by
Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc.
E.F.S. 73.F.19., at 18 (1923), reprinted in 4 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 4003, 4022 (1962); U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 1, 24; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH
H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 27, 37-38 (5th ed. 2005); WILLIAM A.
KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN & DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 6-7
(13th ed. 2003); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 232-40 (4th ed. 1984); STEPHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY 31-
32, 41 (1993); Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income
of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 29 (1993); Martin J. McMahon,
Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive
Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 72-80 (1998); Robert L. Palmer, Toward Unilateral
Coherence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 9-10
(1989); Donald Phares, Tax Equity Analysis, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 399;
Sneed, supra note 9, at 574-80; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DISTRIBUTIONAL
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY, OTA PAPER No. 85, at 6 (1999) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/ota85.pdf. For a discussion of the use of fairness considerations in
defining income, see Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45
(1990).
Countries rely on a benefits theory to tax income earned within their borders by
foreign persons. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The
David R. Tillinghast Lecture - "What's Source Got to Do With It?" Source Rules and
U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 90-106 (2002) [hereinafter Shay,
Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules].
Ability-to-pay is a foundational principle in the income tax systems of many
countries in addition to the United States. See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and
Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United
States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 304 (2006); Frans Vanistendael, Legal
Framework for Taxation, in 1 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 15, 22-23 (Victor
Thuronyi ed., 1996). The ability-to-pay principle has even been made a constitutional
limitation on the power to tax in Italy, Spain, and Germany. See id.; see also Basic
Facts About the United Nations, The United Nations: Organization,
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longstanding concept 4° as the major fairness norm in the U.S. federal
41income tax system.
http://www.un.org/aboutun/basicfacts/unorg.htm ("The fundamental criterion on
which the scale of assessments is based is the capacity of countries to pay.").
40 The ability-to-pay principle has a lengthy intellectual history. Adam Smith
endorsed it as a foundational tax norm although, failing to understand that it differed
from the benefit principle, he conflated the two. See Richard A. Musgrave, Fairness in
Taxation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 135. Smith's statement was: "The
subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as
nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to
the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state." ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 371
(4th ed. 1850). Kant also recognized the ability-to-pay principle as a norm of taxation.
Like Smith, he conflated it with the benefit principle but he also clearly acknowledged
the redistributional implications of ability-to-pay. Kant's statement was:
The general will of the people has united itself into a society which is to
maintain itself perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the
internal authority of the state in order to maintain those members of the
society who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of state the
government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the
means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most
necessary natural needs. The wealthy have acquired an obligation to the
commonwealth, since they owe their existence to an act of submitting to its
protection and care, which they need in order to live; on this obligation the
state now bases its right to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their
fellow citizens. This can be done either by imposing a tax on the property or
commerce of citizens, or by establishing funds and using the interest from
them, not for the needs of the state (for it is rich), but for the needs of the
people. It will do this by way of coercion (since we are speaking here only
of the right of the state against the people), by public taxation, not merely
by voluntary contributions, some of which are made for gain (such as
lotteries, which produce more poor people and more danger to public
property than there would otherwise be, and which should therefore not be
permitted).
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 101 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996)
(emphasis in original). More recent commentators on taxation have recognized that
the ability-to-pay and benefit principles are separate norms. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY
& THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 16-30 (2002); Deborah A. Geier, Time
to Bring Back the Benefit Norm?, 102 TAx NOTES 1155 (Mar. 1, 2004); Sagit Leviner,
From Deontology to Practical Application: The Vision of a Good Society and the Tax
System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 405, 423-30 (2006).
Ultimately, the decision to use ability-to-pay as a foundational principle of a tax
system is based on a societal decision that other approaches are inferior. See generally
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAx L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2006)
[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Three Goals].
41 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 1; STEUERLE,
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Nevertheless, the ability-to-pay concept has drawn sharp criticism
because its meaning can be controversial at the margins. For example,
commentators often refine the ability-to-pay fairness concept by
subdividing it into a horizontal equity component (taxpayers with
equal incomes should pay equal amounts of tax) and a vertical equity
component (taxpayers with unequal incomes should pay amounts of
tax which are sufficiently unequal to fairly reflect the differences in
their incomes).42 Other commentators, however, have criticized these
refinements by asserting that horizontal equity has no significance as a
tax policy norm separate from vertical equity or that neither
horizontal nor vertical equity has any content that is independent of
more general notions regarding fundamental fairness.43 There has also
been disagreement regarding certain nuances of the ability-to-pay
concept, such as the proper handling of psychic income, leisure,
underachievement, and various personal characteristics of taxpayers.44
Finally, ability-to-pay analysis has been criticized for focusing on
CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 10. Regarding the history of the rise of
the ability-to-pay concept as a foundational principle in U.S. tax policy, see RICHARD
J. JOSEPH, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN INCOME TAX: THE REVENUE ACT OF 1894
AND ITS AFTERMATH 89-90, 95-96 (2004); Ajay K. Mehrota, Envisioning the Modern
American Fiscal State: Progressive Era Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of
the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity
versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE:
THE ONGOING DEBATE 25 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002).
42 See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 150-53 (1986);
JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 88 (1989); GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 39,
at 27-28; WILLIAM A. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7
(1976); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39,
86-98 (1996).
43 See generally Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
191 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42
NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and
Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993);
Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354
(1993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113
(1990). But see Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit,
Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 458-59 (2005)
[hereinafter Dodge, Theories].
" See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., REPORT RELATING
TO THE IMPACT ON INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 107-17 (Joint Comm. Print 1997); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L.
REV. 1191 (2008) [hereinafter Infanti, Tax Equity]; Zolt, supra note 42, at 89-101; see
also Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAPMAN L.
REV. 157, 182-83 (1999) [hereinafter Fried, Puzzling Case]. These strike us as
peripheral matters.
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taxation without considering the distributional effects of governmentS 4 5
expenditures and for using the prevailing distribution of income as
the measure of taxpaying capacity without inquiring into whether that
income distribution is itself fair.46 As noted, these points have caused
some commentators to dismiss ability-to-pay as unhelpful 7
In our view, these attacks greatly undervalue the importance of
the ability-to-pay principle in establishing the general structure and
content of the tax base. This utility plus the intuitive appeal48 of the
45 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 24-25, 30, 184; Fried, Puzzling Case,
supra note 44, at 182. In our view, an unfairly distributed tax burden is problematic
even in the unlikely case in which tax inequity is completely corrected by
redistributional spending. See also Dodge, Theories, supra note 43, at 451-52, 456-57.
See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 28-30; Fried, Puzzling Case, supra
note 44, at 182. This criticism overlooks the fact that the ability-to-pay concept is a tax
burden distribution norm, not an income distribution norm. To demand that the
ability-to-pay concept provide a normative basis for both tax burden distribution and
income distribution is to demand too much. A separate income distribution norm is
required. See also Dodge, Theories, supra note 43, at 454 ("[Tlhe point of the ability-
to-pay principle is precisely that a tax base keyed to market outcomes is the only
rational foundation for a system of redistribution that would alter such outcomes.
Existing distributions.., have no normative status whatsoever under the objective
ability-to-pay tax justice norm.").
47 See, e.g., Louis EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 56 (1961) ("To
speak forcefully of ability to pay is merely to indulge in evasive rhetoric."); MURPHY
& NAGEL, supra note 40, at 30 ("[T]he vague idea of 'ability to pay' will not help us
when we move to the different question of what distributive [aims] a just government
should have."); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 64 ("On the compelling
questions of the day, however - such as whether millionaires ought to pay 70
percent, 50 percent, or 30 percent of their income in tax or whether poor families
should pay anything at all - the ability-to-pay principle has nothing concrete to
offer."); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?,
89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1092-93 (1980) ("Such definitions reduce to statements that
society should appropriately tax what it should appropriately tax.").
48 Regarding the intuitive appeal of the ability-to-pay principle, Professor
Joseph Dodge has observed:
[T]he ability-to-pay principle can be constructed from a [preference-
neutral] Rawls-type contractarian method: A person in ignorance of his or
her material station in life (and moderately risk-averse) would opt to be
forced to contribute to government according to the ability-to-pay principle
(so long, of course, as everybody else is subject to the same taxing
principle).
Dodge, Theories, supra note 43, at 460. Consistent with this view, William Safire, the
conservative New York Times political editor, said: "Most of us accept as 'fair' this
principle: the poor should pay nothing, the middlers something, the rich the highest
percentage." William Safire, The 25% Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A23,
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ability-to-pay principle has caused it to persist as a major parameter of
tax policy.49 Thus, a prominent tax economist has recently referred to
the horizontal equity component of ability-to-pay as "perhaps the
queen of all principles affecting government policy."5 °
More importantly, the preceding controversies and criticisms have
been made effectively irrelevant by the development of a U.S. tax
policy consensus under which ability-to-pay means that taxpayers with
larger net incomes in a given year should generally pay more tax
(calculated with progressive rates) than those who have smaller net
incomes in the same year,5 and that when comparing net incomes for
quoted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, How IT GOT
THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 11 (1999). Professor Richard
Schmalbeck reached the same conclusion as Safire. Richard L. Schmalbeck, Race and
the Federal Income Tax: Has a Disparate Impact Case Been Made?, 76 N.C.L. REV.
1817, 1820 (1998).
41 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 1; STEUERLE,
CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 10.
50 See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 10
("[H]orizontal equity ... asserts that those with equal ability to pay should pay equal
taxes.... Horizontal equity is perhaps the queen of all principles affecting
government policy...."); see also Gene Steuerle, A Consensus Base for Tax Reform,
113 TAX NOTES 371 (Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Steuerle, Consensus].
" See, e.g., Testimony of Robert J. Carroll, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax
Analysis), United States Department of the Treasury, Before the S. Finance Comm.,
109th Cong. 3 (Sept. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Carroll Testimony], available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/carrolltestimony%209.20.06.pdf ("[T]he
tax system should be appropriately progressive."); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON
FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 49 ("All members of the Panel
endorsed the goal of a progressive tax structure."); Thomas L. Hungerford, Tax
Expenditures: Good, Bad or Ugly?, 113 TAX NOTES 325, 329 (Oct. 23, 2006) ("[A]bout
two-thirds of Americans 'believe that people with high incomes should pay a larger
share of their income in taxes than those with lower income."'); Theodore P. Seto &
Sandi L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability-to-Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (2006) ("[S]tandard tax theory largely ignores differences
- other than differences in 'income' - in the ability of taxpayers to pay taxes."). On
a related point, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press has conducted
a series of national polls of adult Americans showing that from 1994 to 2007,
agreement with the statement that it is the government's responsibility "to take care
of people who can't take care of themselves" has increased from 57% to 69% and
agreement that the government should assist the needy even if doing so causes an
increase in government debt has risen from 41% to 54%. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER
FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, TRENDS IN POLITICAL VALUES AND CORE ATTITUDES:
1987-2007 (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/312.pdf. For
an article that analyzes the moral, economic, and administrative effects of a
progressive rate structure, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare
and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905
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this purpose, the realization principle is applied, an objective,
market-based standard is used,53 and items that cannot be feasibly
measured (e.g., leisure, psychic income, and forgone opportunities)
are omitted.54 The emergence of this consensus has made the ability-
to-pay principle a workable concept despite uncertainties and
55
controversies at the margins.
Integrally related to ability-to-pay is the widely accepted Schanz-
Haig-Simons (SHS) definition of income which provides that an
individual's income is the sum of his or her consumption and change
in wealth during the taxable period, usually a year.56 Under this
definition, both amounts that are consumed and amounts that are
(1987).
52 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 46-47; William D.
Andrews, A Consumption- Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1113, 1141-48 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Cash Flow Personal Income Tax];
Christopher H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax Reform, 59 SMU L. REV. 435, 437-38
(2006); Ronald A. Pearlman, A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real World, There Is No
Perfect Tax System, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 106, 108-09 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005) [hereinafter Pearlman, No Perfect Tax
System]; Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Principle, 57 TAX
L. REV. 355,396 (2004).
53 See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 51 (1938); Dodge,
Theories, supra note 43, at 449; see also KLEIN, supra note 42, at 7 ("On balance, the
case for objectivity.., has carried the day with respect to the tax system. But, again, it
is useful to keep in mind ... that by opting for objectivity, we have simultaneously
decided to settle for a less-than-perfect measure of ability.").
54 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 3, 159-62; 1 U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 14-15, 37-42; WALTER J. BLUM &
HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 64 (1953);
BRADFORD, supra note 42, at 16-19, 155-56; KLEIN, BANKMAN & SHAVIRO, supra
note 39, at 6-7; Dodge, Theories, supra note 43, at 449-50; Vada Waters Lindsey, The
Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code: The Need for Renewed Progressivity,
5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 3, 7-8, 39-40 (2001); Herbert A. Stein, What's Wrong with the
Federal Tax System, in COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 107, 110-14 (Comm. Print 1959); see also PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 30 (Treasury
Department calculates ability-to-pay in terms of "wages and salaries, business or farm
net income, taxable and tax-exempt interest, dividends, rental income, realized capital
gains, cash transfers from the government, and retirement benefits").
55 For recent vigorous defenses of the ability-to-pay principle, see Dodge,
Theories, supra note 43, at 449-61; Seto & Buhai, supra note 51.
56 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 28; Hanna, supra note 52, at 436
("The Haig-Simons definition of income is generally considered by most tax scholars
to be the ideal definition of income.").
456 [Vol. 27:437
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis
saved are included in the tax base.57 Obviously, this is a way of
describing an individual's taxpaying ability. 8 Thus, SHS is generally
understood to be based on the ability-to-pay principle and as a
formula for implementing that principle. 9
Not surprisingly, the theoretical criticisms leveled at the ability-to-
pay principle with regard to the lack of clarity at the margins or the
failure to include certain items60 have also been directed at SHS.
Because the U.S. tax policy consensus accepts ability-to-pay as a
workable concept despite these objections, that same consensus has
61
also embraced SHS as a practical policy guide.
57 The most famous statement of the Schanz-Haig-Simons (SHS) formula is:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question. In other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding
consumption during the period to "wealth" at the end of the period and
then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning.... Moreover, this gain may be
measured and defined most easily by positing a dual objective or purpose,
consumption and accumulation, each of which may be estimated in a
common unit by appeal to market prices.
SIMONS, supra note 53, at 50.
58 Indeed, Simons characterized the SHS definition as a "measure of the
individual's prosperity." SIMONS, supra note 53, at 206; see also Warren, supra note 47,
at 1085-86 ("The arithmetical process of the Haig-Simons definition should not,
however, obscure the nature of the aggregate tax base, which is the product of the
society's private capital and labor for the accounting period. The Haig-Simons
calculation simply identifies how much of that product has ended up in each taxable
unit.").
59 SHS is principally based on the ability-to-pay concept. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 31; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS,
supra note 39, at 7; William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,
86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 326-29 (1972) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Deductions];
Dodge, Theories, supra note 43, at 450; see also Joseph M. Dodge, What's Wrong with
Carryover Basis Under H.R. 8, 91 TAx NOTES 961, 971 (May 7, 2001) (suggesting that
the assignment-of-income doctrine, a core principle of the U.S. federal income tax,
may be based on the ability-to-pay concept). Consistent with the principle of ability-
to-pay, the consumption element of SHS is measured in objective, market-based
terms. See Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and
the Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAx L. REV. 215,223-24 (1990).
60 See supra text accompanying notes 42-46; see also Infanti, Tax Equity, supra
note 44.
61 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 30 ("[A]s long as we are operating
an income tax, it is important to understand how the tax system's definition of income
compares to the 'true' measure of income."); Hanna, supra note 52, at 448-49; Stanley
A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAx L. REV. 679,
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To be sure, the SHS concept has not prevented the income tax
from acquiring a mass of incoherent special pleading provisions. 12
Moreover, SHS is not the exclusive criterion of good tax policy. It
must be weighed against other considerations such as enforceability,
administrability, economic efficiency, simplification, revenue yield,
and governmental effectiveness. Nevertheless, the SHS definition
does provide a principled structure that is useful for testing the
efficacy of tax provisions and opposing bad tax policy.
The interesting point to be made here, however, is that because
SHS derives from the ability-to-pay principle and because Surrey
explicitly used SHS as the first step in constructing his TEA income
baseline,63 TEA must also be rooted in the ability-to-pay concept.
Consequently, it is puzzling to find that Surrey rejected ability-to-pay
as a justification for TEA.64 The apparent explanation is that Surrey
wanted the deductions for medical expenses and charitableS 6'
contributions to be classified as tax expenditures and he saw this
objective as threatened by the fact that some commentators regard
these items as reflecting decreased ability-to-pay and, therefore,
66properly removed from the SHS baseline. Surrey's concern has
diminished in practical importance with respect to medical expense
deductions because the applicable 7.5% of adjusted gross income
683 (1988) ("[The SHS] definition has become the generally accepted foundation for
modern day, normative analysis of the meaning of income as a base for personal
taxation."). But see Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated
Depreciation - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1979).
62 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 31-53; Steuerle, Consensus, supra
note 50, at 372 ("What has essentially happened to the tax policy process in recent
decades is that it has increasingly adopted many of the bad habits of the expenditure
policy process.").
63 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 3-4, 186-87;
see also Goldberg, supra note 34, at 26 ("The basic premise of this view rests on the
current tax system being an income tax and income for these purposes being defined,
consistent with the generally accepted Haig-Simons definition, as personal
consumption plus increase in wealth ... "). The Surrey baseline did, however, include
modifications of and supplements to the SHS definition. See SURREY & MCDANIEL,
TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 186-92.
64 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 188, 284-85
n.12.
65 Id. at 205-06.
66 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 21; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 188, 205, 284-85 n.12.
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floor67 and the narrowing of the statutory definition of qualifying
medical expenses have made them available only to a small group of
68
taxpayers.
More fundamentally, regardless of Surrey's reason for resisting a
linkage between ability-to-pay and TEA, his position is not well-
founded because income is the generally recognized measure of
ability-to-pay and SHS, which Surrey saw as the first step in defining
the TEA baseline, is generally recognized as the theoretically correct
definition of income. ° Consequently, TEA should be regarded as a
necessary extension of the ability-to-pay principle in spite of Surrey's
objection.
The linkage between ability-to-pay and TEA can be illustrated by
again considering the example in Part II regarding tax-exempt
interest. Interest paid on bonds issued by state and local governments
confers ability-to-pay on the interest recipients just as effectively as
taxable interest paid on corporate bonds. Thus, the ability-to-pay
principle dictates that interest on state and local government bonds
belongs in the tax base and that Congress's exclusion of that interest is
an elective deviation from the ability-to-pay standard.71 Once that
67 See I.R.C. § 213(a).
68 Of the individuals who filed income tax returns for 2004, only 7.2% claimed
medical expense deductions. See Michael Parisi & Scott Hollenbeck, Individual
Income Tax Returns, 2004, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOI BULL., FALL 2006, at
8, 11 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04indtr.pdf.
69 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 31; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 6-7; Richard A. Musgrave, Fairness in
Taxation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 136.
70 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 31; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 7; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at
28; Andrews, Personal Deductions, supra note 59, at 326-29; Hanna, supra note 52, at
436. Professor Thomas Griffith has criticized Surrey's TEA model on the grounds that
it lacks any normative foundation because it adopts the SHS definition of income as
the baseline without providing sufficient justification for doing so. See Griffith, supra
note 11, at 363-66. As indicated in the text above, we believe that the ability-to-pay
principle provides that justification.
71 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 124 (stating that the exemption for state and local bond interest is
"an incentive for investment in public infrastructure .... [s]imilar to preferences for
home ownership, charitable giving, and health coverage .... ); 1 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 135 ("The exemption of this interest is inconsistent
with a comprehensive income tax."); U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23,
at 84 ("The annual receipt or accrual of interest on State and local obligations
unquestionably increases the taxpayer's opportunity to consume, add to wealth, or
make gifts. It is, therefore, properly regarded as a source of income."); Andrews,
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analytical bridge is crossed, the conclusion that the interest exclusion
72
results in forgone revenue is inescapable. This conclusion requires an
analytical tool to account for and evaluate the consequences of the
forgone revenue in terms reflecting the interest savings of the bond
issuers. The application of TEA to the example in Part II shows that
the forgone revenue is effectively transferred by the federal
government to the bond issuers with the same impact as a cash grant.
More generally, the Part II example illustrates that TEA functions as
a necessary consequence of, and adjunct to, the ability-to-pay
principle with respect to all provisions that deliver subsidies or
incentives by carving out (through deductions, exclusions, credits, or
deferral provisions) items that properly belong in the base of an
ability-to-pay-grounded income tax.
B. Neutrality
A second major tax policy principle is that, to the greatest extent
possible, tax provisions should achieve neutrality - i.e., taxpayer
behavior should be altered as little as possible from what it would be
in the absence of a particular tax provision.73 Incentives and subsidies,
including tax expenditures, enhance the after-tax economic returns
from affected activities and cause taxpayers to engage in those
activities to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case,
interfering with the free market's allocation of resources.74 The late
Professor Walter Blum stated this point as follows:
A more classical line of attack on special dispensations
under the income tax is that they cause a misallocation of
economic resources. By taxing (and thus penalizing) certain
Personal Deductions, supra note 59, at 376-77; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 210 ("[T]he
contrast between the tax treatment of municipal bond interest and other interest
makes no sense in purely distributional terms.").
72 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 13 ("A tax expenditure is a tax incentive .... Many of these tax
incentives could have been structured as a direct government spending program.
Either way, it costs the government money to provide benefits, which must be
financed with higher taxes elsewhere.").
73 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 13; SLEMROD &
BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 131-35.
74 See Carroll Testimony, supra note 51, at 3; GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT,
supra note 1, at 49-50; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM,
PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 70-72; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 218; Toder,
supra note 8, at 362.
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activities less than others the preferential provisions - so the
argument goes - cause more resources to flow into these
endeavors than would be attracted if the tax system were
perfectly neutral, and as a result scarce resources are utilized
in less productive combinations. I concur in the soundness of
this reasoning.75
Accordingly, the interest exclusion in the example in Part II distorted
free market choices by causing more capital to flow into state and
municipal bonds than would otherwise have been the case.
Before aspects of the tax system that are not neutral can be
evaluated and addressed, however, they must first be identified; a
focused analytical tool is highly useful for that purpose. TEA serves
this end with respect to incentives and subsidies delivered through
income tax provisions. Stated differently, TEA is a device for
identifying features of the tax system which cause taxpayers to pursue
76certain activities more extensively than they otherwise would. Thus,
a legitimate concern for neutrality in the tax system drives the use of
TEA as a tool of sound tax policy.
IV. OTHER CRITICISMS OF TEA
A. Do Implicit Taxes Nullify Concerns Regarding Tax Expenditures?
To the extent that a tax expenditure causes investors to move
more capital into an activity or economic sector than would otherwise
be the case, the before-tax rate of return in the respective activity or
sector will fall from what it would have been in the absence of the tax
expenditure. As explained in Part II, this decline is characterized as an
implicit tax borne by investors who chase the tax expenditure
benefit.77 TEA opponents sometimes make the suggestion that
• 78
implicit taxes substantially mitigate objections to tax expenditures.
75 Blum, Preferential Provisions, supra note 4, at 82; see also Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European
Economic and Social Committee, Dividend Taxation of Individuals in the Internal
Market, at 18, COM (2003) 810 final (Dec. 19, 2003); Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra
note 3, at 23.
76 See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 204.
77 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 75, 230; Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters
and Tax Capitalization, or Does the Early Bird Get A Free Lunch?, 28 NAT'L TAX J.
416 (1975); see also Susan Ackerman & David Ott, An Analysis of the Revenue Effects
of Proposed Substitutes for Tax Exemption of State and Local Bonds, 23 NAT'L TAX J.
397 (1970); Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do
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To examine the implicit tax concept and its possible impact on
TEA, it will be helpful to revisit the example in Part II where
corporate bonds pay 10% interest before tax, the federal income tax
rate is a flat 35%, and interest on state and municipal government
bonds is tax exempt. On these facts, investors are willing to buy state
and municipal government bonds that bear only 6.5% interest because
they see those bonds as equivalent to corporate bonds of equal quality
that pay 10% interest but that require the interest recipients to incur a
35% tax. According to the implicit tax argument, the market-induced
reduction of investors' interest receipts from 10% to 6.5% reflects a
35% implicit tax 9 - the same rate of tax explicitly borne by investors
in corporate bonds that generate taxable interest.
1. Distortion
At this point, a small modification of the example in Part II will
be helpful. Assume that the hypothetical 35% flat rate U.S. income
tax has been operating without an exemption for interest on state and
municipal government bonds, that these governments have been
unable to borrow because they cannot afford the 10% market rate
interest cost, that Congress decides to assist these governments by
subsidizing their borrowing costs, and that the federal income tax is
amended to create an exemption for interest on state and municipal
government bonds. The new tax exemption will result in increased
state and municipal government borrowing at 6.5%, and investors in
state and municipal government bonds will bear the 35% implicit tax
illustrated in Part II, but only to the extent that state and municipal
governments respond to the exemption with debt offerings and
investors switch to those debt offerings from taxable bonds and other
taxable investment media. In other words, the implicit tax will occur
with respect to an exemption for interest paid on state and local
government bonds, and with respect to any other form of investment
favored by a tax expenditure, only to the extent that tax expenditures
distort choices by causing more capital to flow to the favored activities
or investments than would be the case without a tax expenditure. 8°
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979) [hereinafter
Bittker, Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?].
78 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 418.
71 (0.10 - 0.065) + 0.10 = 0.35. See also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 75.
80 See Johnson, Thermometer, supra note 26, at 17; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that the expansion of economic
activities favored by tax incentives "may occur at the expense of other economic
[Vol. 27:437
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As a result, implicit tax reasoning does not negate, and indeed
confirms, the validity of the neutrality objection to tax expenditures.
Of course, this objection can be overcome by, for example,
demonstrating that a particular tax expenditure counterbalances some
other distortion caused by the tax system or corrects a market
failure.81 Thus, contrary to the assertion of some TEA critics,
characterization of an Internal Revenue Code (Code) provision as a
tax expenditure does not end the inquiry concerning whether the
provision can be justified on efficiency grounds. Nevertheless, implicit
tax analysis shows that tax expenditures enter into the cost/benefit
scrutiny described below with one strike against them because they
are facially distortive elements in the tax system.
2. Capture
Tax expenditure theory opponents, however, are willing to live
with this challenge because they see the implicit tax concept as helpful
in overcoming a TEA-based fairness objection to tax expenditures. In
the context of the Part II tax-exempt bond hypothetical that we have
been analyzing, the fairness objection begins by pointing out that
purchasers of tax-exempt bonds will pay no explicit tax on their
interest income while others who earn their income in the form of
wages will incur a 35% explicit tax. This difference, so the fairness
argument goes, is a horizontal inequity that violates the principle of
82
ability-to-pay.
activities, and the value of what is lost can exceed the value of what is gained,
reducing the overall value of society's output of goods and services").
81 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX EXEMPTIONS AND INCENTIVES FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION 29-30 (Joint Comm. Print 2006) (arguing that federal education
subsidies, including tax expenditures, may be necessary to offset market failure
regarding positive externalities of education and to achieve egalitarian goals); U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 8 (suggesting that tax incentives
may be justified if the additional economic activity encouraged by the tax incentives is
warranted by spillover effects or externality considerations); Sullivan, Tax Incentives,
supra note 3, at 23-24; Zelinsky, The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, supra note 11
(positing an economic efficiency defense of tax expenditures in many cases); see also
Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 675,
683-87 (1985) (discussing three economic efficiency reasons for using tax
expenditures).
82 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 84. A deceptively
attractive response is that because anyone can buy a tax-exempt bond and receive tax-
exempt interest, the interest exemption does not violate the horizontal equity
component of the ability-to-pay principle. This argument, however, has at least two
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The conventional response to this argument is that, as illustrated
83in Part II, the bond purchasers are paying a 35% implicit tax equal to
the 35% explicit tax on the wage earners. This is the case despite the
fact that the implicit tax borne by the interest recipients is effectively
earmarked for a particular federal government purpose - assisting
state and municipal governments by reducing their borrowing costs.
As a result, the interest exemption might represent a poor policy
decision for various practical reasons,84 but not because it creates
inequity between tax-exempt bondholders and taxpayers who earn
flaws. First, investors can purchase tax-exempt bonds only to the extent that they have
savings and savings are heavily concentrated among the wealthy and relatively scarce
among other Americans. See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Inequality,
Populism, and Democratic Tax Policy, 114 TAX NOTES 16, 17-18 (Jan. 8, 2007) ("[In
2004,] [t]he least wealthy 50 percent of households held only 2.5 percent of the
nation's wealth. Meanwhile, the wealthiest 10 percent held nearly 70 percent."); see
also Thomas L. Hungerford, Income Inequality and the U.S. Tax System, 117 TAX
NOTES 465, 467 (Oct. 29, 2007) (reporting that in 2004, household income at the 90th
percentile was 11.2 times household income at the 10th percentile); Barry W. Johnson
& Brian G. Raub, Personal Wealth, 2001, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOI
BULL., WINTER 2005-06, at 120 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/01pwart.pdf (in 2001, the wealthiest 3.5% of the U.S. population held 32.7% of the
total U.S. net worth). Thus, the opportunity to buy section 103 bonds is not equally
available. See Gerald Prante, Comparing Popular Tax Deductions to the Bush Tax
Cuts, TAX FOUNDATION (July 21, 2007), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/
publications/show/22447.html (70.5% of the benefit of the section 103 exemption is
received by the top 10% of the individual income earners). Second, the exemption is
worth more to upper-income taxpayers with a high marginal rate than to lower-
bracket taxpayers. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 84. This bias
of the section 103 exemption and numerous other tax expenditure provisions in favor
of high-income taxpayers causes these provisions to be sometimes referred to as
"upside-down subsidies." See, e.g., Gerard M. Brannon, Tax Expenditures and Income
Distribution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Upside-Down Subsidy Argument, in
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, supra note 6, at 87. For a defense of the "upside-down
effect" of tax subsidies in certain cases on both efficiency and equity grounds, see
Zelinsky, The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, supra note 11, at 1025-26, 1031-32. For
a critique of the argument that tax expenditures undermine progressivity, see Griffith,
supra note 11, at 352-60.
In a recent article, three proponents of using the tax system to achieve
nonrevenue raising social objectives have proposed ameliorating the upside-down
effect of tax incentive provisions by converting exclusions or deductions for such
social objectives into uniform refundable tax credits. See Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T.
Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for
Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006).
8' See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 75.
See generally SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 228-30; Johnson,
Thermometer, supra note 26, at 17.
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their income in taxable forms. On the facts of the example in Part II,
the implicit tax borne by the bond purchasers fully eliminates any
85inequity between wage earners and recipients of exempt interest.
TEA opponents would then be inclined to argue that, like the
exemption for interest paid on state and municipal government bonds,
all tax expenditures that function as a subsidy or incentive with
respect to an income producing activity cause investors to move more
capital into the favored activities than would otherwise be the case.
This shift in turn causes a decline in the before-tax rate of return for
those activities and, as the argument goes, imposes an implicit tax that
mitigates, or perhaps eliminates, the horizontal equity objection with
respect to all such tax expenditures. Although this line of analysis
would not apply to tax expenditures that lack a connection to income
producing activities or investments, such as the extra standard
deduction for the aged and the blind s6 it would reach the many tax
expenditures that are designed to favor particular forms of income
production.
The preceding argument is seriously impaired, however, if the tax
expenditure benefit does not move primarily to its target, i.e., if the
tax expenditure is captured to a significant extent by nontargets. Such
capture does occur and can be illustrated by slightly but critically
modifying the example in Part II. Assume that the federal income tax
has two rates - 35% and 10% - and that state and municipal
governments cannot meet their financing needs by selling tax-exempt
bonds exclusively to taxpayers whose marginal rate is 35% (the high-
bracket investors). Indeed, assume that one quarter of the bonds must
be sold to taxpayers whose marginal rate is 10% (the low-bracket
investors). Those taxpayers will not regard the tax-exempt bonds as
equivalent to taxable corporate bonds paying 10% interest unless the
exempt bonds pay at least 9% interest. This is 2.5 percentage points
higher than the 6.5% interest rate necessary to attract the high-
bracket investors8 but there is no practical way to segment a tax-
exempt bond offering by selling 6.5% interest bonds to the high-
85 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 39, at 215-16; see also Martin J. Bailey,
Progressivity and Investment Yields under U.S. Income Taxation, 82 J. POL. ECON.
1157, 1174 (1974) ("Apparent horizontal inequities as a rule shake out in competitive
resource allocation and translate into misuse of resources."); Bittker, Do
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, supra note 77, at 739-42.
86 See Bittker, Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, supra note 77, at 746.
87 A low-bracket investor who buys a corporate bond paying 10% taxable
interest will have 9% interest after paying the applicable 10% tax.
See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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bracket investors and 9% interest bonds to the low-bracket investors.
Thus, all the bonds issued by state and local governments in this
scenario must pay 9% interest and all the buyers will bear an implicit
tax limited to the 10% difference between the 10% taxable interest
available on corporate bonds and the 9% tax-exempt interest
available on state and municipal government bonds. Most
importantly, the borrowing cost of the tax-exempt bond issuers,
presumably the intended beneficiaries of this tax subsidy/tax
expenditure, will be reduced only from 10% to 9%.
These facts are unobjectionable on equity grounds with respect to
the low-bracket investors because their 10% implicit tax equals the
10% explicit tax paid by low-bracket wage earners.89 Moreover, the
situation in the case of the low-bracket investors is, in fact, the same as
if the exempt bonds had paid 10% taxable interest and the federal
government had received a 10% tax (equal to the 10% implicit tax) on
that interest and used it to fund subsidy payments that reduced the
tax-exempt bond issuers' net borrowing cost by 10% (from 10% to
9%). In other words, the tax expenditure with respect to the low-
bracket investors inures fully to the intended beneficiaries - the
exempt bond issuers.
As shown in Part II, however, the high-bracket investors would
have been willing to buy the tax-exempt bonds even if they had paid
only 6.5% interest. Stated differently, the high-bracket investors were
willing to bear an implicit tax of 35%, which would have exactly
equaled the 35% explicit tax that the government lost with respect to
those investors because of the exemption. Because the income tax in
this hypothetical has two rates and there is a shortage of high-bracket
investors, those investors are able to buy tax-exempt bonds paying the
9% rate of interest necessary to attract the low-bracket investors.
Consequently, the high-bracket investors suffer only a 10% implicit
tax burden and are able to avoid twenty-five percentage points of
implicit tax. Thus, there is inequity to the extent that high-bracket
investors, who bear an implicit tax of only 10%, and high-bracket
wage earners, who pay a 35% tax on their compensation income,
comprise different groups for reasons other than personal choice.
Moreover, there is also inequity between low-bracket and high-
bracket investors in that the 10% explicit tax avoided by the low-
bracket investors is exactly offset by the 10% implicit tax that they
bear while the high-bracket investors avoid a 35% explicit tax but
bear only the same 10% offsetting implicit tax suffered by the low-
89 See Bittker, Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, supra note 77, at 743-44.
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bracket investors. Most importantly, this analysis shows that there is a
substantial element of waste with respect to the high-bracket investors
because the twenty-five percentage points of implicit tax that they
avoid has no effect on reducing the interest cost of the tax-exempt
bond issuers from 10% to 9%. Thus, the twenty-five percentage points
of implicit tax avoided by the high-bracket investors are simply a
windfall that the high-bracket investors have successfully captured.
9 °
Enough is known about the tax-exempt bond market for us to be
certain that the preceding example reflects reality. That is, state and
municipal bond offerings are in fact too large to be absorbed by the
highest-bracket investors and some must be sold to investors in lower
brackets. 9' Thus, these bonds, as in the preceding example, bear
interest rates set to attract lower-bracket investors with the result that
a substantial portion of the related federal tax expenditure is diverted
from the target beneficiaries and captured by high-bracket investors. 92
There is less precise information available about tax expenditures
related to other income producing activities, but what is known
suggests that the capture phenomenon is widespread among these tax
expenditures.3 At the end of the day, the implicit tax concept does not
90 See id. at 742-44 (characterizing this capture as the "trickle-up
phenomenon"). See generally U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 84;
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 230.
91 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 39, at 216; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note
9, at 230.
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 230.
93 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 8 (suggesting that the HOPE credit "may encourage colleges and
universities to increase tuition, thereby capturing some of the benefit of the credit"),
70-72 (suggesting that the housing industry captures some of the benefits of income
tax provisions designed to help individuals acquire homes); John E. Anderson, Jeffrey
P. Clemens & Andrew R. Hanson, Tax Reform and Incentives to Encourage Owner-
Occupied Housing: Analysis of the President's Tax Reform Panel Recommendation to
Convert the Mortgage Interest Deduction to a Tax Credit 23 (Sept. 19, 2006),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=943062 (concluding that the benefit of the mortgage interest
deduction is significantly captured by taxpayers other than those on the margin
between renting and purchasing and those who are low and moderate income
households seeking to become first-time homeowners); Jane G. Gravelle, Do Tax
Incentives Work?, 111 TAx NOTES 88 (Apr. 3, 2006) (suggesting that various tax
subsidies are subject to the capture problem); Johnson, Thermometer, supra note 26,
at 31 (arguing that because all investments compete for a common pool of capital, the
rate of implicit tax on tax-exempt state and municipal bonds sets the limit on the
implicit tax borne by investors in all tax expenditure-subsidized activities, thus making
all such activities subject to the capture phenomenon); see also Larry D. Singell, Jr. &
Joe A. Stone, For Whom The Pell Tolls: The Response of University Tuition to Federal
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eliminate the horizontal inequities of tax expenditures and its failure
to do so results in substantial waste.
B. Is TEA Relevant to the Formation of Government Policy?
1. The Relevance, or Not, of a Normative Tax Base
As noted above, TEA depends on identifying a normative tax
base94 and, for this purpose, Surrey used the SHS definition of income
with various adjustments and supplements. 95 This aspect of TEA has
spawned sharp controversies over whether particular income tax
provisions are (1) elements of SHS and, therefore, not tax
expenditures, or (2) departures from SHS and, consequently, tax
96
expenditures. Recently, Professors David Weisbach and Jacob
Nussim, expanding on earlier work by Professor Michael Mclntyre, 97
have argued that the question of whether a particular tax provision
deviates from a correctly defined income tax base is an unnecessary
inquiry and a distraction from what should be the controlling issueS 98
regarding tax expenditures. According to Weisbach and Nussim, the
controlling question is whether particular subsidies and incentives are
best operated through the tax system or through some other means
Grants-in-Aid 16 (2005), http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-lsingell/Pell-Bennett.pdf
(concluding that based on a survey of 1554 colleges and universities from 1989 to
1996, there is little evidence that Pell grants are captured by in-state tuition increases
at public universities but that "increases in Pell grants appear to be matched nearly
one for one by increases in tuition" at private universities).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 36-72.
" See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 186-94.
96 See generally Bartlett, The End, supra note 8; Bittker, Accounting, supra note
11; Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal
Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193 (1973) [hereinafter Bittker, Personal
Expenditures]; Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8.
97 Professor Michael McIntyre has argued that instead of attempting to
determine which tax provisions are parts of the normative income tax base and which
are subsidies or incentives that deviate from the norm, policymakers should listen to
the defenders of various tax provisions and apply TEA only to the extent of claims
that the tax provisions in question will produce spending-like benefits. See McIntyre,
supra note 2, at 94-99. This approach will be useful in many cases but it can probably
be circumvented by substituting rhetoric couched in terms of removing tax barriers,
deterrents, and discrimination in place of rhetoric phrased in the language of subsidies
and incentives. See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 47, at 57-88.
98 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 977 ("[T]his focus on definitions
distracts from the underlying substantive arguments surrounding tax expenditures.").
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such as a direct expenditure program administered by a nontax
agency.99 The kernel of their argument is as follows:
The central question... is how to determine the best way
to implement a government program .... It can be
implemented through a direct spending program or through a
tax program. The question is how to make this choice.'0°
... [I]t is hard to see how... [this] should depend on a
definition of income. For example, if we are going to
subsidize medical expenses, whether it is desirable to do so
through the tax system should not depend on whether a
medical expense deduction meets the definition of income.
Debates about the matter seem completely beside the point. 1'
A significant problem with this argument is that to determine
whether a particular government subsidy, such as a deduction for
medical expenses, is best delivered as a direct expenditure or as a
subsidy through the tax system, we need to know the tax system's
content and structure so that we can evaluate the effectiveness of the
tax expenditure alternative and the costs it imposes on the tax
system.' °2 The results of this evaluation must then be taken into
account along with the costs and benefits of the direct expenditure
alternative. One way to do this analysis is to assume that the
contemplated tax expenditure would occur in an income tax regime
identical to the present system with its irrational and inefficient load
of tax expenditures. This would distort the analysis, however, because
the systemic costs (in terms of complexity, enforceability, and possible
unfairness) of a proposed tax expenditure would likely appear much
smaller if the tax expenditure were evaluated as just one item among
Id. at 973-76. These commentators frankly admit that this is a difficult and
complex question to answer. See id. at 992-1023.
100 Id. at 961.
101 Id. at 975; see also Shaviro, supra note 8, at 199 ("Where the tax expenditure
debate went off the rails .... was not in its aim of identifying 'special' provisions...
but in its means of doing so, through the identification of a supposedly canonical, yet
in practice under-theorized and rightly controversial, official definition of the
'normative income tax base.'').
102 For example, the windfall enjoyed by high-bracket taxpayers who purchase
tax-exempt bonds, see supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text, cannot be observed
and evaluated unless the progressive rate structure of the income tax is taken into
account.
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many others that were also dubious but that were assumed to be
constant. The analysis called for by Weisbach and Nussim should at
least include an alternative cost/benefit calculation in which the
contemplated subsidy is assumed to be cobbled onto a normatively
correct tax base. From this standpoint, Weisbach's and Nussim's
approach requires that tax expenditures be evaluated in relation to a
normative income definition regardless of their argument to the
contrary. °3 In the present tax policy world, the primacy of the ability-
to-pay principle means that the baseline definition will be SHS.'O°
Perhaps Weisbach and Nussim agree that a normative income
definition, such as SHS, is indeed necessary for purposes of designing
a basic income tax system. They may be arguing that the income
definition is irrelevant only with respect to subsidies and incentives
delivered through that basic system. If this is their contention, we
believe that it misinterprets and undervalues TEA's use of a baseline
definition of income. TEA's focus on determining whether particular
provisions are or are not necessary ingredients in defining an SHS
income tax base is not about fidelity to an academic abstraction. 05 On
103 If a tax system had no normative baseline, there would be no debates over
whether particular tax provisions do or do not fit within an SHS tax and, thus, no
arguments over whether various features are or are not tax expenditures. Instead, we
would look solely to the political process to legitimate or reject tax provisions.
Anything that could pass both houses of Congress and obtain the President's approval
would be acceptable.
There are compelling reasons not to go down this road. As observed by two
leading commentators, "the political system is incapable of distinguishing legitimate
arguments from illegitimate ones and often succumbs to the political clout of
powerful pleaders." SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 218. Thus, without a
normative baseline, tax legislation would "become simply a test of political power,"
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 29, and the tax law would be "simply a hodgepodge of
excises that are not based on any structural tax components." Sugin, supra note 2, at
427. The resulting inequities and inefficiencies would make for an ugly picture and
within that ugly picture, various tax expenditures would look more acceptable than if
they were examined against a normatively correct system. Conversely, "the notion
that taxes should be apportioned among the population according to an intelligible,
reasonable, and acceptable principle .... can constrain unbridled rent-seeking tax
politics." Dodge, Theories, supra note 43, at 460. Thus, identifying a normative
baseline does seem to be an important component of TEA.
104 See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
105 In this respect, we agree with the following statement by one TEA critic:
"[F]idelity to a definition is not the sole test of a good tax system. Its revenue yield,
simplicity, and other characteristics are also important .. " Bittker, Personal
Expenditures, supra note 96, at 213. It is our position that TEA is only one test, albeit
an important test, for evaluating the soundness of provisions within a tax system.
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the contrary, it is about first identifying tax provisions that are
subsidies or incentives, because they are not features that define the
contents of an ability-to-pay tax base (i.e., TEA is concerned with the
transparency of government programs) and then subjecting those
subsidies and incentives to rigorous scrutiny. Stated differently, TEA's
principal function is to serve as the triggering mechanism for
mandatory recasting and cost/benefit analysis that we will now explore
in greater detail.' °6
2. Recasting Tax Expenditures as Direct Expenditures
Weisbach and Nussim might reply that they fully agree with the
need for cost/benefit analysis of tax expenditures but that their focus
on whether a government program should be operated through the
tax system or through the direct expenditure system is, indeed, a form
of cost/benefit analysis and that their approach has the advantage of
bringing us directly to the cost/benefit inquiry without getting
involved in the controversies regarding the normative income
definition that can arise under TEA.' ° The first problem we see with
this argument is that it ignores the usefulness of TEA in deciding
whether a particular tax expenditure is even a credible programmatic
option that merits serious consideration. The importance of this point
can be illustrated by returning to the example of the section 103
exclusion for interest paid on public purpose bonds issued by state and
local governments.
In Part IV.A.2 of this article, we explained that because taxpayers
in the highest marginal income tax rate bracket purchase less than
substantially all of the tax-exempt bonds offered by state and local
governments, these bonds must pay interest at a rate sufficiently high
to attract meaningful numbers of lower-bracket investors. This rate,
however, is higher than necessary to make state and local government
bonds attractive to high-bracket taxpayers. In other words, a
significant part of the tax savings garnered by investors in state and
106 Professors Weisbach and Nusim recognize that TEA triggers heightened
scrutiny. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 974 n.49 ("[T]he principal
consequence of categorizing a program as a tax expenditure is the application of
regular government budgetary analysis and scrutiny."). They seem, however, to
regard this point as unrelated to their concerns.
107 Id. at 1028 ("[T]he purpose of the framework presented in this Article is to
prompt us to question - to reconsider the costs and benefits of our present
institutions and to evaluate whether our present allocations of tasks and functions
across government agencies make sense.").
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local government bonds plays no part in lowering the interest rate on
those bonds, which is the intended purpose for this tax
exemption/subsidy. As a result, a substantial component of the federal
revenue loss from the section 103 exemption is effectively diverted
from the state and local government bond issuers and captured by the
high-bracket investors. Specifically, one study shows that in recent
years only between 10% and 30% of the federal revenue loss with
respect to top-bracket investors inured to the benefit of state and local
governments. The remainder was a windfall reaped by the wealthiest
Americans. 8
Weisbach and Nussim would apparently agree that given these
facts, the tax expenditure in section 103 is wasteful and inequitable.'0 9
Nevertheless, they seem to regard this as irrelevant because it sheds
no light on what for them is a substantially more important question:
assuming that the government has decided to adopt a wasteful and
inequitable subsidy for state and local government borrowers, is the
subsidy best delivered through a tax expenditure or a direct
expenditure? Moreover, their approach to answering this question
seems to depend entirely on weighing the benefits of overall
governmental simplification and coordination that arise from
integrating government programs into the tax system against the
benefits of specialization that result from focusing the tax system on
revenue collection and assigning other government programs to
expert nontax bureaucracies. Weisbach and Nussim apparently regard
TEA as substantially unilluminating for this purpose. Specifically,
they state that:
In contrast to... [the comprehensive tax base and tax
expenditure theories], which focus on taxation, our theory
focuses on institutional design - the question of how the
government chooses to compartmentalize its functions. It is
entirely irrelevant whether some piece of government policy
complies with independent tax norms. If the underlying policy
is held constant, there are no effects of putting a program into
or taking a program out of the tax system even if doing so
hurts or enhances traditional notions of tax policy. Welfare is
the same regardless of whether the program is formally part
of the tax system or is located somewhere else in the
108 See Johnson, Thermometer, supra note 26, at 30; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 84.
109 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 967-68.
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government. If we mistakenly look only at the tax system
instead of overall government policy, we will draw the wrong
conclusions. Putting a program into the tax system makes the
tax system look more complicated, but there is unseen
simplification elsewhere. The tax system will seem less
efficient, but the efficiency of government policy is
unchanged.
... The Department of Defense needs highly specialized
operatives, and thus benefits little from coordination with the
revenue collection function. Welfare programs, on the other
hand, may gain much from coordination with tax collection,
and there may be low costs to losing the utility of separate
units that can specialize in each function. The question is one
of tradeoffs between the benefits of specialization on the one
hand and the benefits of coordination on the other.1 °
•.. The key is to assume that a program of some sort will be
implemented so that it is not an option to say that these are
bad ideas and we should do nothing. They may very well be
bad ideas .... The government will, sometimes for the better
and sometimes for the worse, subsidize, penalize, or regulate
various activities, and we must decide how this should be
done."'
... Tax expenditure theory fails to account for the inherent
benefits of integration .... 112
As suggested above, however, this focus overlooks TEA's key
implication that in considering whether to operate a spending regime
"0 Id. at 958-59 (emphasis added). They also say that "the differences that
matter most between tax and direct expenditures [are] the simplification that the tax
system provides on the one hand, and the tailoring and accuracy that direct spending
programs provide on the other." Id. at 982. Professor Weisbach has published a
subsequent article that extends his and Professor Nussim's
"specialization/coordination analysis by adding two additional, related factors:
principal/agent problems and redundancy." David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures,
Principal-Agent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1824 (2006).
. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 963-64 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 982.
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through the tax system, we should first recast the tax expenditure as
an analogous direct expenditure program and then ask whether this
direct expenditure is acceptable. 13 If the answer is negative, then an
equivalent tax expenditure program should be viewed with skepticism.
For example, the direct expenditure analogue of the section 103
exemption for interest on state and local government bonds would be
a program of cash payments divided between governmental borrowers
and wealthy individual investors with the portion received by the
investors being windfalls that cause no reduction in the interest costs
of the governmental borrowers.14 Not only would this be wasteful, it
would also be objectionable from a distributional standpoint because
the windfall payments would go overwhelmingly to high-income
taxpayers. A direct expenditure program displaying these
characteristics of waste and inequity would have little (hopefully no)
chance of being enacted. With these flaws exposed by TEA's
mandatory recasting of the section 103 exemption into a direct
expenditure program, the next question would be whether the
simplification and coordination gains that might result from putting
the program into the tax system - and this is the focus of Weisbach's
and Nussim's analysis - would be large enough to transform an
appalling direct expenditure program into an acceptable tax provision.
The answer is likely no"' but Weisbach and Nussim seem to regard
116the inquiry as unimportant. Instead, they apparently view the issue
of simplification and coordination gains as determinative when we
believe that it should be only one factor in a broader analysis.
113 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 35-39 ("[B]efore we analyze the tax
expenditure program, we must first translate the tax language into expenditure
results."); SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 80-82;
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 26 ("Tax expenditure analysis converts special tax
provisions and tax incentive provisions, whether in the form of exclusions, deductions
or credits, into their economically equivalent spending provisions. In that manner,
those provisions can be analyzed and evaluated more clearly than if buried in the tax
code.").
14 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
115 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 37 ("[A]lmost any of these tax
expenditures is seen as woefully unfair or inefficient when cast as a direct expenditure
program."). If a tax expenditure is unfair, inefficient, or both as a direct expenditure
program, it is difficult to see how transforming it into a tax expenditure makes it a
worthy government program.
116 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 957 ("[T]he decision to implement a
'nontax' program through the 'tax system' has little or nothing to do with tax policy.
Instead, the tax expenditure decision,... or the decision to combine tax and spending
programs, is solely a matter of institutional design.").
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3. The Suspect Status of Tax Expenditures and the Need for
Compulsory Identification
We see a second difficulty with Weisbach's and Nussim's
contention that they can skip over the question of whether a tax
provision is or is not an element of a normatively correct income
definition and move directly to deciding if a contemplated subsidy or
incentive can best be delivered as a tax expenditure or as a direct
expenditure. This difficulty can be explored by considering an
example in their argument involving a tax expenditure for education.
Weisbach and Nussim point out that an education subsidy or
incentive could be provided through either a direct expenditure, a tax
expenditure, or a combination of both and they argue that the only
important question is which of these three approaches provides the
best delivery mechanism."' The principal elements of their argument
are as follows:
[S]uppose that the government wants to provide an education
incentive....
Such a program can be implemented through an
expenditure program that distributes money to individuals
meeting the criteria. The department implementing the
program, say the Department of Education, would have to
create an application process, a certification or audit process
(both for students and schools), a process for handing out
money, and, if appropriate, a process for collecting payments.
Setting up such a program would be complex and would take
significant resources. Alternatively, a similar program could
be implemented through the tax system by allowing
individuals to subtract or add the same amounts to their taxes
(or if their taxes are not sufficient, by requiring the
Department of the Treasury to write a check to the individual
based on a claim made on his tax form). Similar application,
certification, and auditing requirements could be imposed.
The additional requirements imposed on the tax system
would also be significant, making the tax system much more
complex. As a final alternative, the program could be split
between the tax system and another agency, with each agency
providing services related to its expertise and some
117 Id. at 963-64.
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coordination between the operations.
The question is how we should decide which is the better
method of implementing these programs in each of their
circumstances.
118
It is important to note that this approach requires the education
tax expenditure alternative to undergo a certain degree of scrutiny.
That is, it will not be chosen as the subsidy delivery method unless it
appears to work better than either the direct expenditure alternative
or the tax system/nontax agency hybrid. Although this testing seems
to be less rigorous than what is required under TEA, it does mean
that the hypothetical education tax expenditure is exposed to the risk
of being unsuccessfully compared to the alternatives.
Weisbach and Nussim, however, state that in framing their
analysis "we generally will discuss only comparisons between direct
grants and tax subsidies."11 9 We take this to mean that they respect the
distinction between income-defining provisions and provisions that
deliver subsidies or incentives. As a result, they would not require an
education expense deduction to compete against a direct expenditure
alternative or a mixed expenditure/deduction alternative if the
education expense deduction were an element of a normatively
correct income definition. The quintessential example would be a
deduction for the cost of education that keeps the taxpayer up-to-date
in her line of work without causing her to satisfy the minimum
educational requirements for that work and without leading her toS • 120
qualify for a new trade or business. Although such a deduction
subsidizes the acquisition of education in the sense that it lowers the
after-tax cost of the education, the deduction has long been regarded
121 122as income-defining and, therefore, not a subsidy or incentive.
The broader significance of this point is that base-defining tax
deductions and exclusions are not subsidies or incentives to any extent
and are therefore privileged under Weisbach's and Nussim's form of
118 Id. at 961-63.
119 Id. at 964.
120 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967).
121 See, e.g., Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
122 Expenses of earning income are neither consumption nor additions to saving
and, therefore, should be deducted when computing SHS income. See Andrews,
Personal Deductions, supra note 59, at 313; Bittker, Personal Expenditures, supra note
96, at 202-03.
476 [Vol. 27:437
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis
analysis because base-defining provisions do not have to compete
against direct expenditure alternatives. Likewise, base-defining
deductions and exclusions are excused from the high level of scrutiny
that TEA imposes on subsidies and incentives and are also privileged
to that extent.
With respect to TEA, this status of privilege has troubled two
other commentators who are critics of TEA, Professors Douglas Kahn
and Jeffrey Lehman, because it means that under TEA, Code
provisions are subject to radically different burdens of justification
depending on whether they are components of the normative tax base
or deviations and, therefore, tax expenditures. As indicated above, the
normative base-defining provisions (the section 162 business expense
deduction is an example) are accepted without the need for
justification while TEA forces tax expenditure provisions to pass
through recasting and cost/benefit analysis (and Weisbach and Nussim
would require such provisions to compete against direct expenditure
alternatives). Kahn and Lehman object to this disparate treatment
and seem to suggest that all Code provisions should face the same
level of scrutiny. They state that "[t]he tax expenditure budget's
conception of an appropriate tax base has no legitimate claim to
establishing the terms of political debate. It should not immunize
provisions of the code from political discussion, nor should it change
the burden of justification for others."' 23 Presumably, they would
make the same argument with respect to the more limited scrutiny
advocated by Weisbach and Nussim, although their work preceded
Weisbach's and Nussim's by many years and consequently did not
discuss it.
One way to respond to this objection would be to put tax
expenditures and normative base-defining provisions on the same
footing by entirely relieving tax expenditures from any burden of
justification, including the burden advocated by Weisbach and
Nussim. The test of a tax expenditure's legitimacy would then be
whether it could garner sufficient votes to pass both houses of
Congress and get signed into law by the President. No responsible tax
analyst would advocate such an abandonment of principle in favor of
special interest politics124 and Kahn and Lehman are not in favor of
123 Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1663.
124 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 218 ("[T]he political system is
incapable of distinguishing legitimate arguments from illegitimate ones and often
succumbs to the political clout of powerful pleaders."); Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax
and Spending Programs, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1197, 1212 (2006) (opining that the tax
law writing committees are "notorious for pandering to special interests to the
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doing so. Instead, they seem to suggest that normative base-defining
provisions should be scrutinized in the same way as tax expenditures.
Specifically, they state that:
We think democratic debate would be promoted if we
knew how much additional revenue could be gained by
repealing each of the code provisions shown in the various tax
expenditure budgets, as well as who would bear the incidence
of that additional revenue. We think democratic debate
would also be promoted in precisely the same way, however,
if we knew how much additional revenue could be gained
through a host of changes to provisions that are not shown on
the tax expenditure budgets. Most tax provisions, like most
policy judgments, are good only as long as their price tags are
not exorbitant. Here again, the tax expenditure budget hides
that fact by suggesting that certain features of the tax system
are different in kind from others.125
It would be possible to adopt this suggestion and, for example,
require the section 162 and section 212(1) and (2) deductions to pass a
TEA-style recasting and cost/benefit test or the Weisbach and Nussim
126test even though they are costs of earning income. While this is a
useful exercise for students, there would be no point in requiring
detriment of unorganized and diffuse groups"); id. at 1212 n.64 ("There is no reason
to believe that the tax-writing committees are less political than all other
congressional committees and the evidence suggests just the opposite - the tax-
writing committees are the most political of all."); see also STEUERLE,
CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 249-51; Daniel J. Mitchell, Tax
Incentives Work - and That's a Big Argument for the Flat Tax, 111 TAX NOTES 93
(Apr. 3, 2006) ("The tax code is correctly viewed as one of the leading sources of
political corruption in Washington...."); Gene Steuerle, Summers on Social Tax
Expenditures: Where He's Wrong... or at Least Incomplete, 89 TAX NOTES 1639
(Dec. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Steuerle, Summers on Social Tax Expenditures II];
Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyists - How Special Tax Provisions
Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1957). For a contrary view by a TEA critic that
tax institutions are less susceptible to capture by interest groups because of their more
competitive nature and greater visibility, see Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures, supra note 2.
125 Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1664-65; see also Weisbach & Nussim, supra
note 8, at 976-77.
126 Expenses of earning income are neither consumption nor additions to saving
and, therefore, should be deducted when computing SHS income. See Bittker,
Personal Expenditures, supra note 96, at 202-03; Andrews, Personal Deductions,
supra note 59, at 313.
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others to join in because the answer almost always would be that
denying deductions for income producing costs (i.e., operating the
income tax as a tax on gross income) would yield unacceptable
inequities and distortions 127 unless the government refunded all tax
collected with respect to income producing costs. That approach
would, however, involve a circular flow of money that seems pointless
when compared to a net income tax that allows deductions for the
costs of earning income. In our view, deductions for these and the
other normative base-defining costs of a net income tax will almost
always pass TEA-style recasting and cost/benefit scrutiny as well as
Weisbach's and Nussim's analysis and there is no point in putting
128them through either test.
More importantly, there seems to be little practical interest in
eliminating the burden of proof difference between normative base-
127 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATIVE, AND
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE ASPECTS OF A GROSS INCOME TAX (1989). One exception to
this conclusion might be provisions such as section 67, which do limit the deduction
for certain costs of producing income (e.g., unreimbursed employee business expenses
that are deductible under section 162), on the grounds of reducing compliance and
administrative burdens. Such provisions might be viewed as appropriate tax penalty
or negative tax expenditure provisions because their benefits (e.g., reduced
compliance and administrative costs for both the taxpayers and the government)
exceed the costs of the inequities and distortions caused by disallowing otherwise
legitimate income producing expenses that do not exceed the deduction floor. Some
commentators (including one of the authors of this article), however, have argued
that such provisions are not appropriate elements of a properly designed income tax
system. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for
Structural Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005); Robert
J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income Tax
System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415 (May 28, 2001).
128 It is true that the progressive rate structure gives the deduction for these costs
an upside-down effect because the resulting tax savings of high-bracket taxpayers are
a greater percentage of deducted costs than is the case for deductions by low-bracket
taxpayers. The denial of deductions for income producing costs, however, would
amount to imposing a tax penalty, see SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra note 2, at 80, thereby causing an economic distortion. See Bittker, Personal
Expenditures, supra note 96, at 199. On the other hand, replacing the deductions for
income producing costs with credits would be problematic because setting the credit
rate at the highest marginal rate would give lower-bracket taxpayers a windfall
(indeed, they would be tax expenditure beneficiaries) and setting the credit rate at
any level below the highest marginal rate would effectively penalize top-bracket
taxpayers. See generally id. at 209. Moreover, the upside-down effect of allowing
deductions for income producing costs "merely confirms [the fact] that the rate
structure is progressive." Id. at 208. On balance, the allowance of deductions for
income producing costs is the best approach.
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defining provisions and tax expenditures by subjecting the former to
the same degree of scrutiny as the latter. This likely reflects an
intuitive judgment that if a Code provision effectively transfers federal
money to private beneficiaries, it requires a higher level of
justification than a provision that is a necessary element of a
normatively correct tax base. 1
9
For all these reasons, it remains and it is likely to remain the case
that normative base-defining provisions occupy a comparatively
privileged position under TEA because they are self-justifying and
that this would also be true if the Weisbach and Nussim approach
were adopted. By contrast, tax subsidies and incentives that are not
elements in defining the normative tax base are "presumptively
suspect"'3° and required to endure heightened scrutiny under both
TEA 131 and, to a lesser extent, the Weisbach and Nussim approach.
This conclusion leads us back to Professors Weisbach and Nussim
and their suggestion that the question of whether a tax subsidy or
incentive is a deviation from the normative tax base is irrelevant.
Advocates of tax incentives and subsidies know that the rigorous
scrutiny required by TEA is often toxic to their interests and they
would immediately recognize that even the lower bar imposed by the
Weisbach and Nussim approach presents a risk that their pet
provisions might go down. Thus, in the present world of TEA,
taxpayers have resisted having tax subsidies that benefit them
identified as departures from the normative baseline132 and they would
surely continue to do so if the Weisbach and Nussim approach were
adopted.
129 See Leonard E. Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 56
NAT'L TAX J. 613, 614 (2003) ("The purpose of the tax expenditure estimates is to
subject spending programs administered through the tax code to the same
Congressional scrutiny and control as direct expenditures."); Sullivan, Tax Incentives,
supra note 3, at 26 ("If, however, lobbyist-legislator-advocates claim that tax breaks
provide a tax incentive, the tax break must be held to a higher standard: Does the tax
incentive help the economy?... [It does] if its economic benefits outweigh its
economic costs.").
130 See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 26. As aptly stated by one leading tax
economist: "The burden of proof, in effect, always remains with the advocates for
discrimination." Steuerle, Consensus, supra note 50, at 371.
131 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 974 n.49 ("Following the goal of
Surrey's work, the principal consequence of categorizing a program as a tax
expenditure is the application of regular government budgetary analysis and
scrutiny.").
132 See Sugin, supra note 2, at 417-18.
[Vol. 27:437480
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis
For example, U.S. tax on foreign active business income is
generally deferred until the income is repatriated to the United
States133 whereas all other business income earned by U.S. residents
bears a current U.S. tax. Accordingly, Surrey characterized this type
of deferral as a tax expenditure1 4 and we will expand on that point in
Part VI. Nevertheless, defenders of tax deferral for foreign business
income have argued that because it is based on the separateness of
corporations and shareholders, it is a component of a normatively
correct income tax base and, therefore, not exposed to the scrutiny
that goes with tax expenditure characterization.3 This illustrates how
the privileged status of base-defining provisions produces conflicts
over whether particular features of the tax system are elements of a
normatively correct tax base or are tax expenditures. The same
dynamic would be present under the Weisbach and Nussim approach.
Promoters and defenders of tax subsidies and incentives also
resist tax expenditure classification for at least two process-related
' See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION - PROPOSALS ON
UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF
UNITED STATES PERSONS 171-72 (1987) [hereinafter ALl, INTERNATIONAL TAX
STUDY]; CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH,
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 34-35, 443-44 (3d ed. 2006); 1 JOSEPH
ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND
FOREIGN INCOME 1.12 (3d ed. 2004); 1 JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION B3.01 (1992); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 50;
Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the
U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11,
12, 27-28 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990); Robert J. Peroni, Back to the
Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51
U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 986-87 (1997) [hereinafter Peroni, Back to the Future); Robert
J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing
Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 457 (1999)
[hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral].
13 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 159.
135 See 1 NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE NFTC FOREIGN INCOME
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY - REPORT AND
ANALYSIS 3 n.3 (2001) [hereinafter NFTC, REPORT AND ANALYSIS], available at
http://www.nftc.org/default/tax/fip/FIP%2OPart%201.pdf; see also HUGH J. AULT &
BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 377
(2d ed. 2004); 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 133, 1.12; Ault & Bradford, supra note 133,
at 35; Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational
Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 486-87 (2005); Stanley S. Surrey, Current Issues
in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 826-27
(1956).
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reasons. First, although it is theoretically possible to use sunset
provisions that require tax expenditures to be scrutinized annually,
like most direct expenditures, this is not the usual practice.136 Tax
expenditures typically endure much longer than direct expenditures
before having to be reviewed and justified anew.37 Thus, tax
expenditure beneficiaries are usually more secure in their largesse
than are direct expenditure recipients. For example, Part IV.A.2 of
this article illustrated the wasteful benefit capture consequence of the
section 103 exemption for interest paid on state and municipal
government debt. This problem could be eliminated by abolishing
section 103 and instituting a direct expenditure program under which
138the Treasury sends subsidy checks to governmental debt issuers.
State and local governments, however, strenuously resist this
alternative and it is generally understood that they do so because they
believe that the direct expenditure approach, even if enacted as an
entitlement program like Social Security or Medicare, would be more
vulnerable to budget cutting than the present tax expenditure in
section 103 of the Code. 3 9
A second process-related reason for resisting having tax subsidies
labeled as tax expenditures is that outlays successfully hidden in the
tax system allow politicians to have it both ways. By avoiding direct
expenditures while using tax expenditures that do not appear in media
accounts as "government spending," politicians can simultaneously
136 See generally SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 54-
65; Hin, supra note 33, at 8 n.7. But see WITTE, supra note 1, at 311-35 (concluding
that many of the most controversial tax expenditures undergo frequent and serious
review).
137 See GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 17-18, 68-69; Michael
Brostek, Tax Expenditures Need to Be Reexamined, 111 TAX NOTES 86, 87 (Apr. 3,
2006); Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Expenditures, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 407.
But cf. WrrTE, supra note 1, at 312-17 (maintaining that the presumption that tax
expenditures are rarely modified is "overstated"); Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of
Tax Expenditures, supra note 2, at 1191. Indeed, none of the forty largest tax
expenditures listed in the tax expenditure discussion portion of the Bush
Administration's fiscal 2007 budget is subject to sunset provisions. See 2007
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 296-97.
138 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 85.
139 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 230; see also Johnson, Wrong Way,
supra note 33, at 92 (speculating that if the section 103 exemption were converted into
a direct expenditure program, it would be eliminated "in a budget cycle or two").
State and municipal governments have been generally successful in preventing
substantial reform of section 103 from becoming part of a major tax revision plan. See,
e.g., PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra
note 15, at 124; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 147.
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argue that they are limiting government spending and size but also
providing valuable benefits to constituents and interest groups.140
Thus, the fact that tax expenditure programs lack transparency and
accountability makes them appealing to politicians who are concerned
about being re-elected and need to raise large amounts of campaign
contributions from private interests to do so. This stealth
characteristic of tax expenditure programs is inconsistent with
democratic ideals, and TEA is one tool for helping achieve a more
open and accountable process for enacting governmental programs.
For all of these reasons, under both TEA and the Weisbach and
Nussim approach, interested parties will fight against having their tax
incentives and subsidies classified as such (so as to avoid scrutiny and
frequent review). Consequently, something is needed to compel
identification of deviations from the normative tax base and force
them to undergo examination. Both our and Surrey's version of TEA
provides the necessary device through the principle that departures
from the normative income baseline are tax expenditures. The
Weisbach and Nussim approach, by contrast, disavows the use of any
such device and provides no guidance for situations in which
140 See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 181, 184, 194,
240-41; Hin, supra note 33, at 10-11; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 189, 191, 197; Steuerle,
Summers on Social Tax Expenditures H, supra note 124, at 1639; Toder, supra note 8,
at 361, 370. Professors Weisbach and Nussim make a contrary argument with respect
to this second point. According to them, "if a congressman can fight for either tax
reductions or direct spending, and if constituents perceive direct spending dollars to
be greater than equivalent amounts of tax reductions [that function as tax
expenditures], then the congressman may prefer direct spending." Weisbach &
Nussim, supra note 8, at 971. We concede that this calculation may work with respect
to some constituents. Sophisticated constituents, particularly large corporations,
however, will understand that a dollar of benefit through a tax expenditure is as
helpful as a dollar of direct expenditure benefit. Thus, these important and powerful
constituents will be perfectly happy with the decision to use tax expenditures instead
of direct expenditures and indeed will prefer tax expenditures because of the
comparative lack of transparency and freedom from review that is mentioned in the
text of this article. See Hin, supra note 33, at 35-36 (reporting that a survey of
individual Singapore taxpayers showed that "beneficiaries (particularly, high-income
beneficiaries who stand to gain the most) are more perceptive than non-beneficiaries
of the overall distribution of the tax subsidies"). Moreover, among the
unsophisticated constituents who perceive direct spending dollars to be more valuable
than tax expenditure dollars, there will be many who are favorably impressed by the
reduction in federal expenditures and government size that appear to accompany
substituting tax expenditures for direct expenditures. Thus, it would seem on balance
that there will be a strong preference for using the tax expenditure approach to hide
transfers of government largesse from the voting public and press.
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taxpayers argue that particular provisions that look like tax subsidies
and incentives are actually elements of the normative tax base."'
4. Narrow Versus Broad Cost/Benefit Analysis
We have previously suggested that the Weisbach and Nussim
approach to cost/benefit analysis has an additional problem -
although it is rigorously reasoned, it is also very narrow. To be
specific, it is limited to analyzing the tradeoffs between the benefits of
overall governmental simplification and coordination that come from
integrating government programs into the tax system versus the
benefits of specialization that come from devoting the tax system to
revenue collection while locating other government programs in
nontax agencies. Although that dichotomy is an important piece of
the puzzle, the Weisbach and Nussim approach to cost/benefit analysis
seems to overlook the facts that the primary purpose of the federal
143income tax is to raise revenue for federal government purposes, that
a high degree of voluntary compliance is required for the income tax
to perform this function,'" and that the application of cost/benefit
analysis to any tax expenditure must seriously consider the effects of
its complexities and inequities (if any) on Internal Revenue Service
(Service) treatment of taxpayers and on voluntary taxpayer
141 This same criticism applies to Victor Thuronyi's proposal to replace TEA with
a concept of "substitutable tax provisions." See Thuronyi, supra note 8.
Weisbach and Nussim stipulate that recognizing "the functional equivalence of
putting a program in the tax system or somewhere else" is a "key insight." Weisbach
& Nussim, supra note 8, at 958. They do not, however, seem to see a need for
demanding recognition of this equivalence when a select group of taxpayers,
Treasury, and/or Congress would prefer to ignore it.
142 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 979-82. In a subsequent article,
Professor Weisbach expanded the Weisbach and Nussim analysis to include
consideration of principal-agent problems and redundancy. See Weisbach, supra note
110. He continued, however, to hold to the view that tax policy is irrelevant to this
analysis. Id. at 1824-25.
143 See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 15; Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, The Case for a Consumption Tax, 113 TAX NOTES 373, 375 (Oct. 23,
2006); Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 3, at 22. A different statement of the same
principle is: "[T]he primary.., effect of the [income] tax.., is to reduce private
consumption and accumulation in order to free resources for public use." Andrews,
Personal Deductions, supra note 59, at 313.
1" The overall Internal Revenue Service (Service) audit coverage rate for returns
of individuals has been below 1% for the fiscal years 1997-2006 inclusive. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 2006 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE
RESULTS 3, http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/11-06-enforcement-stats.pdf.
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compliance and the ability of the Service to effectively perform itsS141
examination function. Stated differently, Weisbach's and Nussim's
insistence on ignoring tax policy norms apparently would require
policymakers to disregard the effects on voluntary compliance arising
from any complexities and inequities engendered by tax
expenditures.146 By contrast, TEA provides a cost/benefit framework
within which to answer the question on which Professors Weisbach
and Nussim are focused (simplification and coordination versus
• I. . • 147
specialization) but that also requires a broader inquiry that includes
critical issues, such as distributional fairness, distortive effects, and
148general effectiveness, in addition to coordination, governmental
simplification, and specialization.
5. When Only a Tax Expenditure Can Be Enacted
At this point, we digress from our critique of Weisbach's and
Nussim's work to examine an argument that they did not make but
that can be viewed as distantly related to their analysis. To be specific,
it is well known that following the 1994 Republican takeover of
145 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 9; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ,
THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT Is, How IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE Go
FROM HERE 105-07 (1999); SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2,
at 26-27; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economics and Tax Reform: 1986 and Now, 113
TAX NOTES 362, 363 (Apr. 4, 2006); Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 3, at 22; see
also Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM
L. REV. 395, 425-26 (1987) [hereinafter Yorio, Tax Reform Act of 1986]; Edward
Yorio, The Future of Tax Reform: A Rejoinder to Professor Zelinsky, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 899, 904-05 (1987).
14 Regarding such complexities and inequities, see PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 5; STAFF OF JOINT
ECON. COMM., 109TH CONG., INDIVIDUALS AND THE COMPLIANCE COSTS OF
TAXATION 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2005); SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra note 2, at 107; Blum, Preferential Provisions, supra note 4, at 83; Toder, supra
note 8, at 370.
147 Professors Weisbach and Nussim provide a thoughtful demonstration of how
cost/benefit analysis applies to their focus issue by discussing the possibility of
integrating the food stamp program into the income tax system. See Weisbach &
Nussim, supra note 8, at 997-1023; see also Toder, supra note 8, at 368-69.
141 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 83 ("[T]he Panel believes that.., tax preferences should be treated
like any direct spending program, and should be evaluated by policymakers based on
objective criteria, such as their cost, the distribution of their benefits, overall
effectiveness, and the appropriateness of administering them through the tax
system.").
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Congress, the Clinton administration and Congress collaborated in
using tax expenditures to adopt governmental programs that could not
be enacted via the direct expenditure approach in the then-prevailing
political environment.' Among these tax expenditures were higherS- 150
education tax credits and a child tax credit. This history suggests that
in certain circumstances, tax expenditures can be used to accomplish
worthy governmental objectives that could not otherwise be done
through the legislative system."' The implication is that TEA is badly
flawed in this setting because it is an obstacle to the accomplishment
of desirable goals when a tax expenditure is the only feasible
alternative for enacting the governmental program.152
It strikes us that using this argument to protect a particular tax
expenditure from TEA amounts to an admission that the tax
expenditure is a direct expenditure equivalent and also amounts to a
waiver of any claim that the tax expenditure in question is part of the
normative tax base. More importantly, this argument is not grounds
for excusing the tax expenditure from rigorous cost/benefit analysis;
the "slippery slope" consequence of exempting "good" tax
expenditures from TEA scrutiny is obvious. 53 Instead, if the
cost/benefit analysis described later in Part V of this article shows that
the program truly is desirable, then the fact that a tax expenditure is
149 See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 181-82, 190-96,
206; Christopher Bergin, Civics 2000, 89 TAX NOTES 1501 (Dec. 18, 2000); Martin A.
Sullivan, Tax Expenditure Budget, Now More Than Ever, 86 TAX NOTES 1187 (Feb.
28, 2000) [hereinafter Sullivan, Tax Expenditure Budget].
150 See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 3, at 181,191-93.
151 See generally Steuerle, Summers on Social Tax Expenditures II, supra note
124; Sullivan, Tax Expenditure Budget, supra note 149, at 1188.
152 At the Tax Foundation's November 16, 2000 national conference, then
Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers praised the Clinton administration's
education tax credits and stated that the tax policy community is "'a tad theological in
resisting bringing tax expenditures into the system."' Christopher Bergin, Summers
Says It's Important to Promote "Values" Through the Code, 89 TAX NOTES 994, 994
(Nov. 20, 2000); see also Wiedenbeck, supra note 81, at 688-99 (defending tax
expenditures on the ground that they accomplish worthy governmental objectives that
could not be accomplished through explicit direct expenditure programs due to public
perceptions/political concerns).
153 As stated by one leading commentator, Gene Steuerle: "Over the long run,
politicians who think they are achieving good by hiding what they are doing may end
up with just the opposite result. They breed cynicism among the public, who then
approach government from the standpoint of self-interest ('at least I'll get mine'),
abandon support for government altogether, or became disinterested and fail to
engage in the building up of a better civil society." Steuerle, Summers on Social Tax
Expenditures II, supra note 124, at 1639.
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the only politically acceptable possibility is a relevant consideration in
determining whether to house the program in the tax system or the
direct expenditure system. This consideration, however, should not be
conclusive. Where the Service would be an unacceptably poor
manager of the program or the program would place unacceptable
costs on the tax system, the program should not be adopted as a tax
expenditure even though political considerations make the direct
expenditure alternative unavailable. Sometimes the lesser evil is to
have no program at all.
6. Conclusion
According to Professors Weisbach and Nussim, TEA is faulty
because "the theory ultimately falls back on tax policy for
recommendations. ',1 4 In our view, this is only partially correct as a
description and it is not well-founded as a criticism. TEA does,
indeed, rely on tax policy to determine whether recasting and
cost/benefit analysis should be invoked but we conclude that tax
policy is appropriate for this purpose. Moreover, the cost/benefit
analysis envisioned by TEA is not a pure tax policy exercise. It
involves the integration/specialization tradeoffs that concern
Weisbach and Nussim and other nontax-system issues (such as
whether to have a program at all) as well as tax system concerns (such
as fairness and complexity within the tax system) . In other words,
TEA makes tax policy concerns only one element, but an appropriate
and important element, in this mix.
C. Is TEA a Rule of Automatic Disqualification or Acceptance?
Some critics of TEA have argued that it functions as a rule of
automatic, or nearly automatic, disqualification for all Code
156provisions labeled as tax expenditures. This supposed feature of
TEA is said to give undue weight to the definition of tax expenditure,
particularly in cases where experts disagree over whether provisions
are or are not deviations from the normative baseline. Perhaps the
154 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 958.
155 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 5-6.
156 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 414; Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax
"Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1113 (1973); Blum, Book
Review, supra note 26, at 490; Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1662-63; Shaviro,
supra note 8, at 201-02; Thuronyi, supra note 8, at 1165; Weisbach & Nussim, supra
note 8, at 976.
2008]
Virginia Tax Review
strongest version of this criticism comes from Professors Kahn and
Lehman who said:
What is disturbing about the language of tax expenditures
is its tone of moral absolutism.... [Tihe language suggests
that provisions that fall outside the implicit baseline of the tax
expenditure budget (tax expenditures) are somehow corrupt,
dangerous, and evil. They should be changed as soon as
possible to conform with the "neutral" position. To flirt with
them is to call one's probity into question.
This is, of course, a bit of an overstatement. But it captures
the rhetorical direction of the tax expenditure budget.
15 7
This is not, however, what Surrey said, or what we advocate.
Surrey and his frequent co-author, Professor McDaniel, explained
TEA's desired effect as follows:
The classification of an item as a tax expenditure does not in
itself make that item either a desirable or an undesirable
provision; nor does it indicate whether the inclusion of the
item in the tax system is good or bad fiscal policy. The
classification of an item as a tax expenditure is purely
informative, just as the presence of an item in the direct
budget of a government is informative; it is simply a way of
announcing that the item is not part of the normative tax
structure. This being so, it is appropriate to ask whether the
presence of those items in the tax system is desirable or
undesirable, given the existing budget policy, tax policy, and
other relevant criteria.
15 8
Similarly, the preceding part of this article explains our view that TEA
does not automatically disqualify a tax expenditure program but,
instead, triggers appropriately heightened scrutiny and a serious
cost/benefit analysis of the program."'
Admittedly a large number of tax expenditures are shown to be
unjustified when subjected to the rigorous examination advocated by
157 Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1662-63.
... SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 5--6 (emphasis
added); see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 25-27;
Burman, supra note 129, at 614; Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 3, at 26.
159 See Sugin, supra note 2, at 416-26.
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Surrey and us and that fact has surely caused critics to label TEA as a
rule of automatic, or near automatic, disqualification. That label,
however, is a mischaracterization of Surrey's and our position. The
failure of many tax expenditures to pass muster under the analysis
that we advocate is due to their inherent weakness and not to an
automatic effect of TEA.
Professor Blum argued that the close scrutiny of tax expenditures
that we advocate would have the effect of limiting debate over the
wisdom of various tax law provisions.' 6 We respectfully disagree. If
anything, closer scrutiny will produce more open, robust, and
informed debates about the efficacy of these tax subsidies; that, in
fact, is one of the major benefits of TEA. We fail to see how a lack of
transparency concerning tax subsidy provisions promotes effective tax
policy debate and analysis.
Finally, it should also be noted that a provision that escapes the
tax expenditure label because it fits within the SHS definition of
income is not automatically acceptable. Such a provision must still be
examined in the light of other tax policy criteria, including
enforceability, administrability, economic efficiency, simplification,
and revenue yield.
D. Hidden Agenda?
Some have suggested that Surrey's advocacy of TEA was a
pretext to advance his agenda of a broad-based progressive income
tax.' The validity of this suggestion is uncertain with respect to
progression because Surrey, although concerned about progressive
rates being undermined 16 by tax expenditures that disproportionately
benefit upper-income taxpayers, 6' did not consider the tax
expenditure concept as applying to the personal exemptions or to
those rate brackets that are below the highest rate in the individual
rate tables.'6 Moreover, if the point concerning a broad base is meant
160 See Blum, Book Review, supra note 26, at 490-91.
161 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 414; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 189, 201-
02, 204-05 ("[TEA] seems to be viewed in many circles as logically dubious special
pleading in support of a particular policy agenda.").
162 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 68-72; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 103, 108-11.
163 Le., tax expenditures structured as deductions, exclusions, exemptions, and
deferral of income recognition. See Toder, supra note 8, at 366.
164 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 13; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 185-86, 191-92, 220. For a discussion of this point,
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as criticism, it is a curious reproach in view of the widespread
agreement that the base broadening produced by eliminating tax
expenditures is desirable because it mitigates the distortive effects of
an income tax, particularly if at least some of the revenue produced by
an enlarged tax base is used to finance tax rate reduction."' From this
standpoint, if TEA is a clandestine device for promoting base
broadening, then it is a salutary tool for pursuing a widely shared tax
policy goal.
E. Does TEA Overreach?
TEA has been criticized on a number of grounds for
overreaching. We now examine that critique of TEA.
1. Does TEA Imply That the Government Owns All of Your
Income?
TEA has been the target of a rhetorical flourish created more for
see infra text accompanying notes 178-186. Surrey did, however, regard the rate
brackets below the top corporate rate as tax expenditures. See SURREY & MCDANIEL,
TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 220-22.
161 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., MACROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL TO BROADEN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX BASE AND
LOWER INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES 16 (Joint Comm. Print 2006); U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 7-11, 25; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 2; 1 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at
13-14; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1028T, INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX POLICY: STREAMLINING SIMPLIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL REFORMS ARE
DESIRABLE 21-22 (Aug. 2006); Carroll Testimony, supra note 51, at 3; Alan J.
Auerbach & Kevin A. Hasset, Introduction, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM 1, 2 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin J. Hasset eds., 2005); Bruce Bartlett,
Agenda for Tax Reform, 105 TAX NOTES 1531, 1532-33 (Dec. 13, 2004) [hereinafter
Bartlett, Agenda]; Heidi Glenn, Business Leaders Would Give Up Tax Breaks for
Lower Rates, 116 TAX NOTES 324 (July 30, 2007); Holtz-Eakin, supra note 143, at 375;
Pearlman, No Perfect Tax System, supra note 52, at 113; Joseph A. Pechman, Erosion
of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 2 (1957); Joel Slemrod, My Beautiful
Tax Reform, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 135,144 (Alan J. Auerbach &
Kevin Hasset eds., 2005) [hereinafter Slemrod, Beautiful Reform]; Martin A. Sullivan,
Economic Analysis: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom: Rate Cuts Beat Expensing, 118
TAX NOTES 456 (Jan. 28, 2008); Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 3, at 23; Toder,
supra note 8, at 362; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 967-68; see also Cordia
Scott, U.S. Must Broaden Tax Base, OECD Survey Says, 103 TAX NOTES 295 (Apr.
19, 2004) (stating that base broadening is desirable to produce additional revenue for
federal deficit reduction).
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political speeches and writings than for thoughtful policy analysis. 16
According to this rhetoric, when TEA proponents characterize
narrowly drawn tax reductions67 as the equivalent of direct
government expenditures, the proponents are implicitly arguing that
the government's taxing power gives it a normative claim to all
income earned by U.S. residents and, therefore, that all exclusions,
deductions, credits, and tax rates that reduce income taxation below
100% are transfers of largesse from the Treasury to the tax reduction
beneficiaries.' 68 A typical example of this forensic strategy is the
statement that "lurking behind the concept of the tax expenditure is a
more sinister premise .... It is the subtle disposition to think of all
income as virtual state property, and forbearance to tax away every
last penny of it as itself a tax expenditure.' 69 Although the rhetoric
usually goes no further than this, the intended argument seems to be
that TEA is fatally flawed because it is based on the ridiculous view
that the government's taxing power makes it the a priori owner of all
privately generated income.
This argument, however, cannot withstand scrutiny. First, the
166 See Thuronyi, supra note 8, at 1178 ("Politicians commonly attack the tax
expenditure concept for assuming that our money belongs to the government and that
the government is doing us a favor by not taxing it.").
167 These are tax reductions that are limited to particular activities, income
sources, or taxpayers. See authorities cited supra note 3.
168 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 106TH CONG.,TAx EXPENDITURES: A
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 9 (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT ECON.
COMM., REVIEW]; Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 419; Thuronyi, supra note 8, at
1178; The $91 Billion Loophole, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1975, at 22; see also Heidi
Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax Expenditures List, 91 TAX NOTES
535 (Apr. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Glenn, Questions]; Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit
Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis, Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a
Collective Identity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 740-41 (2005); Zelinsky, The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, supra note 11, at 979. One commentator has
characterized this argument against TEA as "peculiar." See Burman, supra note 129,
at 620.
169 Charles Fried, Whose Money Is It?, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1995, at C7; see also
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax
Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 896-97 (2002)
("[S]ome people believe that the Bush Administration's wording in the [2002 fiscal
year] budget [referring to 'so-called' tax expenditures 'of questionable analytical
value'] has an ideological basis reflecting a concern that 'the rhetoric [of the tax
expenditure concept] suggests it's the government's money and not the people's
money."') (quoting Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax
Expenditure List, 91 TAX NOTES 535 (Apr. 23, 2001) (quoting statement of Joel
Friedman, senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities)).
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federal government could never acquire actual ownership, through the
tax system, of all income earned by U.S. residents unless Congress
used its taxing powers to impose a generally applicable federal income
tax with a single rate of 100%. The extremely attenuated possibility
of such legislation171 derives from Article I of the United States
Constitution, which confers on Congress the general power to "lay
and collect Taxes," and from the Sixteenth Amendment thereto,
which specifically allows Congress to impose "taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States., 173 Neither of these delegations of authority is explicitly
capped, although in some cases such authority may be limited by
other provisions in the Constitution. TEA, however, cannot be
interpreted as implying that this taxing power makes the federal
government the owner of all income earned by U.S. residents unless
TEA can be fairly understood as asserting that Congress has a
normative obligation to adopt a generally applicable income tax and
that 100% is the normatively correct rate for such a tax. 174 TEA does
17'
not, however, require the enactment of an income tax and it does
not, in fact, prescribe any particular level of generally applicable
income taxation as normatively correct. 116 Moreover, TEA does not
170 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 61.
171 There is a very close to zero probability of such an outcome ever occurring
given that, for many years, the total U.S. tax burden imposed by all levels of
government has been confined within a range between 25% and 30% of GDP, see
Jeffrey Owens, Fundamental Tax Reform, An International Perspective, 59 NAT'L TAX
J. 131, 134 (2006), and total federal revenues have averaged less than 20% of GDP.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE xi
(Aug. 2006). Enactment of a 100%-rate income tax would be tantamount to political
suicide for the members of Congress who voted for it and would be economically
disastrous because it would effectively destroy any incentive for work effort and
wealth accumulation. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the
State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1246-47 (2004)
[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State]. Professor Reuven Avi-
Yonah also has suggested that a federal income tax imposed at a 100% rate could be
treated as an unconstitutional "taking." Id. To date, however, the Supreme Court has
generally rejected Takings Clause challenges to tax provisions. See Eduardo Moises
Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2198-2204 (2004).
172 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
173 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
174 See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 204.
175 There is a strong normative case in favor of an income tax, but it rests on the
ability-to-pay concept, coupled with the valuation difficulties associated with wealth
taxes, and not on TEA.
176 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 61, 191-92.
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dictate that revenue gained by eliminating tax expenditures must be
spent by the federal government. Indeed, TEA has nothing to say
about whether such revenue should be used for direct expenditure
purposes or to pay for tax rate reductions.'
Indeed, some critics have charged that TEA is logically flawed
because it does not take a normative position with respect to the
generally applicable rate or rates under an income tax on individuals.
For example, Professors Kahn and Lehman have asked, "Why isn't
the existence of marginal rates below the highest marginal rate a tax
expenditure?"1
78
A useful way to respond to this is to hypothesize a generally
applicable progressive rate table, say 10%, 20%, and 30%. We can
then ask two alternative versions of Kahn's and Lehman's question:
(1) Why is the existence of the two marginal rates above the 10%
marginal rate not a tax penalty or negative tax expenditure (as often
charged by critics of progression) and (2) Why is the rate below the
20% middle rate not a tax expenditure and why is the rate above the
middle rate not a tax penalty?
There is no objective or normative basis for arguing that Kahn's
and Lehman's question, or either of our alternative versions, is the
correct inquiry because there is no objective or normative basis for
arguing that the 10% rate, the 20% rate, or the 30% rate establishes
the baseline from which the other two hypothetical rates are
departures. For this reason, TEA is largely agnostic with respect to
generally applicable rates.
This is not to say that there are no normative guides with respect
to income tax rates. For example, low tax rates that are targeted at a
particular activity, investment, or taxpayer group are not part of the
normative baseline for TEA purposes. 79 Moreover, regressive rates
would violate the ability-to-pay principlels° unless there were
offsetting features in the overall tax system or the governmental
expenditure system. 18 Thus, regressive rates would not ordinarily be a
177 See Burman, supra note 129, at 621 (pointing out that revenue gained from
eliminating or reducing tax expenditures was used to pay for the dramatic, but
revenue neutral, income tax rate reductions adopted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986);
Hungerford, supra note 51, at 327 (same).
178 Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1664.
179 For further discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.E.2.
180 See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 62.
181 As stated by one commentator: "An apparently regressive tax system may be
mitigated by increased spending benefits for lower-income households." Donald
Phares, Tax Equity Analysis, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 401; see also Fried,
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feature of the normative baseline for TEA purposes. Conversely, the
broad societal consensus in favor of progressive rates makes some
degree of progression an element of the normative baseline.82
Finally, it has been argued that income tax rates should be high
enough to provide "adequate" funding for government183 - a
normative position that gives extremely broad leeway to
policymakers. Within these rather loose parameters, however, TEA
regards the adoption of taxes and the setting of generally applicable
rates of tax as policy matters properly controlled by Congress and
TEA functions within the boundaries set by Congress's choices on
those points, whatever they might be.' 84 In other words, once a
decision is made to have a tax on income, the ability-to-pay concept
and other principles set normative parameters for the tax base, but the
choice of a general rate, or table of general rates, applied to the tax
base is largely free of normative constraints. Thus, if Congress
selected a generally applicable U.S. federal income tax rate of only
1%, TEA would have nothing to say about that rate choice but, in that
setting, TEA would apply the tax expenditure label to provisions of
the tax statute that imposed a less than 1% rate on discrete classes of
income.' 86 The larger point, however, is that because TEA does not
advocate the adoption of any particular form or general level of
taxation, it cannot fairly be characterized as implying that the
Puzzling Case, supra note 44, at 182-83; Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 3, at 23-
24.
182 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 49; Carroll Testimony, supra note 51; Hungerford, supra note 51, at
329.
'83 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 184 ("[T]ax policy should be
dictated ... by the joint aims of financing public goods at the right level and securing
social justice .... ); Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based
on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 680-93 (2006) (arguing that Judeo-
Christian ethics require a tax system that raises sufficient revenue to guarantee access
to minimum subsistence and adequate education, healthcare, and housing);
Hungerford, supra note 51, at 329 ("[A] tax system should raise adequate revenue to
run the government and meet the needs of the governed.").
184 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 17; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 191-92.
1 As stated by one commentator: "Only the political process can ultimately
decide such issues when there is a range of 'reasonable' compromises, as when basic
principles by themselves do not really tell us how stimulative, progressive, or revenue-
raising a tax system should be." Steuerle, Consensus, supra note 50, at 372.
186 See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 204.
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congressional taxing power makes the federal government the owner
of all income generated by U.S. residents. 87
In addition, Congress's constitutionally authorized income taxing
powers are not self-executing. Legislative action on the part of a
Congress and President elected by "we the people" is required before
the federal government has any specific claim to any part of the
income earned by U.S. residents. In that sense, the federal tax burden
is imposed by the voters upon themselves and a high-marginal-rate
income tax would be a self-inflicted wound that could not be
attributed to TEA.
Finally, let us again consider the example in Part II regarding the
exclusion for interest received on bonds issued by state and local
governments. Although that interest is exempt from tax, it confers
ability-to-pay on recipients to the same extent as taxable interest paid
by private debtors such as corporations and banks. This requires the
conclusion that the interest exclusion in the example in Part II is a
stark deviation from the kind of tax that Congress has chosen to
impose - a tax on income defined principally in terms of ability-to-
pay. Only at this point does TEA become relevant and its effect is
limited to (1) demonstrating that Congress has used the tax system to
make an elective" 8 transfer of forgone revenue that is denominated a
tax expenditure, (2) recasting the tax expenditure as an analogous
direct expenditure and then evaluating the analogue, and (3) applying
cost/benefit analysis to the tax expenditure. This approach has no
implications regarding the existence, or nonexistence, of a normative
governmental right to privately generated income.
In short, the political allegation that TEA implies federal
government ownership of all income earned by U.S. residents is
simply unsupportable.
2. Are Tax Expenditures Indistinguishable from Tax Cuts?
A second possible version of the charge that TEA overreaches is
the assertion that TEA has no meaningful analytical power because
there is no mathematical difference between a tax incentive or subsidy
that lowers X's tax bill by one dollar and tax relief for X in the form of
a one dollar tax cut. Thus, so the argument goes, it is as logical to call
187 See id. at 187 (referring to the government-owns-all-your-income allegation as
a canard).
188 There is no significant constitutional barrier to nondiscriminatory federal
income taxation of interest paid on state and local government bonds. See South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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tax expenditures tax cuts (good) as it is to call them tax expenditures
(bad) and TEA advocates overreach when they insist on favoring the
tax expenditure characterization over the tax cut label. 89
A response to this second argument requires a brief extension of
the analysis that disposed of the government-owns-all-your-income
canard. To be specific, the preceding tax cut/tax expenditure
equivalency argument glosses over the fact that not all tax reductions
are the same. For example, assume that the U.S. income tax has a
single rate of 35 % and no exclusion for interest paid on state and local
government bonds. A reduction in the general rate from 35% to 30%
would not be a tax expenditure because the reduction would not
create preferential treatment for any particular activity or income190
source. Thus, it would simply be a tax cut. The creation of an
exclusion for state and local government bond interest, however,
would be a tax expenditure, not a mere tax cut, because it would
preferentially carve out a class of income that is normatively
includable in the base of an income tax. Stated differently, the
mathematical equivalence between (1) taxing a particular activity or
income source while providing a direct government payment to the
participating taxpayers and (2) simply enacting an equivalent tax
reduction limited to the particular activity or income source does not
establish that either (1) or (2) is the same as (3) a reduction in the
general tax rate for all taxpayers. Instead, the mathematical
equivalency of (1) and (2) shows that (2) is the same as a government
subvention paid to discrete, privileged beneficiaries and that is the
whole point of TEA.'9' As stated by President George W. Bush's
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, "[a] tax expenditure is a tax
incentive that provides special tax treatment to a particular type of
activity. ' 92
The late Professor Boris Bittker objected to the preceding
distinction between a general rate reduction and a targeted
preferential rate reduction. He posited a situation where a tax cut is
enacted with respect to only the highest rate bracket because
Congress believes that investment will be stimulated by the greater
propensity of high-income taxpayers to save additional after-tax
189 See generally STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., REVIEW, supra note 168, at 9;
Shaviro, supra note 8, at 191; Thuronyi, supra note 8, at 1178-79.
190 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAx EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 191-92.
191 See Sugin, supra note 2, at 410, 416; authorities cited supra note 3.
192 PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra
note 15, at 13 (emphasis added).
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income. He assumed that because this hypothetical rate reduction
applies to all high-income taxpayers, it might be considered "general"
.. 193
and, therefore, not a tax expenditure.
His assumption strikes us as reasonable. Of course, a dissenter
could sensibly insist that Bittker's top-bracket rate cut is not "general"
because it is limited to the top bracket and that a rate cut is general
only when it hits all, or most, brackets. Clever fox that he was, Bittker
would then likely force this critic to deal with, say, a 50% rate cut in
the top bracket and a 1% reduction in each of the lower rates. The
critic might reasonably respond by arguing that the 1% cuts should be
ignored as de minimis and, accordingly, that the 50% rate cut should
be classified as a tax expenditure. Bittker, however, would then likely
force the critic to agonize over where, in the 1% to 50% range, the
lower-bracket tax cuts would be sufficiently large to make the top-
bracket rate reduction part of a "general" tax cut and, therefore, not a
tax expenditure. It is tempting to avoid this pain by conceding that the
50% rate cut in the top bracket is "general," and not a tax
expenditure, even if there is no meaningful reduction in the lower
rates.
But treating Bittker's hypothetical top-bracket rate cut as general,
and not a tax expenditure, creates a new problem. It gives a preferred
position in legislative contests to an investment stimulus measure (the
top-bracket rate cut) that is overbroad since it will also free up more
income for luxury consumption, while an investment credit is treated
as a suspect tax expenditure' 94 even though it can be structured as a
more effective, targeted investment stimulus than the top-bracket rate
cut.
A dissenter might suggest dodging this problem by treating the
top-bracket rate reduction as a tax expenditure, even though it is a
"general" rate cut, because Congress's motive was a tax expenditure-
. . 195
type motive - to stimulate investment. Under this approach,
however, the same rate reduction would not be a tax expenditure if
Congress's action was based on a belief that the top rate was
unnecessarily high 96 or unfairly skewed so that America was grinding
193 See Bittker, Accounting, supra note 11, at 252.
194 Surrey considered an investment tax credit to be a tax expenditure. See
SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 32, 34.
195 See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 218.
196 Granted, it would be difficult to hold this belief in the face of present and
projected federal budget challenges. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 1-3 (Aug. 2006); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2007 TO 2016, at 1-25 (Jan. 2006).
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the faces of the rich. 197 This distinction did not impress Bittker; he
suggested that it would likely do nothing more than influence
Congress's choice of rhetoric without changing the substance of the
matter. 98 In short, Bittker thought that the problem of deciding which
rate cuts are, and are not, tax expenditures is unsolvate.9
Bittker's argument is a reasonable objection with respect to the
aspect of TEA on which he was focused. To be specific, Bittker's
analysis of general and targeted tax cuts was addressed to Surrey's
hope that tax expenditures could be summed up and reflected in an
accounting of total federal government outlays. Bittker's point was
that an acceptably accurate total of tax expenditures is impossible if
we cannot decide whether a tax cut is a tax expenditure or not.01 In
our view, Bittker's argument, though logically correct, is overstated.
We are, after all, operating in an environment where total annual
direct federal expenditures exceed $2.7 trillion 0 2 and total annual
federal tax expenditures exceed $700 billion. Given numbers of that
magnitude, decisions on classifying particular items as tax
expenditures or not have a substantial margin for error in terms of
absolute dollars. In that context, it is our sense that we can get close
enough to a usable tax expenditure total by treating tax cuts as tax
expenditures when they are clearly targeted at particular income
sources or activities (as distinguished from being targeted at particular
economic classes) and as "not tax expenditures" in other cases,
including Bittker's hypothetical top-bracket rate cut that is enacted
because Congress believes that the wealthy beneficiaries will stimulate
investment by saving their tax reduction. In other words, we would
197 Likewise, it would be hard to hold this belief given the generally increasing
concentration of income and wealth in the hands of the most affluent Americans. See
DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 9, at 143-47; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note
9, at 65-68; John W. Lee, III, Class Warfare 1988-2005 over Top Individual Tax Rates:
Teeter-Totter from Soak-the-Rich to Robin Hood-in-Reverse, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 47
(2006).
198 See Bittker, Accounting, supra note 11, at 252.
199 Id.
200 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 6, 25, 226;
Surrey, Full Accounting, supra note 2, at 578; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at
973.
201 See Bittker, Accounting, supra note 11, at 252.
202 The President's budget proposed outlays of $2.77 trillion for fiscal 2007, see
2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 340, and $2.9 trillion for fiscal
2008, see 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 340.
203 The estimated revenue loss from tax expenditures in fiscal 2004 was
approximately $728 billion. See GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 8, 26.
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not treat Bittker's top-bracket rate cut as a tax expenditure, regardless
of the congressional motive behind it, because we regard attempts to
be more precise on this point as a game that is not worth the candle.
The preceding point carries more force with respect to the aspect
of TEA on which we are focused. Our primary concern is TEA's role
in triggering a substantially higher level of scrutiny than applies to
• 204
provisions that are elements of the SHS baseline. For that purpose,
an accurate dollar total of tax expenditures is not important. Instead,
the critical objective is to ensure that tax provisions with a subsidy or
incentive element are carefully examined to see if they are justifiable.
Thus, an investment credit and a rate cut that the context shows is
targeted to particular activities or income sources (as distinguished
from particular income classes) should be subjected to TEA scrutiny,
and we ought not to abandon that aspect of TEA even if we have
difficulty in deciding whether Bittker's hypothetical rate cut that is
directed at an economic class is actually a tax expenditure.
The problem of distinguishing tax cuts from tax expenditures was
raised by the enactment of section 199 as part of the American Jobs
205Creation Act of 2004. Congress's declared objective for this
provision was to assist domestic manufacturers, and no other class of
taxpayers, to compete in worldwide markets.2° This is clearly a tax
expenditure-type purpose. However, section 199 operates by lowering
a taxpayer's effective tax rate through a deduction generally equal to
2079% (when fully phased in) of qualified production activities income,
a term that is defined much more broadly than the ordinary
• 208
understanding of manufacturing income. For that reason, President
204 In other words, we agree with Professor Shaviro's view that TEA is an
important tax policy tool as well as a budget management tool. See Shaviro, supra
note 8, at 218-19.
205 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418
(2004).
206 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 170 (Joint
Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2005 GENERAL
EXPLANATION].
207 See I.R.C. § 199(a)(1); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2005 GENERAL
EXPLANATION, supra note 206, at 170-76; Carol Conjura, Timothy A. Zuber &
Katherine M. Breaks, Practical Considerations in Implementing the Section 199
Regulations, 105 J. TAX'N 68 (2006); Deloitte Tax LLP, Producing Results: An
Analysis of the New Production Activities Deduction, 106 TAX NOTES 961, 962 (Feb.
21, 2005).
208 For example, the term includes revenue from domestic movie making (section
199(c)(4)(A)(i)(II)), domestic electricity generation (section 199(c)(4)(A)(i)(III)),
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Bush's fiscal 2008 budget document argues that section 199 might be a
general tax cut instead of a tax expenditure. The relevant statement in
the budget document is as follows:
[T]he deduction may prove to be so broad that it is available
to most U.S. businesses, in which case it might not be seen as
a tax expenditure. Rather, it would then represent a feature
of the baseline tax rate system because the deduction is
equivalent to a lower tax rate. °9
We disagree with this characterization of the section 199
deduction. The type of income that qualifies for the deduction is,
indeed, defined very broadly to include counter-intuitive items.
Nevertheless, the service, retail, and financial sectors of the economy
are largely excluded from section 199. In our judgment, this means
that the scope of section 199 is too narrow to allow it to qualify as a
general tax cut; it should be regarded as a tax expenditure and
subjected to recasting and appropriately rigorous cost/benefit analysis.
3. Should There Be a Special Dispensation for C Corporations?
Critics sometimes suggest that even if TEA is valid, its advocates
overreach when they apply it to tax subsidies and incentives enjoyed
with respect to the income of C corporations. This view rests on the
fact that the earnings of sole proprietors, S corporations, and
Subchapter K entities bear only one level of tax (at the level of the
owners) while C corporation profits are subject to an entity-level tax
in addition to the tax paid by shareholders on dividend income. This
double tax regime is said to create penalty-like excess taxation of C
corporation earnings that amounts to a negative tax expenditure or
tax penalty for conducting business in the C corporation form of
business enterprise. Thus, so the argument goes, tax subsidies and
incentives granted to C corporations, or to shareholders with respect
to C corporation dividends, merely mitigate a negative tax
expenditure (the double tax regime) and do not result in a net transfer
and engineering and architectural services performed in the United States with
respect to domestic construction projects (section 199(c)(4)(A)(iii)).
209 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 315. But see U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 8-9 (treating the section 199 deduction
as a targeted tax incentive, rather than a tax rate cut, which adds to the complexity of
the tax system and will result in more disputes between taxpayers and the Service).
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to the corporate beneficiaries.
Surrey responded to this point by arguing that once Congress has
made a policy determination to impose a double tax regime on C
corporations, double taxation is the normative baseline and tax
subsidies and incentives in the form of preferential reductions in
either the corporate income tax or the shareholder tax are deviations
from that baseline and, therefore, tax expenditures.211 This response is
a variation of the argument used above to rebut the government-
owns-all-your-income canard and it strikes us as correct.
This point can be buttressed, however, by considering a major
purpose of the corporate income tax. As previously noted, the income
of a domestic C corporation is typically subjected to both a corporate-
level tax as it is earned by the corporation and also to a shareholder-
level tax at the, perhaps distant, time when the shareholders receive
212the income from the corporation or sell their shares. This taxation
scheme initially seems difficult to explain on ability-to-pay grounds
because liability under the corporate-level tax is calibrated to the
taxable income of the corporation and bears no necessary relationship
213to the respective abilities to pay of any individuals. Thus, several
210 See 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 314, which stated:
[T]he reduction or elimination of individual level tax on income from
investment in corporate equities might not be a tax expenditure relative to
a comprehensive income baseline because the income is taxed first at the
corporate level. A similar line of reasoning suggests that in the case of
corporations, expensing of R&E or accelerated depreciation are not tax
expenditures because they offset the corporate tax penalty.
See also Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 417, 419; Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra
note 3, at 24.
ZU See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 4,215.
2 See I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(3), (7). The shareholder-level tax is not reduced by
credits reflecting corporate-level tax. Thus, the corporate-level and shareholder-level
income taxes function as independent, cumulative levies. Double taxation is avoided
in the cases of S corporations and domestic C corporations reporting their income
with a parent corporation on a consolidated return. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(3), 1501.
This article assumes that classical double taxation of C corporation income will
continue as the general pattern under the Code for the foreseeable future even
though we believe that a properly designed integration of the corporate and
shareholder income taxes would be a desirable tax policy move.
213 See I.R.C. § 11(a), (b)(1); M. Slade Kendrick, Corporate Income Tax Rate
Structure, in 3 COMMIT-EE ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 2289,
2297 (Comm. Print 1959); Slemrod, Beautiful Reform, supra note 165, at 142; George
K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141, 152
(1999) [hereinafter Yin, Future Taxation]. Because the corporate-level tax is generally
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rationales other than ability-to-pay have been proposed as
justifications for the corporate-level tax and there is disagreement
regarding which of these is the "best" and, indeed, whether the basic
concept of a separate, unintegrated corporate income tax is defensible
at all.214 The merits of this controversy are outside the scope of this
article.
More importantly, in spite of this dispute over the theoretical
justification for a separate, unintegrated tax on corporate income,
there is broad agreement that because pass-through treatment
probably cannot be practically imposed on corporations with large
numbers of shareholders, 21 and because Congress is quite unlikely, in
regarded as borne by living individual taxpayers and not the entity itself, see 2007
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 286; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON
FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 34; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 4, the question of a C corporation's ability-to-pay is
commonly viewed as irrelevant. See PETER ANDREW HARRIS,
CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION AND ALLOCATING TAXING RIGHTS
BETWEEN COUNTRIES 104 (1996); Michael J. Graetz, David R. Tillinghast Lecture:
Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 301-02 (2001) [hereinafter Graetz,
Taxing International Income]; see also Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in
a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1113-14 (2000).
214 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 51-55, 59-63 (1999); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES 44-46 (1993) [hereinafter AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, INTEGRATION]; BRADFORD, supra note 42, at 103; Robert Cassanos,
Single Taxation of Publicly Traded Entities, 99 TAX NOTES 1663, 1665-69 (June 16,
2003); Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of
the ALl Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITr.
L. REV. 223, 241-44, 253-57 (2000); Pratt, supra note 213, at 1100-03, 1109-10. With
respect to the historical origins of the corporate-level tax, see Steven A. Bank, Entity
Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
447 (2001); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
215 See Graeme S. Cooper & Richard K. Gordon, Taxation of Enterprises and
Their Owners, in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 811, 817 (Victor Thuronyi ed.,
1998); Pratt, supra note 213, at 1112-13; George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration
and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV. 431, 434 (1992); see also U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS:
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 27-35 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
INTEGRATION]. Among other things, large numbers of shareholders imply frequent
trading in a corporation's stock which creates difficulties in allocating income and
losses to the shareholders. For contrary views asserting that a pass-through system can
be constructed for publicly traded corporations with large numbers of shareholders,
see U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 69-74; Joseph M. Dodge, A
Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate Shareholder Integration
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the near term, to adopt other means of currently taxing shareholders
on corporate income through integration of the corporate and
individual income taxes, the present corporate-level tax must be
216
maintained as a crude, second-best anti-deferral device. Otherwise,
shareholders of domestic C corporations would be able to completely
defer taxation until they withdrew the corporation's earnings (or sold
their shares), thus achieving a deferral of U.S. tax that is not available
Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995) [hereinafter Dodge, Integration Proposal]; Yin,
Future Taxation, supra note 213, at 195-96.
216 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTEGRATION, supra note 215, at 189 & n.1; 1 U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 118-21; J.D.R. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY,
THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES 8 (1997); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTEGRATION, supra note 214, at 94;
BRADFORD, supra note 42, at 55; RICHARD L. DOERNBERG & HOWARD E. ABRAMS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 4-5 (3d ed.
2000); JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (Cong. Res. Service,
Oct. 31, 2007); HARRIS, supra note 213, at 102-04; RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY
B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 372 (5th ed. 1989);
PECHMAN, supra note 9, at 136; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 235-36; JOSEPH
E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 586-87 (2d ed. 1988); Avi-Yonah,
Corporations, Society, and the State, supra note 171, at 1201; Cooper & Gordon, supra
note 215, at 812-13; Malcolm Gammie, The Taxation of Inward Direct Investment in
North America Following the Free Trade Agreement, 49 TAX L. REV. 615, 628-29
(1994); Graetz, Taxing International Income, supra note 213, at 302; Green, supra
note 39, at 28; Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of
Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613, 629-30 (1990); David A. Weisbach, The
Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and Doctrine in the
Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 217 (2007); see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, THE
DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS 4 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DEFERRAL STUDY],
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf; JEFFREY L.
KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS,
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 5-8 (3d ed. 2005); UTZ, supra
note 39, at 177-78; Pratt, supra note 213, at 1115; Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should
Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1066-69
(1988-89); Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity Tax and Corporate Integration: An Agency
Cost Analysis and a Call for a Deferred Distributions Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 43
(1993).
Of course, if the corporate-level tax were integrated with the shareholder-level
tax, the corporate-level tax could continue to serve its anti-deferral function without
imposing the double tax result that characterizes the present approach to taxing C
corporations. There is, however, no near-term likelihood of such an integration
scheme being adopted and this article assumes continuation of the current regime of
C corporation taxation, no matter how ill-advised that may be from a tax policy
standpoint.
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to the owners of closely held businesses taxed under the Subchapter K
or S pass-through regimes.2 17 Indeed, we believe that the anti-deferral
effect of the present U.S. corporate income tax is the only persuasive
reason for a large, unintegrated levy on domestic C corporation
218
earnings.
This analysis brings us back to ability-to-pay, because
undistributed C corporation income represents a resource that confers
ability-to-pay but that is being accumulated for the shareholders in the
corporation. If no tax were paid on this income until distributions
occurred, the shareholders' ability-to-pay would be currently
mismeasured. For this reason, the anti-deferral corporate income tax
is an important backstop to an ability-to-pay-based income tax system.
For the corporate income tax to be a perfect anti-deferral device,
two conditions would have to be satisfied. First, the tax would apply
only to C corporation income that is allocable to shareholders who
would bear a shareholder-level tax if the income were distributed to
them when earned. Second, the corporate income tax base and rate
would be calibrated to precisely offset any advantage gained at the
shareholder level from deferring the shareholder tax on dividend
distributions and stock sale gains. 21' The current law's corporate
217 Deferral is already available to the U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations,
with some notable exceptions, as explained below, see infra Part VI.A. However, the
absence of both an integration scheme and a corporate-level tax would extend
deferral of U.S. tax to the far larger universe of U.S. shareholders of domestic
corporations.
Generally speaking, only closely held businesses can qualify for the Subchapter
K or S regimes. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1)(A) (regarding Subchapter S), 7704
(regarding Subchapter K). Indeed, the current structure of the income tax creates an
incentive for new closely held business enterprises to operate under the Subchapter K
or S pass-through taxation regimes. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAXES AND CORPORATE
CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM, OTA PAPER No. 73 (1997), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ota73.pdf. But see John W. Lee, A
Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars
Might Lie but the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEx. L. REV. 885 (2000) (pointing out that
despite the conventional wisdom that the preferable entity for new, closely held
business ventures is an LLC, new formations of corporations (either C corporations
or S corporations) outnumbered new LLC formations in all but one state, usually by a
2-to-1 or greater margin, in the 1995-1998 period).
218 See generally Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate
Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 894, 944, 947 (2006); Kim Brooks, Learning to Live
with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the Corporate Tax, 36 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV.
621, 638-39 (2003).
219 See generally Daniel Halperin & Ethan Yale, Deferred Compensation
Revisited, 114 TAX NOTES 939, 943 (Mar. 5, 2007).
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income tax does not satisfy either of these conditions220 and its failure
to do so results in well-known distortions, such as the incentive to
capitalize C corporations with debt capital that generates deductible
interest payments, instead of using equity capital that yields
nondeductible dividends, and the incentive for C corporations to
accumulate income rather than distribute it to shareholders.22 For
220 In addition, the corporate income tax is overbroad to the extent that it reaches
foreign stockholders' shares of foreign-source income earned by U.S. corporations.
See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA.
TAX REV. 299, 321-23 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation].
Regarding the incidence of the corporate income tax, the Treasury Department
and the Congressional Budget Office assume that the tax is borne by all owners of
capital, see PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 34; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES UNDER
CURRENT LAW, 2001 TO 2014, at 3 (Aug. 2004), but the Joint Committee on Taxation
generally assumes that the tax is borne only by owners of corporate capital, see STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN
MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 8 (Joint Comm. Print
1993). Some economists, however, argue that the tax is partially borne by labor and
consumers. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM,
PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 34; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 77-78; Phares,
Tax Equity Analysis, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 400. With respect to
differences between the corporate and individual tax bases, see STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO SELECTED
BUSINESS TAX ISSUES 26-28 (Joint Comm. Print 2006).
221 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 99-102; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 48-49. The amount of
double taxation that actually occurs in practice as a result of the two levels of tax that
apply to C corporation income may not be large. See William G. Gale, Tax Reform
Options in the Real World, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 34, 41 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Kevin A. Hasset eds., 2005) ("[Because of various tax strategies,] [o]nly
about a quarter of corporate income appears to be taxed at both the individual and
corporate level, and all of that is now taxed at a maximum rate of 15 percent at the
personal level.... About one quarter of corporate income is taxed at the individual
level, but not the corporate level; one quarter is taxed at the corporate level, but not
the individual level; and one quarter appears never to be taxed."); Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., President's Dividends Plan Undertaxes High-Income Taxpayers, 98
TAX NOTES 389, 391-92 (Jan. 20, 2003) (double taxation of C corporation earnings is
"not a common occurrence"); George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public
Corporations Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 VA. L. REV.
1793, 1798 (2003) (stating that, over the period 1995-2000, when the top statutory
corporate income tax rate was 35%, the effective tax rate of the group of corporations
comprising the S&P 500 fell from 30.11% to 27.98%); see also CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE RATES AND APPROACHES TO REFORM
7-8 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME]
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those reasons, we have characterized the corporate income tax above
as a crude, second-best anti-deferral device and we recommend
integration of the corporate and individual income taxes through a
regime that would produce only one tax on C corporation business
222income, imposed primarily when the income is earned.
Nevertheless, the considerably imperfect corporate income tax is
all that prevents the C corporation business form from being utilized
as a massive tax deferral machine 223 and the corporate income tax can
fill its anti-deferral role effectively only if its base is substantially
inclusive of all items that should be income if earned directly by
individual shareholders. When viewed from that vantage point,
corporate income tax deviations from a normatively correct individual
income tax base are subsidies or incentives to the corporate activities
that benefit therefrom and the deviations should be regarded as tax
expenditures for this reason as well as the reason suggested above by
Surrey. Consequently, such corporate tax expenditures should be
subject to recasting and rigorous cost/benefit analysis just the same as
other tax expenditures.
F. Tax Norms Versus Social Values
Professors Kahn and Lehman have pointed out that although
certain Code provisions deviate from the normative income tax base
(their principal examples are the denial of deductions for illegal
224 225bribes, the gambling loss deduction limitation, and the exclusion of
(describing the effective tax rate for corporations as 26.3%). Nevertheless, the
strategies utilized to mitigate or avoid double taxation of C corporation income are
distortions of taxpayer behavior that have negative economic efficiency
consequences.
222 For examples of extensively developed integration proposals, see U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, INTEGRATION, supra note 215; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTEGRATION,
supra note 214; Dodge, Integration Proposal, supra note 215. We recognize, however,
that a principled and coherent corporate integration system is not likely to be enacted
within the reasonably foreseeable future. Given that reality, the present double tax
system is the lesser evil in comparison to the extensive deferral of tax on domestic
income that would occur if the income of U.S. corporations were not taxed until
dividends were distributed or shareholders sold their stock.
223 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 275. Of course, foreign C
corporations are already tax deferral machines as explained infra Part VI.A.
However, if the corporate-level income tax were eliminated without enacting an
integration system, all domestic C corporations would be tax deferral machines as
well.
114 See I.R.C. § 162(c).
225 See I.R.C. § 165(d). Actually, the limitation on the deduction of gambling
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certain personal injury recoveries 26), these departures reflect nontax
societal norms. They have then argued that it is unacceptable to use
TEA as a vehicle through which tax norms trump these and other
value judgments of the American public. 22' As they put it, "the
ultimate choice must rest with the citizen and not the oracle.
228
We believe that this view misconstrues the role of TEA, which
does not prohibit value-based departures from the normative
definition of income. Instead, TEA requires that the costs and
benefits of such departures be forthrightly acknowledged and weighed
so that society will make informed decisions about the degree to
which it wishes nontax norms to trump tax norms and vice versa. It is
difficult to see how TEA, which involves identifying the existence of
government programs effected through the tax system and subjecting
those programs to a cost/benefit analysis, does anything but enhance
the ability of citizens (through their elected representatives) to
exercise value-based choices concerning those programs.
In any event, this criticism of TEA is largely irrelevant with
respect to the international tax provisions that we examine below in
Part VI of this article because those provisions are not manifestations
of any value judgments by the American public. They are largely
manifestations of successful lobbying efforts by a relatively small but
powerful group of multinational corporate taxpayers and their
sophisticated tax advisers.
G. Zero Taxation as a Possible Norm
One could argue that the proper policy baseline is a world with no
taxation so that subsidies and incentives in the form of reduced
taxation or outright exemptions effectively bring us towards, or back
to, the baseline and should not be characterized as tax expenditures.
A no-tax world is, however, a world of no government, or virtually no
government. This condition amounts to a Hobbesian nightmare filled
with such poverty and insecurity that people would rapidly abandon it
by organizing governments which, even when of the small Lockean
losses is not an indisputable example of a departure from the SHS definition of
income because many, perhaps most, of those losses are entertainment expenditures
and, therefore, should properly be viewed as personal consumption costs that should
not be deducted for tax purposes under either an income or consumption tax base.
See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 9, at 586-88.
226 See I.R.C. § 104(a).
227 See Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1662.
228 Id.
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sort, imply taxation.22' Thus, zero taxation is not a realistic policy
choice in our complex and dangerous world. For these reasons, a no-
tax baseline is not a meaningful alternative and it should play no part
in any serious critique of TEA.
H. Consumption Taxation as the Norm
A substantial number of leading commentators has expressed the
belief that a normatively correct tax regime would exclude savings
from the tax base or, alternatively, would include saved amounts in
the tax base but exempt all returns thereon.130 Either way, only
consumption would be taxed; savings and investment would be
exempt. 31
Surrey's muscular version of TEA rejected consumption as the
normative tax base and took as its baseline the SHS definition of
232income, which treats all amounts that are saved as income inclusions
233
along with amounts which are consumed 3. Thus, if consumption
alone were accepted as the correct tax base, the number of tax
provisions carrying the tax expenditure label would be reduced
because provisions that have the effect of eliminating savings from the
229 See generally MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 31-33.
230 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); Edward J.
McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807 (2005) [hereinafter
McCaffrey, New Understanding]; Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91 (Apr. 5, 2004). Regarding the views
of the economics profession on this question, compare Bartlett, Agenda, supra note
165, at 1532 ("[M]ost economists now favor a consumption-based tax system."), with
Robert Whaples, Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!., 3 ECONOMISTS' VOICE 9
(2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/artl (reporting on a 2005
survey of randomly selected members of the American Economics Association in
which the mean average response to the question of whether the United States should
replace the income tax with an equivalent consumption tax was in the range of
"neutral" to "disagree").
231 If tax and interest rates remain constant, the exclusion of saved amounts
coupled with taxation at the time of consumption of all returns to saving (including
recovery of principal) will provide the same economic treatment of the riskless return
to capital as the up-front taxation of saved amounts coupled with the exclusion of all
returns thereon (including recovery of principal). See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER,
supra note 9, at 72-73; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 199-205.
232 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 3-4; see also
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 26.
233 See SIMONS, supra note 53, at 50.
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tax base,234 or reducing the tax on investments, would no longer be
236tax expenditures.
The extent of the reduction would, however, be less than is
commonly supposed because a number of tax expenditures would
probably persist under a consumption tax regime. For example, the
President's fiscal 2007 budget document lists the following features of
existing federal income tax law as tax expenditures, or probably tax
expenditures, under a consumption-based tax system, and favorable
treatment of these popular items would likely be preserved in some
form in a consumption tax regime:
Tax Expenditure Under a Consumption Base
Exclusion of workers' compensation benefits
Probably a Tax Expenditure Under a Consumption Base
Deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes
Child credit
Deductibility of nonbusiness state and local taxes other than on
owner-occupied homes
Exclusion of Social Security benefits for retired workers
Deductibility of State and local property tax on owner-occupied
homes
Earned income tax credit
Exclusion of Social Security benefits of dependents and
survivors237
234 E.g., the IRA regime and section 401(k) plans.
235 E.g., Roth IRAs and the section 103 exclusion for interest received on public
purpose debt issued by state and local governments.
2.36 See 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 322-25, 328.
Moreover, there would be no separate corporate income tax in a theoretically correct
consumption tax regime. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX
REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 37-40; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra
note 23, at 133-34; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 234-42. Thus, the tax
subsidies and incentives in the present corporate income tax would not be tax
expenditures if consumption taxation were the norm.
One of the complaints made against TEA by some consumption tax advocates is
that the inclusion of consumption tax features in the tax expenditure lists highlights
the revenue cost of replacing the federal income tax with a consumption tax regime
and makes such replacement more difficult to achieve. See STAFF OF JOINT ECON.
COMM., REVIEW, supra note 168, at 5-6; Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 420.
237 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 328 app. tbl.2.
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More importantly, any politically acceptable federal consumption
tax would almost surely be adorned with additional tax expenditures
designed to direct the flow of capital into many of the investments and
activities that are the beneficiaries of tax expenditures under the
existing federal income tax. 38 To be specific, it seems virtually certain
that in some way the existing tax expenditures in favor of such things
as investments in state and local government bonds, investments in
business and industrial equipment, and investments in owner-211
occupied residences would be substantially preserved. Undoubtedly,
Congress would be under pressure to enact other departures from a
theoretically pure consumption base as well; it is nafve to think that
shifting the tax base from income to consumption would eliminate the
efforts by various interest groups to obtain narrowly based tax
preferences of their liking. For these reasons, TEA would have an
important role to play even if the federal income tax were replaced by
a consumption tax. Nevertheless, if consumption taxation were to
replace the SHS definition of income as the normative baseline of the
federal income tax, the number of tax expenditures would be
240
reduced, the international tax provisions that are discussed below in
Part VI of this article either would be unnecessary (because all forms
of savings would be excluded from the tax base) or would no longer
carry the tax expenditure label, and TEA would change somewhat.
The vigorous debate regarding the SHS income tax base versus
the consumption tax base has generated a vast literature without
coming even close to resolving the dispute. Any attempt on our part
238 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Scoping Out the Uncertain Simplification
(Complication?) Effects of VATs, BATs and Consumed Income Taxes, 2 FLA. TAX
REV. 390, 398-99, 421-39 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Scoping Out]; see also Robert
J. Peroni, Tax Reform Interrupted: The Chaotic State of Tax Policy in 2003, 35
MCGEORGE L. REV. 277, 317 n.165 (2004) [hereinafter Peroni, Chaotic State of Tax
Policy] ("[Tihe pressure on Congress to enact tax preferences that treat expenses
incurred in favored personal consumption activities as non-consumption expenses for
tax purposes would be as intense, if not more intense, under a cash-flow consumption
tax system as under our existing system.").
239 See Fleming, Scoping Out, supra note 238.
240 See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 28; Hungerford, supra note 51, at 326 n.3.
241 See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 233-71; Andrews, Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, supra note 52; William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal
Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., Replacing the Federal Income Tax with a Postpaid Consumption Tax:
Preliminary Thoughts Regarding a Government Matching Program for Wealthy
Investors and a New Tax Policy Lens, 59 SMU L. REV. 617 (2006) [hereinafter
Fleming, Postpaid Consumption Tax]; Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the
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to achieve closure would involve abandoning this TEA article in favor
of a lengthy piece (perhaps a book) on the income versus
consumption base controversy. Although we have strong views
regarding this important issue, we choose to remain focused on TEA
and to defer the other project to a later piece. For purposes of this
article, we simply note that consumption with a general exclusion for
savings has not been adopted as the baseline for the federal income
tax and is unlikely to be adopted within the foreseeable future.2
Consequently, we will proceed to discuss TEA in the light of the SHS
baseline.
L Not So Fast! Hasn't Our Hybrid Income/Consumption Tax Evolved
into Primarily a Consumption Tax?
Tax academics in both the economics and law disciplines tend to
dislike disputes over definitions because these controversies often
obscure more fundamental issues. We generally share that distaste for
definitional debates. Nevertheless, we now venture into the debate
over whether the federal income tax is properly defined as an SHS tax
243with tax expenditures or as a hybrid income/consumption tax. We
do so because some commentators advocate the latter definition as a
ground for limiting or discarding TEA. To be specific, TEA critics
contend that although the federal income tax is not a full-bore
consumption tax, it has so many important consumption tax features
that it is at least a hybrid income/consumption tax.244 Accordingly, so
Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992); McCaffery, New Understanding,
supra note 230; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975); Warren, supra note 47.
242 Replacing the federal income tax with a full-blown consumption tax would
involve either a large downward distribution of the tax burden or structural
refinements to the consumption tax that would diminish its simplification and
efficiency aspects. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 256-64; authorities cited
supra note 238. These are probably insuperable political barriers. See SLEMROD &
BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 271; Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform,
59 TAX LAW. 649, 653 (2006) [hereinafter International Task Force Report]; see also
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note
15, at 49 ("[T]he Panel decided to design reform options that would remain relatively
close to the current distribution of tax burdens."); STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX
POLICY, supra note 3, at 241-42; Bartlett, Agenda, supra note 165, at 1533;
Hungerford, supra note 51, at 326 n.3; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 215.
243 See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-
Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992) [hereinafter McCaffery, Hybrid-
Income Consumption Tax].
244 See 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 315; PRESIDENT'S
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the argument goes, it is unrealistic to use income tax concepts as the
baseline for identifying deviations and classifying them as tax
expenditures.24 ' The implication of this contention is either that there
is no feasible baseline246 with the result that TEA must be discarded or
that the proper baseline is consumption taxation so that all existing
tax expenditures that create consumption tax results are no longer tax
247
expenditures.
The consumption tax features of our current income tax system,
however, are more constrained than the preceding argument suggests.
For example, in spite of the Code's consumption tax treatment of
various retirement savings plans and its better-than-consumption-tax
treatment of owner-occupied housing,248  about two-thirds of
249household savings are taxed as they would be under SHS .
Moreover, most of the income tax system's currently existing
consumption tax features were adopted to effectuate discrete federal
objectives such as aid to state and local governments through the
ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 21;
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 215; Andrews, Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
supra note 52, at 1120; Bartlett, Agenda, supra note 165, at 1533; Glenn, Questions,
supra note 168, at 535-36; McCaffery, Hybrid-Income Consumption Tax, supra note
243, at 1152.
245 See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 28; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 215-16; Sugin,
supra note 2, at 427, 429.
246 See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., REVIEW, supra note 168, at 9; Kahn &
Lehman, supra note 8, at 1661; Sugin, supra note 2, at 427.
247 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 420-22. As noted at supra note 236, this
argument has an interesting sub-argument: TEA is inadvisable because the revenue
loss figures it generates interfere with accomplishing the full replacement of the
federal income tax with a consumption tax regime. See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM.,
REVIEW, supra note 168, at 9; Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 420.
248 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 70-71 (concluding that the set of tax expenditures related to
personal residences results in an "economy-wide [income] tax rate on housing
investment [that] is close to zero"); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL
INCOME, supra note 221, at 8 (finding an effective tax rate of minus 5.1% on owner-
occupied housing). Under a theoretically pure consumption tax, the net imputed
income from owner-occupied housing would bear the generally applicable rate of tax.
See 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 325-26; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 23, at 121-22; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 220-22.
There is no reason to believe that tax policy advocates would be any more successful
in ridding a U.S. consumption tax system of this tax expenditure than they have been
in eliminating it from the current U.S. income tax system. See Peroni, Chaotic State of
Tax Policy, supra note 238, at 304-05.
249 See 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 285; PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL, PROPOSALS ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, supra note 15, at 21-22.
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section 103 exemption2 0 and encouragement of private savings for
retirement, education, and healthcare by means of various tax-
21preferred savings plans. In addition, the preferential tax treatment
252
of long-term capital gains was adopted for the multiple but limited
purposes of ameliorating the effect of several years of asset
appreciation being realized in a single year (the "bunching" problem),
counteracting the effects of inflation, alleviating the "lock-in" effect
that results from the disparate income tax treatment of realized and
unrealized gains, encouraging risk taking, and stimulating saving.253 As
these examples indicate, the consumption tax features of the Code,
although often overbroad, inefficient, and incoherent, are generally
targeted to achieve narrow policy goals and many are subject to
significant limitations.9 These features do not represent a policy
250 PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra
note 15, at 124 (characterizing section 103 as "an incentive for investment in public
infrastructure"); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 229-30 (stating that the effect
of section 103 "is to subsidize debt-financed expenditures in the states and
municipalities").
251 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2007 REVENUE PROPOSALS 5-8 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
2007 PROPOSALS].
252 See I.R.C. § 1(h).
253 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2005 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra
note 206, at 22-23; MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 364 (10th
ed. 2005); PAUL R. MCDANIEL, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., DANIEL L. SIMMONS &
ALICE ABREU, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1118-19 (5th ed. 2004).
254 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, 2007 PROPOSALS, supra note 251, at 5-8; PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 72
(stating that the set of tax expenditures that subsidizes owner-occupied housing "is
often justified on the grounds that it is necessary for promoting home ownership");
Christopher Howard, Tax Reform: The Sam Gerard Problem, 113 TAX NOTES 365,
366 (Oct. 23, 2006). Closely related is Professor Deborah Geier's argument that the
current income tax system's departures from pure SHS are driven by the goal of only
taxing income that is available for discretionary use and not by the goal of achieving
consumption-based taxation. See Deborah A. Geier, The Taxation of Income
Available for Discretionary Use, 25 VA. TAX REV. 765 (2006); see also Seto & Buhai,
supra note 51, at 1127-35. For a discussion of the discretionary use concept under
German income tax law, see also Ordower, supra note 39, at 302-08.
255 For examples, see the limitations imposed by sections 402(g), 404, 404A, 408,
and 408A on the use of certain retirement savings plans. See generally JONATHAN
BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 218-19 (2006). In addition, note that the
preferential tax treatment of long-term capital gains is generally limited to gains (in
excess of losses) from sales or exchanges of properties that qualify as capital assets or
so-called "quasi-capital assets" and that are held for more than one year. See I.R.C. §§
1(h), 1221, 1222, 1231.
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decision to embrace the consumption tax approach by generally
216
removing savings from the tax base.
Furthermore, one of the largest consumption tax features of the
257
current income tax system, the realization doctrine, was conceded
by Henry Simons, a chief proponent of SHS, as an administrative
258
necessity in any feasible SHS tax. Thus, the realization doctrine is
arguably as much an income tax feature as a consumption tax feature
and its inclusion in the income tax does not necessarily support the
259
argument that the income tax is a hybrid levy. 5 In addition, even
though consumption taxes exclude imputed income, the exclusion is
260based on practical concerns rather than doctrinal principles. The
failure to include imputed income in the income tax base, then, is not
a partial adoption of a consumption tax norm.
256 This is not to say that tax expenditures cannot be used to achieve an
incremental conversion of the income tax into a consumption tax or a near-
consumption tax. For a description of a plan to do so, see William G. Gale & Peter R.
Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001-
2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1227-30 (2004). Instead, we argue that the existing
consumption tax elements in the federal income tax are better characterized as rifle
shots directed at particular issues within a tax regime that primarily taxes income.
257 The realization doctrine excludes unrealized asset appreciation from the
current income tax base. This is the mathematical equivalent of deducting unrealized
gains that the taxpayer effectively adds to savings by electing to defer realization. A
deduction for an addition to savings achieves a consumption tax result. See DODGE,
FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 9, at 70-73.
258 See SIMONS, supra note 53, at 100, 207-08. For proposals to eliminate the
realization requirement in the income tax system, see Noel B. Cunningham &
Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to
Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725 (1992); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive
Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1990); Mark L. Louie, Note, Realizing
Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable
Securities, 34 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1982); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without
Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986).
259 See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 26; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 213. One TEA
critic, Professor Zelinksy, argues that the departures from the SHS base based on
considerations of enforceability/practicality and taxpayer morale make it "difficult see
why an ideal [SHS] cannot be breached for other equally compelling concerns such as
efficiency," thus suggesting that these departures undercut TEA arguments against
tax incentives. See Zelinsky, The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, supra note 11, at
1029. In our view, this is substantially the same as asserting that tax expenditures are
acceptable if they pass cost/benefit analysis, an assertion with which we agree.
'60 See generally Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption
Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1614 (1979) [hereinafter Graetz, Progressive
Consumption Tax].
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As these examples have illustrated, the consumption tax features
of the Code were not, generally speaking, adopted for the purpose of
moving the income tax system closer to a consumption tax ideal.
Instead, these features were adopted in pursuance of other policies
and their consumption tax effects are secondary consequences of
those other objectives.
For these reasons, there is a strong case for characterizing the
current federal income tax as an SHS tax levy with targeted tax
expenditures and concessions to administrative necessity, rather than
as a hybrid income/consumption tax. This treatment becomes
compelling when we consider that tax expenditures structured on the
basis of consumption tax principles will "work" only if the baseline
income tax is an SHS levy. This point can be illustrated by returning
to the example in Part II of this article regarding the exemption for
interest paid on state and local government public purpose debt. If a
theoretically correct consumption tax were substituted for the federal
income tax, all income from capital, including all interest, would be
effectively exempt 26' and issuers of state and municipal government
bonds would have to pay the same interest rates as all other
262borrowers, including business corporations.
State and local government bond issuers might be indifferent to
losing the benefit of the section 103 exemption if the consequence of
replacing the federal income tax with a consumption tax were a
dramatic decline in interest rates generally. It is not certain, however,
that this would happen, and indeed there is credible evidence that
general interest rates would increase substantially.263 Faced with this
uncertainty, the risk averse approach is to assume that if the federal
income tax were fully replaced by a levy on consumption, there would
not be a general interest rate reduction sufficiently large to effectively
neutralize the states' and local governments' loss of the section 103
benefit enjoyed under the income tax. This drives us to conclude that
section 103 "works" only because it is part of an SHS system under
which interest is generally taxed.
Moreover, it is reasonable to regard section 103's purpose as not
only reducing the interest costs of state and municipal governments,
but also conferring a comparative borrowing advantage on those
261 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 214, 222. See generally Fleming,
Postpaid Consumption Tax, supra note 241.
262 See Harry Watson, Implicit Taxes, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 185.
263 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE
TAX REFORM 33-34 (July 1997); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 223.
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governments. Indeed, in the most detailed consumption tax proposal
yet developed in the United States, the Unlimited Savings Allowance
264(USA) System, the section 103 exemption was continued with
respect to interest received by individuals on state and municipal
government debt. This continuation went beyond consumption tax
principles because the deduction granted under the USA System to
individuals for the cost of state and municipal government bonds was,
by itself, sufficient to create a consumption tax exemption for the
266interest paid to individuals with respect to those bonds. Thus, the
section 103 exemption in the USA System effectively imposed a
negative tax rate with respect to interest received by individuals on
state and local government debt. The USA System authors took this
step because they believed that the rationale of section 103 in the
present income tax is to confer a comparative advantage on state and
municipal governments vis-A-vis other borrowers (a view certain to be
shared by virtually all state and local politicians) and that this
267advantage should be preserved under their proposed system.
From this standpoint, the effective elimination of the present
section 103 by replacing the current income tax with a consumption
tax having only theoretically correct elements (i.e., no section 103
exemption) would deprive state and municipal governments of a
comparative advantage that they currently enjoy. A similar analysis
arguably applies to all other currently existing Code tax expenditures
that create a consumption tax result by eliminating the tax on
particular types of capital income (e.g., tax-favored retirement savings
vehicles) or that move particular types of capital income in the
direction of consumption tax treatment by lowering the applicable
rate of tax.
For these reasons, it seems correct to conclude that the section
103 exemption in its present form, and other consumption-type tax
expenditures, work only because they are components of an SHS tax
system instead of a consumption tax regime. Because these tax
expenditures are meant to work and because they do so only if there is
a substantial amount of capital income that is taxed pursuant to SHS
264 See Paul H. O'Neill & Robert A. Lutz, Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA)
Tax System, 66 TAx NOTES 1485 (Mar. 10, 1995) [hereinafter USA System].
265 See id. at 1564.
266 See Fleming, Postpaid Consumption Tax, supra note 241, at 620-28; USA
System, supra note 264, at 1564.
'67 See USA System, supra note 264, at 1564.
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268principles 6, we should resist the inference that consumption-type tax
expenditures in the federal income tax have swamped the SHS
baseline and moved the system to the uncertain baseline, if any, that
underlies a hybrid income/consumption tax. 269 The better conclusion is
that the federal income tax is an SHS tax with targeted tax
expenditures (subject to the understanding that a practical SHS tax
operates with a realization principle).210 Most importantly, this
conclusion supports using an SHS baseline for TEA purposes and
legitimizes inquiries into whether the consumption tax features of the
present income tax are tax expenditures and, if so, whether they can
survive recasting and cost/benefit scrutiny.
J. Indeterminacy
Other critics have argued that uncertainties regarding both the
SHS baseline and the items that should be included in the tax
expenditure list give TEA a degree of conceptual indeterminacy that
substantially limits its usefulness as a policy tool. 1 1 With respect to the
SHS baseline, these critics point out that there is a debate among
experts regarding the scope of the consumption component of the
SHS definition of income. The usual examples of this are the
disagreements over whether personal casualty losses, personal
medical expenses, and charitable contributions are nonconsumption
costs that should be subtracted when computing SHS income or,
instead, are consumption items that should remain in the tax base. 2
These critics also argue that the conceptual validity of TEA is thrown
into question by the practice of omitting certain items from the tax
... See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME, supra note 221, at 7
(calculating a 24.2% effective tax rate on business capital income and a 13.8% overall
tax rate on capital income).
261 See Sugin, supra note 2, at 427 ("A hybrid base defies the ideal of a 'normal'
tax.").
270 See Hanna, supra note 52, at 449 ("The United States tax system is primarily
an income tax system but has elements of a consumption tax system."). See generally
Avi-Yonah, Three Goals, supra note 40, at 24-25 (arguing that targeted savings and
investment incentives that operate by conferring consumption tax treatment are
effective only within an income tax system).
"' See generally Bartlett, The End, supra note 8; Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8.
272 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 416-17; Bittker, Personal Expenditures,
supra note 96. It is worth noting that there are also uncertainties regarding the scope
of the tax base in a consumption tax regime. See 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 29, at 321-24; Graetz, Progressive Consumption Tax, supra note 260, at
1591-95.
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expenditure list even though they represent departures from the SHS
baseline. 273 For example, Surrey left the exclusion of the imputed
rental value of owner-occupied homes and the exclusion of unrealized
appreciation out of his initial tax expenditure list,274 even though the
excluded items are arguably SHS income inclusions, and the Treasury
Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation have continued to
omit these items from their annual tax expenditure lists.
2 71
Professor Daniel Shaviro has argued that controversies regarding
the TEA baseline would lessen if the baseline were restructured to
draw a distinction between tax rules that distribute the tax burden in
accordance with equitable principles, such as ability-to-pay, and tax
rules that have no substantial burden-distributing purpose but,
instead, serve to provide benefits to particular groups or activities.
. 276
Only the latter, he argues, are tax expenditures. Arguably, Surrey's
version of TEA does this by defining tax expenditures with reference
to the SHS definition of income, which is based principally on the
concept of ability-to-pay. Moreover, Shaviro seems to concede that his
proposed dichotomy has no more precision than the Surrey
277
approach.
The most important point to be made here, however, is that
regardless of the debates over the precise scope of the SHS income
273 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 415-16; Bittker, Accounting, supra note
11, at 250. For a list of such items, see 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
29, at 320.
274 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 18-19; see also U.S. Treas. Dep't,
Conceptual Analysis, supra note 5, at 593. Surrey viewed the realization doctrine as a
deviation from the SHS definition but he nevertheless treated it as consistent with the
baseline that he employed for TEA purposes because he considered the doctrine to
be part of the generally accepted structure of an income tax. See SURREY &
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 4, 198-99. If Surrey is regarded as
unprincipled on this point, it should be noted, as discussed earlier in this article, that
Simons himself viewed the realization doctrine as an inherent feature of a workable
income tax. See SIMONS, supra note 53, at 100, 207-08. From this standpoint, the
realization doctrine is not a deviation from the SHS baseline. In addition, even if the
realization doctrine is a tax expenditure, it seems justifiable under cost/benefit
analysis because of the administrative problems associated with taxing unrealized
gains and allowing deductions for unrealized losses.
275 See 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 295; 2007 ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 295; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at
5 (Joint Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2006
ESTIMATES]; Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 415-16.
276 See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 188-89, 207-13.
277 See id. at 213.
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definition and the inclusion, or not, of certain items in the catalogue of
tax expenditures, the government agencies that annually create tax
expenditure lists have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus. For
example, in the President's fiscal 2007 budget presentation, the
. 278
Treasury Department listed 177 income tax expenditures, and the
corresponding presentation by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
. 279
Taxation identified 192 such expenditures. The two lists were the
same except for no more than forty-three items.280 This forty-three-
item difference was only 24.3% of the Treasury's list and 22.4% of the
Joint Committee Staff's list, meaning that the two lists had a greater
than 75% overlap. Moreover, only one of the 100 largest items on the
Treasury list was excluded from tax expenditure classification by the
Joint Committee Staff.28' This large area of. common ground
demonstrates that such definitional disputes are largely at the margins
and that TEA has a settled core that makes it a useful analytical
tool,282 notwithstanding the intense criticism that it has endured.
278 See 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 287-90. The Treasury
Department prepares the annual list of tax expenditures that is included in the
President's annual budget proposal. See GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1,
at 7-8.
179 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2006 ESTIMATES, supra note 275, at 22-
25, 30-42.
280 We use the phrase "no more than" because certain items that are identified as
tax expenditures by the Joint Committee Staff but are excluded from the Treasury list
may have been excluded only because they fell below the $5 million de minimis
ceiling employed by the Treasury. Unfortunately, the Treasury's presentation does
not identify items that it regards as tax expenditures but excludes from its list under
this de minimis convention. See 2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at
290 & tbl.19-1.
281 See id. at 285-90, 296-97 & tbl.19-3; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2006
ESTIMATES, supra note 275, at 24-25. The one exception is the passive loss rules
exception for up to $25,000 of rental real estate losses. See I.R.C. § 469(i).
282 See Burman, supra note 129, at 618, 626; Roin, supra note 8, at 605-08, 610-
14; Sugin, supra note 2, at 416-19; Linda Sugin, What Is Happening to the Tax
Expenditure Budget?, 104 TAx NOTES 763 (July 5, 2004). Surprising support came
from the Bush administration's OMB, which stated:
The information in the tax expenditure tables can be useful to
policymakers and the public. Potentially, it indicates how the current tax
code deviates from an ideal tax system.... Despite the conceptual
limitations, the tables of tax expenditures have provided tax reformers with
information about where the tax code deviates from a defined baseline and
about tax preferences that ought to be limited or even eliminated to
improve the tax code.
Foster Letter, supra note 32, at 3, in GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at
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K. Inaccuracy
One of Surrey's reasons for promoting TEA was to facilitate
disclosure of the full cost of the federal government by producing
estimates of revenue losses from tax expenditures that could be added
to the totals of direct congressional appropriations! 3 Critics have
argued that TEA cannot fulfill this role because the repeal of one or
more tax expenditures would produce both positive and negative
secondary revenue effects that are hard to quantify and make
estimates of tax expenditure revenue losses inherently uncertain. The
Treasury Department has explained this problem as follows with
respect to its annual tax expenditure estimates:
The estimates shown for individual tax expenditures.., do
not necessarily equal the increase in Federal revenues (or the
change in the budget balance) that would result from
repealing these special provisions, for the following reasons:
First, eliminating a tax expenditure may have incentive
effects that alter economic behavior. These incentives can
affect the resulting magnitudes of the activity or of other tax
provisions or Government programs. For example, if capital
gains were taxed at ordinary rates, capital gain realizations
would be expected to decline, potentially resulting in a
decline in tax receipts. Such behavioral effects are not
reflected in the estimates.
Second, tax expenditures are interdependent even without
incentive effects. Repeal of a tax expenditure provision can
increase or decrease the tax revenues associated with other
provisions. For example, even if behavior does not change,
repeal of an itemized deduction could increase the revenue
costs from other deductions because some taxpayers would
be moved into higher tax brackets. Alternatively, repeal of an
itemized deduction could lower the revenue cost from other
84; see also Charles Davenport, Tax Expenditure Analysis as a Tool for Policymakers,
11 TAX NOTES 1051, 1052 (Oct. 6, 1980) ("The only people who think there is a
serious definitional problem are academics."); McIntyre, supra note 2, at 94-101
(arguing that the difficulties of defining tax expenditures can be obviated by treating
as tax expenditures all tax provisions that are justified on subsidy or incentive
grounds); Surrey & McDaniel, Current Developments, supra note 6, at 228 (arguing
on similar grounds).
23 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 6,25, 226.
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deductions if taxpayers are led to claim the standard
deduction instead of itemizing. Similarly, if two provisions
were repealed simultaneously, the increase in tax liability
could be greater or less than the sum of the two separate tax
expenditures, because each is estimated assuming that the
other remains in force.284
From this point of view, the estimated revenue losses, and therefore
the estimated costs, of tax expenditures are substantially uncertain
and not helpful in measuring the full cost of the federal government.
281
Such criticism may not be a good faith objection, however,
because these same imperfections affect the procedures that are
regularly used, without serious dissent, to produce revenue estimates
for budgetary purposes and to evaluate proposed legislative
286
changes. More importantly, our principal point is that TEA is a
highly useful tool for implementing the principles of ability-to-pay and
neutrality and for imposing recasting and cost/benefit analysis. We are
not concerned with calculating precise revenue loss amounts. The
numbers yielded by TEA show rough magnitudes that are sufficient
284 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 286; see also THOMAS L.
HUNGERFORD, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TAX EXPENDITURES: TRENDS AND
CRITIQUES 7 (Cong. Res. Service, Sept. 13, 2006); Forman, supra note 4, at 541
(describing the early Nixon Administration's concerns about the reliability of TEA
revenue estimates); Griffith, supra note 11, at 349; Joseph E. Stiglitz & Michael J.
Boskin, Impact of Recent Developments in Public Finance Theory on Public Policy
Decisions: Some Lessons from the New Public Finance, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 296-
97 (1977). But see Davenport, supra note 282, at 1054 (arguing that in a progressive
income tax system the revenue gain resulting from eliminating several tax expenditure
provisions would be larger than the total revenue gain determined by adding up the
revenue estimates for each tax expenditure provision under the assumption that each
such provision was the only one being repealed). For a model that attempts to
determine the revenue gain from eliminating different combinations of tax
expenditure provisions, see Daniel H. Weinberg, The Distributional Implications of
Tax Expenditures and Comprehensive Income Taxation, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 237 (1987).
285 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 415-18; Burman, supra note 129, at
614-15; Adam Carasso & Gene Steuerle, Tax Expenditures: Revenue Loss Outlay
Equivalents, 101 TAX NOTES 287 (Oct. 6, 2003); Foster Letter, supra note 32, at 3-4, in
GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 84-85; Roin, supra note 8, at 613-14;
see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 226-31; Shaviro,
supra note 8, at 221-30.
286 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 15, at 44-49; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 9, at 152-55; SURREY &
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 6, 226-31; Roin, supra note 8, at
614-22; see also Davenport, supra note 282, at 1054.
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for separating de minimis cases from significant cases and for making
useful comparisons between tax expenditures and analogous direct
287
expenditures. Moreover, even if the TEA revenue loss estimates
lack precision, they are more illuminating than the alternative - an
estimate of zero (i.e., no estimate at all) - because such estimates
show that tax expenditures are not without cost and that these costs
are often material. In addition, the TEA cost estimates tell us
something about the degree of distortion caused by particular tax
expenditures, an important consideration in applying cost/benefit
analysis Thus, in our view, the imprecision in TEA cost estimates
does not significantly undercut the effectiveness of TEA as an
analytical tool of tax policy.
L. What Professor Bittker Actually Concluded
Professor Boris Bittker was one of the earliest and most
thoughtful skeptics regarding TEA29 and more recent critics have
relied on his work.' 90 Consequently, it is interesting to recall that his
bottom-line verdict on TEA was the following:
Would it be useful, then, to have a more limited
accounting, one that confined itself to estimating the cost of
departures from the Haig-Simons definition, without
attempting to account for the "cost" of such structural
provisions as the joint return, rate schedules, taxable periods,
tax exemptions, and other aspects of existing law for which
that definition provides no normative model? Yes, in my
opinion: like the revenue estimates that usually accompany
the Treasury's recommendations for statutory changes, such
calculations could provide information that would be helpful
in applying our political, economic, and ethical criteria in
making policy judgments about the income tax system.
Assuming a consistent use of the Haig-Simons definition,
See GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 19-21; PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 52-54;
Sugin, supra note 2, at 416-17.
28 See Burman, supra note 129, at 620.
289 See, e.g., Bittker, Accounting, supra note 11; Bittker, Personal Expenditures,
supra note 96.
290 See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., REVIEW, supra note 168, at 6; Bartlett, The
End, supra note 8, at 414-15; Kahn & Lehman, supra note 8, at 1663 n.8; see also
Shaviro, supra note 8, at 205.
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moreover, these estimates would help to show whether the
departures of existing law are skewed in a particular direction,
and whether some departures counterbalance rather than
reinforce the others - matters of much importance for the
person who acknowledges that some departures are
unavoidable, but who wants nevertheless to approach as
closely as possible to the Haig-Simons ideal. Finally, such a
set of estimates would permit statutory provisions that depart
from the Haig-Simons definition to be judged on their merits,
free of the criticism that the non-disclosure of their cost
automatically makes them inferior to subsidies as devices for
achieving their objectives, since these instances of "back-door
spending," if disclosed, would be no more surreptitious than
"front door spending."
291
These comments are consistent with our view that TEA's most
important function is to trigger rigorous scrutiny of tax provisions that
depart from the SHS baseline and that its imperfections do not justify
abandoning its benefits. The defects of TEA are real, but TEA can
nevertheless continue to serve an important function in tax policy
analysis. If anything, the growth of tax expenditure programs during
the past three decades292 makes TEA even more important in today's
policy world.
M. The Limited Success of TEA
Although the President's annual budget and the annual report of
tax expenditures by the Joint Committee on Taxation provide
comprehensive lists of tax expenditures, there is, regrettably, no
institutionalized structure for regularly and comprehensively
291 Bittker, Accounting, supra note 11, at 260-61 (emphasis added); see also
Shaviro, supra note 8, at 203. Another TEA critic, Professor Zelinsky, has also
acknowledged the positive influence of TEA on the tax policymaking process:
"Despite my reservations about the classification of items as normative or subsidizing,
I believe that on balance, the tax expenditure budget has improved the quality of tax
discussion and policymaking, forcing greater scrutiny of the Code and proposals to
change it." Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures, supra note 2, at 1.168
n.14; see also Zelinsky, Response, supra note 11, at 893-94 ("Professor Surrey and his
followers have performed a service of inestimable value by demonstrating the
equivalence between direct and tax expenditures, exposing the fallacy that tax
expenditures are costless, establishing annual accounting of tax expenditures, and
highlighting the possible inequities and inefficiencies of such expenditures.").
292 See GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 19-23.
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submitting tax incentives and subsidies to recasting and cost/benefit
293
analysis. Instead, TEA is usually employed ad hoc in response to
proposals for new tax expenditures (both to review the new proposals
and to determine if existing tax expenditures should be repealed to
pay for the new ones) and in response to broader tax reform
294programs. Various commentators have suggested governmental
arrangements and methods that would ensure more regular
cost/benefit review of tax expenditures95 and we hope that those
suggestions will be fully explored and will bear fruit. Such suggestions
are not, however, within the scope of this article. Rather, our principal
point is that even with the limitations resulting from its present ad hoc
application, TEA is a valuable tax policy tool that has had a positive
296influence on the tax legislative process.
Nevertheless, TEA has met with less than complete success. Tax
expenditures, whether defective or well-conceived, have continued to
grow in number 297 and Professor Surrey's hope "that tax expenditures
once identified [would] be converted into direct expenditures or
repealed altogether, has made little if any headway."'2 98 However, the
complaints lodged against TEA by advocates of tax incentives and
299
subsidies suggest that TEA has had a restraining effect and that
without its presence tax expenditure growth would have been even
more robust. Moreover, TEA continues to provide both a tool for
293 See id. at 58-71; Burman, supra note 129, at 622-26; Foster Letter, supra note
32, at 4, in GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 85; Hungerford, supra note
51, at 328.
294 See Foster Letter, supra note 32, at 4, in GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra
note 1, at 85.
295 See, e.g., GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 73-74; Mary L.
Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Government Program
Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 751 (2000).
2% See Burman, supra note 129, at 626; Roin, supra note 8, at 605-08, 610-13;
Sugin, supra note 2, at 416-17.
297 See GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 19-23.
298 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 187 (citations omitted). One TEA critic, Professor
Zelinsky, has suggested that one reason that TEA has been unsuccessful in
eliminating tax expenditures is a framing effect phenomenon, under which support for
a government program varies depending on whether it is framed as a direct program
or tax subsidy. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing
Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax
Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797 (2005).
299 See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., REVIEW, supra note 168, at 6; Bartlett, The
End, supra note 8, at 420; Fried, supra note 169.
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asking the right questions about tax incentives and subsidies and a
goad to the Treasury Department and Congress to do so. TEA helps
promote transparency and accountability in the process of enacting
government programs through the tax system and makes it more
difficult for politicians to hide what they are really doing in terms of
government spending. In short, given the continuing pressures on the
Executive Branch and Congress to use tax expenditures in lieu of
direct expenditure programs as a way to lessen political accountability
for such actions, TEA or something very much like it is as important
as it ever was.300
V. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
As has been noted many times in this article, the appropriate
labeling of a tax provision as a tax expenditure (i.e., properly
classifying a statutory provision as a tax expenditure) does not call for
automatic rejection of the provision. Instead, it calls for a cost/benefit
analysis.3 ' Because tax expenditures are so varied, this cost/benefit
analysis will usually have to be done on a case-by-case basis; a
mandatory template seems inadvisable. Nevertheless, the following
questions will be relevant in most cases:302
300 See also Peroni, Chaotic State of Tax Policy, supra note 238, at 317.
301 SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at viii; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 25-27; Shaviro, supra note 8, at 209, 221. Professor
Surrey argued that tax expenditures had certain characteristics that usually made
them inferior to direct expenditures as a method for implementing government
programs. See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 2, at 134-54; SURREY & MCDANIEL,
TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 102-17. These characteristics are not automatic
disqualifiers. Instead, they should be woven into questions 2 and 3 of the cost/benefit
analysis listed infra text accompanying notes 302-04. For critiques contending that
some of Surrey's points regarding the general inferiority of tax expenditures are
overstated, see Roin, supra note 8, at 612; Toder, supra note 8, at 366-68; Weisbach &
Nussim, supra note 8, at 978-79; Zelinsky, The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, supra
note 11, at 1026-33; Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures, supra note
2, at 1194-1207.
302 These questions, however, may need to be modified in appropriate cases. For
example, question 1 would have to be modified in a case where an argument can be
made in favor of having a government program but interpretation of the relevant
constitutional case law would allow an indirect tax subsidy to be used but not a direct
expenditure program (e.g., the charitable deduction under section 170 for gifts to
religious organizations). In such a case, question 1 would be modified to ask whether
the direct program analogue would be acceptable, assuming that such a program was
constitutionally permissible. For more detailed approaches to structuring the
cost/benefit analysis of a tax expenditure provision, see PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 27:437
1. Is the tax expenditure an acceptable governmental program
when recast as an analogous direct expenditure program?
2. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, do the
benefits of the tax expenditure outweigh its costs, including its
undesirable effects and its costs of administration?
30 3
3. If the answers to both of the preceding questions are yes,
can the tax expenditure's benefits, nevertheless, be better
achieved through a direct expenditure program?'04
PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 83; THE CENTURY
FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES, BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND
(2002); SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 112-17; Gene
Steuerle, Summers on Social Tax Expenditures: Where He's Right, 89 TAX NOTES 1481
(Dec. 11, 2000); Steuerle, Summers on Social Tax Expenditures II, supra note 124, at
1639; Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 3, at 21-26. For discussions of the reasons
why most tax expenditures fail under cost/benefit scrutiny, see Shaviro, supra note 8,
at 202; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 8, at 973, 978.
303 The costs of a tax expenditure should include the costs of administering the
program through the tax system but there is no specific information available
regarding the administrative costs of tax expenditures. See GAO, FEDERAL
COMMITMENT, supra note 1, at 54; Toder, supra note 8, at 365. This information
failure could make the costs of a tax expenditure program erroneously appear to be
lower than the costs of an analogous direct expenditure program when, in fact, they
are not lower. This problem obviously is most serious when the tax expenditure
program being evaluated is particularly complex (as is true of most international tax
provisions) so that the government is forced to incur substantial administrative costs
to implement/enforce it.
304 Professor Anne Alstott has noted that tax system-based governmental
programs have certain inherent institutional limitations that need to be taken into
account in answering this question: "less accurate targeting, less responsiveness to
changing needs, and vulnerability to noncompliance." Anne L. Alstott, The Earned
Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 533, 589 (1995) (analyzing the earned income tax credit in section 32 as a
mechanism for effecting welfare reform). By contrast, one TEA critic, Professor
Zelinsky, takes the position that in many cases tax subsidies are preferable to their
direct expenditure program analogues because "the committees and agencies that
design and administer tax subsidies are less prone to capture by clientele groups,
conform more closely to pluralist norms, and are better positioned to make decisions
informed by expertise than their direct expenditure counterparts." Zelinsky, A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures, supra note 2, at 1194. Contra authorities
cited supra note 124. Professor Zelinsky also defends many tax subsidies on economic
efficiency grounds. See Zelinsky, The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, supra note 11.
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If the answer to the third question is that a direct expenditure
program is a better delivery mechanism for achieving the benefits of
the program, then the tax provision in question should be retained
only if other tax policy criteria support its retention. If the answer to
the third question is negative (i.e., a direct expenditure provision
would not be a superior method for achieving the benefits of the
program), then the provision withstands scrutiny under TEA and is a
good candidate for retention in the federal income tax system.
Different policy analysts may reach different conclusions based on
this analysis. To take one example, a number of commentators have
argued that the charitable contribution deduction in section 170 is an
example of a tax expenditure provision that is an acceptable
governmental program, the benefits of which exceed its costs
(including, most particularly, its effects on tax administration and tax
compliance), and which is superior to its direct governmental program
analogue.05 Yet, other commentators have taken the position that the
charitable contribution deduction is an inefficient tax expenditure and
that a program of direct grants for charities (at least, nonreligious
charities) would be more effective.3°6 This latter point of view has
305 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 529 (7th ed.
2007) (concluding that the charitable contribution deduction may be more efficient in
promoting charitable giving than a direct governmental program of charitable grants);
Feldstein, supra note 35, at 99 (same; making use of extension of Ramsey theory of
optimal commodity taxation in assessing the efficiency of the charitable contribution
deduction); see also Zelinsky, A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures, supra note
2, at 1192-94 (arguing that in the charitable area, "there is less danger of religious
interests' capturing tax institutions than direct expenditure agencies"). For an analysis
of nonprofit tax policies as a tax expenditure program of providing foreign aid, see
David E. Pozen, Comment, Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid, 116 YALE L.J. 869
(2007).
Some commentators have argued that the charitable contribution deduction is a
base-defining provision rather than a subsidy. See Andrews, Personal Deductions,
supra note 59, at 344-46. Under this view, the charitable contribution deduction
would not even be subject to TEA. For a spirited critique of the Andrews theory for
not treating the charitable contribution deduction as a subsidy, see Mark P. Gergen,
The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1414-26
(1988).
306 See, e.g., E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., An Economic and Constitutional Case for
Repeal of the I.R.C. Section 170 Deduction for Charitable Contributions to Religious
Organizations, 27 DuQ. L. REV. 695 (1989): Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching
Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27
TAX L. REV. 377 (1972); Yorio, Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 145, at 422-23.
The Service is reportedly undertaking a study to determine whether it would make
sense to replace the charitable contribution deduction in the Code with a direct
20081
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generally prevailed among the tax policy commentators but not with
the U.S. Congress, which to date has been unwilling to repeal (or even
substantially reduce) the charitable contribution tax subsidy.
Although tax reform proponents are not pleased with this outcome,
the debate has at least focused on the right questions and TEA has
been a major factor in achieving that focus.
VI. TEA AND THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX REGIME
In our judgment, Parts I through IV of this article have shown
that regardless of its imperfections, TEA is a useful and powerful tool
of tax policy analysis and that TEA is as important today as it was
when it first achieved prominence in the United States in the 1960s.
TEA, however, has been under-utilized in international taxation,
which has grown in significance as cross-border transactions have
become a more important part of the U.S. and world economies.30 7 As
is true of the domestic tax area discussed earlier in this article, TEA
can help focus tax policy analysts on the right questions in evaluating
the efficacy of the international tax provisions in the Code and it is
unfortunate that TEA has played such a small role in the international
tax reform debates to date. One major objective of this article is to
help remedy this deficiency. Accordingly, in this Part of the article, we
apply TEA to three important elements of the U.S. system for taxing
income derived by U.S. persons from business or investment activities
conducted abroad - deferral of U.S. tax on income earned through a
foreign corporation, cross-crediting, and the export sales source rule.
A. Deferral of U.S. Tax on Income
Earned Through a Foreign Corporation
Under the current U.S. international tax rules, foreign-source
government program in the form of a government match of charitable contributions.
See Dustin Stamper, IRS Studying Bold Policy Replacement for Charitable Deduction,
2007 TNT 115-7 (June 14,2007).
'07 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21' CENTURY 2 (Dec.
2007) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T., COMPETITIVENESS REPORT]; U.S. Commerce
Dep't, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Transactional Tables: U.S. International
Transactions in Goods and Services and U.S. International Transactions, 85 SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS D-64, D-65 (May 2005); U.S. Commerce Dep't, Bureau of
Econ. Analysis, Transactional Tables: U.S. International Transactions in Goods and
Services and U.S. International Transactions, 84 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS D-62,
D-63 (Oct. 2004).
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income earned by a U.S. person directly, through an unincorporated
branch, or through an entity taxed on a pass-through basis (i.e., a
partnership or limited liability company that is treated as a
partnership for U.S. tax purposes under the U.S. entity classification
rules)3°8 pays current U.S. tax on that income, subject to a direct
foreign tax credit for creditable foreign taxes imposed on such
income. 309 By contrast, foreign-source income earned by a U.S. person
through a foreign subsidiary corporation generally is not subject to
U.S. tax until the income is repatriated through a distribution to the
U.S. person or upon sale by the U.S. person of the foreign subsidiary's
stock (i.e., the tax is "deferred")," ° unless one of the anti-deferral
regimes in the Code applies."' Thus, the U.S. person obtains the
benefit of deferral of the U.S. tax, which substantially reduces the
effective rate of that tax. In fact, if the period of deferral is long
enough, the present value of the future U.S. tax approaches zero and
'08 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (2007), -3 (2006). The entity classification rules
of current law are often referred to as the "check-the-box" rules. For a discussion of
these rules, see ROBERT J. PERONI, STEVEN A. BANK & GLENN E. COVEN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 40-48, 817-21 (3d ed. 2006).
309 See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 34, 276, 443-44; 1
KUNTz & PERONI, supra note 133, B3.01; SCHOLES, WOLFSON, ERICKSON, MAYDEW
& SHEVLIN, supra note 23, at 288-90. For a detailed policy study by the Treasury
Department on the deferral issue, see U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra
note 216. For an earlier Treasury study on international tax reform, which included a
significant discussion of the deferral issue, see U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERNATIONAL
TAX REFORM: AN INTERIM REPORT 7-17, 41-53 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT].
310 See, e.g., ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 171-72;
GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 34, 276, 443-44; 1 ISENBERGH, supra
note 133, 91 1.12; 1 KuNTz & PERONI, supra note 133, B3.01; SCHOLES, WOLFSON,
ERICKSON, MAYDEW & SHEVLIN, supra note 23, at 288-90; see also Ault & Bradford,
supra note 133, at 12, 27-28.
311 The two most important anti-deferral regimes are the Subpart F provisions
that apply to a "controlled foreign corporation" (CFC), I.R.C. §§ 951-964, and the
rules that apply to a "passive foreign investment company," I.R.C. §§ 1291-1298. See
3 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS chs. 69, 70 (rev. 3d ed. 2005); 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 133, chs. 70-77, 80;
1 KUNTz & PERONI, supra note 133, chs. B2, B3. In our view, these anti-deferral
regimes do not do enough to curtail the deferral subsidy, particularly in the light of
the legislative changes made to them since 1996 that further reduce their
effectiveness. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income:
End It, Don't Mend It - Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2001) [hereinafter Peroni, End It, Don't Mend It]; Peroni,
Fleming, & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at 488-
92.
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deferral becomes equivalent to exemption of tax on the foreign
312
corporation's income. Consequently, deferral has many of the same
distortive effects on taxpayer behavior as would outright exemption of
313the foreign-source income from U.S. tax.
This deferral subsidy encourages U.S. persons to shift their
operations and investments abroad to low-tax foreign countries,3"4
even if their pre-tax returns on the investments in such foreign
countries are below those on comparable investments in the United
States."' This deferral subsidy also serves as a barrier to repatriation
312 See, e.g., REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL
LAW 124 (2007) [hereinafter AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL
LAW]; VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 78 (1995); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1593 n.70 (2000); Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation, supra note 220, at 339-40; Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of
International Taxation: Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES 581, 584 (Apr.
30, 1990); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1065 (1997). For a recent article discussing
U.S. companies that use deferral and other tax preferences to reduce their taxes to
very low effective rates, see Nanette Byrnes, The Taxman Barely Cometh, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 3, 2007, at 56.
313 See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 443-44.
314 See id.; Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: U.S. Multinationals Move
More Profits to Tax Havens, 102 TAX NOTES 690 (Feb. 9, 2004); see also Rosanne
Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Governments and Multinational Corporations in the Race
to the Bottom, 110 TAX NOTES 979 (Feb. 27, 2006) (concluding that empirical analysis
shows that aggressive tax planning strategies, which take advantage of deferral and
the check-the-box entity classification regulations, played a greater role in the decline
in the effective tax rates on the foreign income of U.S. multinationals during the
period after 1996); David Harris, Randall Morck, Joel Slemrod & Bernard Yeung,
Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 277, 278 (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod eds.,
1993) (empirical study reporting "cross-firm regression results that are consistent with
the notion that multinational firms shift income from high-tax locations to the United
States and from the United States to low tax locations").
315 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 7 ("[T]he
combined benefits of the deferral of U.S. tax and the lower foreign corporate-level tax
could cause a U.S. multinational corporation to prefer foreign investments with pre-
tax returns substantially below those of otherwise comparable domestic
investments."); GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 444; Peroni, Back to
the Future, supra note 133, at 987; Peroni, End It, Don't Mend It, supra note 311, at
1613-14; Robert J. Peroni, The Proper Approach for Taxing the Income of Foreign
Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1579, 1583-84 (2001) [hereinafter
Peroni, The Proper Approach]; see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni &
Stephen E. Shay, Deferral: Consider Ending It, Instead of Expanding It, 86 TAX
NOTES 837, 837-38 (Feb. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider
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of the U.S. person's share of the foreign corporation's foreign-source
income because it encourages U.S. persons to favor retention of the
earnings by the foreign corporation.' 16 The empirical studies, however,
are inconclusive on the extent of the effect of repatriation taxes on
.. 317
location decisions of U.S. corporations.
Ending It]; Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra
note 133, at 468-69. But see Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International
Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1269-70 (1981) [hereinafter Kingson, Coherence]
(suggesting that deferral as a substantive tax policy issue has become less important as
the problem of exporting jobs in the manufacturing sector has allegedly peaked and
the supposedly less mobile trade and service industries become increasingly
responsible for job creation in the United States).
316 J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the Foreign Tax Credit
Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax - What's ETI Repeal Got To Do With
It?, 104 TAX NOTES 1393, 1406 (Sept. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, ETI
Repeal]. Thus, the U.S. tax is viewed as a barrier to repatriations and leads to what
many commentators call the "lockout phenomenon," i.e., foreign-source earnings that
would otherwise be repatriated to the United States are locked out of the United
States by the prospect of a U.S. income tax upon repatriation. See id. In 2004,
Congress enacted a temporary relief measure in the form of a dividends-received
deduction in section 965, which was intended to encourage repatriations of deferred
earnings. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422, 118
Stat. 1418, 1514-19 (2004). For a tax policy critique of the section 965 deduction on
fairness and economic efficiency grounds, see Fleming & Peroni, ETI Repeal, supra.
For a critique of the section 965 deduction as a tax amnesty program, see Craig M.
Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 667 (2007).
317 See DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, TAX EXEMPTION FOR REPATRIATED FOREIGN
EARNINGS: PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS 7 (Cong. Res. Service, Oct. 22, 2003); HARRY
GRUBERT & JOHN MuITI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME: DIVIDEND
EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM (2001) [hereinafter GRUBERT & MUTrI,
TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME]; Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert,
Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation Strategies and Multinational Financial Policy, 87 J.
PUB. ECON. 73 (2003) [hereinafter Altshuler & Grubert, Repatriation Taxes]; Rosanne
Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go if We Go Territorial? Dividend
Exemption and the Foreign Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational Corporations, 54
NAT'L TAX J. 787 (2001); Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr.,
Repatriation Taxes and Dividend Distortions, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 829 (2001); Fleming &
Peroni, ETI Repeal, supra note 316, at 1410. Moreover, a 2007 Treasury background
paper stated that "comparisons of the behavior of corporations with and without
excess foreign tax credits suggest that the repatriation tax must not be imposing a
significant burden." U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 51.
One major reason for this is the various techniques that U.S. corporations can use to
avoid the repatriation tax on dividends while still having cash flow to the U.S. parent
corporation. Id.; see, e.g., Altshuler & Grubert, Repatriation Taxes, supra, at 74;
Fleming & Peroni, ETI Repeal, supra note 316, at 1410.
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To determine whether the deferral subsidy represents a departure
from a normative baseline and, therefore, is a tax expenditure
provision, we must first identify a baseline. In this context, we can
articulate the baseline in three alternative ways.
The general principle of ability-to-pay. As developed more fully in
Part III.A above,318 the principle that the income tax burden should be
allocated among taxpayers in relation to their taxpaying abilities -
the ability-to-pay principle - is the fundamental fairness norm
underlying the U.S. federal income tax system. U.S. persons' foreign-
source income confers ability-to-pay319 but deferral allows U.S.
persons to avoid current U.S. taxation with respect to foreign-source
income earned through a foreign corporation. Thus, even though the
U.S. income tax system has incorporated some significant features of a
consumption tax base by exempting certain types of savings from
current taxation, the deferral subsidy is a departure from the general
320ability-to-pay baseline.
The anti-deferral tax concept supporting the imposition of the
321corporate income tax. As explained earlier in this article, the
corporate income tax serves a critical anti-deferral function, although
it is admittedly a crude, second-best anti-deferral mechanism. Without
the corporate income tax, C corporation shareholders would be able
to completely defer taxation of business income earned through the
corporation until they withdrew the earnings from the corporation (or
sold their stock); the corporate income tax attempts to prevent that
from happening by imposing a current income tax on a C
corporation's net earnings. Because deferral of U.S. tax on foreign-
source income earned through a foreign C corporation owned by U.S.
persons allows avoidance of current imposition of the corporate
income tax, deferral undercuts the anti-deferral function of the
corporate tax system and, thus, is a departure from the corporate
income tax baseline.
The general current business taxation regime. The general
approach of the U.S. income tax system is to impose current tax on
318 See supra text accompanying notes 36-55.
319 See, e.g., Ault & Bradford, supra note 133, at 27 (U.S. system of taxing the
worldwide income of its citizens and residents "reflects the conception of income as a
measure of ability to pay").
320 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International Taxation, supra note
220, at 353-54; Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 981-82; see also TANZI,
supra note 312, at 77-78 (stating that residence-based taxation of international
income is superior to source-based taxation on both allocative and equity grounds).
321 See supra text accompanying notes 215-18.
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business income earned by a U.S. person, whether that income is
earned through an unincorporated branch, a sole proprietorship, a
flow-through entity (i.e., a partnership, a limited liability company
taxed as a partnership for federal income tax purposes, or an S
corporation), or an entity taxed as a C corporation for federal income
tax purposes.32 2 Deferral with respect to foreign-source income earned
by U.S. persons through a foreign corporation is a deviation from this
general approach. Thus, the deferral privilege is a significant
departure from the current taxation of business income that generally
323prevails within the present income tax system. This departure
creates a preference for foreign-source income and encourages
taxpayers to shift business and investment activities from the United
324States to low-tax foreign countries.
Stated differently, deferral is the equivalent of imposing postpaid
consumption tax treatment (i.e., allowing a deduction at time of
investment and imposing taxation on liquidation of the investment)
with respect to the income of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC)
invested in the CFC's business operations.32 ' Thus, deferral effectively
322 See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 61(a)(1), (a)(2), 63, 702, 1366; ELISABETH A. OWENS, THE
FOREIGN TAX CREDIT 3 (1961) ("[T]he source or nature of income, whether it is from
one type of business or another, earned or unearned, from a foreign or domestic
source, is largely immaterial in the basic tax structure.").
123 See, e.g., ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 171-72.
324 See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of the American Jobs Act
of 1996, 72 TAX NOTES 1165, 1166-67 (Aug. 26, 1996); Donald J. Rousslang, Deferral
and the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 589
(2000); see also Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: A Challenge to Conventional
International Tax Wisdom, 113 TAX NOTES 951, 959-60 (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
Sullivan, A Challenge] (deferral helps contribute to the phenomenon of "runaway
plants," but the magnitude of the problem is relatively small). Regarding the
responsiveness of host country taxes on location of U.S. multinational investment, see
Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. Corporations Invest?,
53 NAT'L TAX J. 825 (2000) (empirical study of the international operations of more
than 500 U.S. companies in sixty potential foreign locations showing that average
effective tax rates of host countries "have a significant effect on the amount of capital
that U.S. MNCs [U.S. multinational corporations] have in a given location" and
suggesting that almost one out of every five dollars invested abroad by U.S.
corporations is drawn to its investment location because of low host country taxes);
Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Has U.S. Investment Become
More Sensitive to Tax Rates? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6383, 1998) (providing further empirical support for proposition that foreign
investment by U.S. multinational corporations is sensitive to host country tax rates).
325 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 844-45;
Peroni, Fleming, & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
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provides an exemption from U.S. tax with respect to earnings on CFCS• 326
income invested in the CFC's business operations. This effective
327
exemption via deferral is a subsidy delivered through the tax system
and, therefore, is properly characterized as a tax expenditure. The
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Office of
Management and Budget/Treasury have both consistently treated
deferral as a tax expenditure and have attempted to quantify the cost
328
of this tax subsidy.
Some proponents of deferral argue that deferral is not a tax
. 329
expenditure. As noted earlier in this article, they base this argument
in part on the proposition that deferral follows from a decision to treat
corporations and shareholders as separate taxpayers and, therefore, is
not a deviation from the normative baseline for properly measuring
net income."" As explained above, however, this view is inconsistent
with (1) the principle of ability-to-pay, (2) the anti-deferral tax
concept supporting the imposition of the corporate income tax, and
311(3) the general current business taxation regime.
Other proponents of deferral argue that even if deferral is a tax
subsidy, it survives a cost/benefit analysis because it remedies a
competitiveness problem that U.S. multinationals experience when
they engage in international business transactions in low-tax foreign
466-68. This point is illustrated in the example infra Part VI.C.
326 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 845;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
467-68; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 45 (stating
that deferral "substantially lowers the effective rate of tax" on active business income
earned through a foreign subsidiary "and moves the U.S. tax system towards a
territorial system"); Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 312, at 1064-65.
327 With respect to measuring the amount of the subsidy, see SURREY &
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 228-30.
328 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2007 ESTIMATES, supra note 13, at
24 (estimating the total revenue cost for fiscal years 2007-2011 from the deferral of
U.S. income tax on the active income of CFCs as $34.6 billion and from the deferral of
active financing income as $5.7 billion); 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
29, at 287 (estimating the total revenue cost for fiscal years 2008-2012 from the
deferral of U.S. income tax on the income of CFCs as $73.35 billion and from the
deferred taxes for financial firms from certain income earned abroad as $3.55 billion).
329 See Bartlett, The End, supra note 8, at 416-17 (arguing that deferral is not a
tax expenditure); see also NORMAN TURE, TAXING FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME: THE
ECONOMIC AND EQUITY ISSUES 8-12 (Tax Foundation 1976) (arguing that deferral is
not a tax subsidy).
330 See supra text accompanying note 135.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 215-18 and 318-24.
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332
countries. This claim, however, is typically made with little or no
empirical support for the existence of a competitiveness problem333
332 See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, THE COMPETITIVE BURDEN: TAX TREATMENT OF
U.S. MULTINATIONALS 2 (Tax Foundation 1991) (focusing on the tax systems of
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States and concluding that "the
United States subjects the foreign operations of its multinationals to the severest tax
constraints and the heaviest tax burden of any of the four countries studied"); GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 49-55 (1992); 1 NFTC, REPORT AND ANALYSIS, supra note 135, at 3, 5; SOL
PICCIOTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION 114 (1992); William P. McClure &
Herman B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909 to 1989: How a Tilted
Playing Field Developed, 43 TAX NOTES 1379 (June 12, 1989); Peter Merrill & Carol
Dunahoo, 'Runaway Plant' Legislation: Rhetoric and Reality, 72 TAX NOTES 221, 226
(July 8, 1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 209 (2004) (discussing
competitiveness concerns as a rationale for repealing in 2004 the anti-deferral rules in
section 954 relating to foreign base company shipping income); U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 3 (discussing how deferral and exemption both
support the objective of competitiveness, but conflict with the objective of neutrality
using traditional economic analysis); U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, COMPETITIVENESS REPORT,
supra note 307, at 85-86 (discussing competitiveness concerns as a rationale for
weakening the Subpart F anti-deferral rules); HERBERT STEIN, TAX POLICY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 82-83 (Herbert Stein ed., 1988); Rosanne Altshuler, Recent
Developments in the Debate on Deferral, 87 TAX NOTES 255, 258-60 (Apr. 10, 2000)
(summarizing the arguments in favor of capital import neutrality and deferral);
Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 312, at 1109 ("[The compromises between conflicting
principles in the international tax area] have made the tax law governing international
transactions subject to routine complaints of competitive disadvantage by U.S.
companies depending on where they are competing and against whom."). For an
international tax economist who argues that deferral enhances the economic
efficiency of the home country under certain circumstances, see James R. Hines, Jr.,
The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential Reconsideration, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 385
(1999).
333 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 216, at 56 ("[T]he
United States, as a general matter, is agreed by almost any measure to be one of the
most competitive countries in the world."), 57 ("[T]he available data simply do not
provide a reliable basis for evaluating whether subpart F has affected multinational
competitiveness to any significant extent."); Sullivan, Incentives, supra note 3, at 23-
25; Timothy Aeppel, Overseas Profits Help U.S. Firms Through Tumult, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 2007, at 1 (discussing that U.S. corporations continue to experience growth in
foreign-source profits); Marc Champion, U.S. Ranked Most Competitive; Oil-Rich
Nations Show Promise, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 1, 2007, at A4 (2007 World Economic
Forum report characterized the U.S. economy as the most competitive in the world);
see also Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and
International Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV. 53, 64-65 (2006); Richard C.
Pugh, The Deferral Principle and U.S. Investment in Developing Countries, in UNITED
STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 267, 280 (Robert Hellawell ed.,
1980) (stating that "one faces a relative scarcity of detailed empirical analysis" in
536 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 27:437
and largely on the basis of limited anecdotal support or unsupported
assertions. Therefore, this competitiveness claim appears to be
overstated at best.335 Moreover, there is little factual support for the
assessing the claims of advocates and opponents of deferral). But cf STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 189 (Joint Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, OPTIONS], available at http://house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf (opining
that the current U.S. international tax system "arguably" impairs the competitiveness
of U.S. multinationals "in some cases"); U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER,
supra note 1, at 43 ("[T]he United States likely experiences some reduction of both
foreign direct investment and its corporate tax base due to its above-average CIT
[corporate income tax] rate."). For a skeptical economic efficiency critique of the
competitiveness arguments for the deferral subsidy, see Gravelle, supra note 324, at
1168.
334 For an example of a report that, though well-written, provides only limited
anecdotal support for its claims, see 1 NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE
NFTC FOREIGN INCOME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY - PAR T ONE: A RECONSIDERATION OF SUBPART F 102-10 (2001), available
at http://www.nftc.org/default.asp?Mode=DirectoryDisplay&id=162. For critiques of
this report, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Competition and Competitiveness: Review of
the NFTC Subpart F Report, 83 TAX NOTES 582 (Apr. 26, 1999); Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315. For a defense of this report by one of its
authors and a leading proponent of the competitiveness-based arguments for allowing
deferral, see Peter R. Merrill, A Response to Professor Avi-Yonah on Subpart F, 83
TAX NOTES 1802 (June 14, 1999).
335 See, e.g., TIMO VIHERKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 64 (1991); Gravelle, supra note 324, at 1168; see also
Paul R. McDaniel, Herman Goldman Lecture: Territorial vs. Worldwide International
Tax Systems: Which is Better for the U.S.?, 62 THE RECORD 70, 71 n.4 (2007)
[hereinafter McDaniel, Herman Goldman Lecture] (rejecting competitiveness as a tax
policy criterion "(1) because it has no substantive tax policy content (it seems largely
to be a rhetorical slogan for U.S. multinationals that want tax cuts) and (2) [the
author has] ... found no empirical studies that show U.S. companies are at a
competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis their foreign competitors"); Paul R. McDaniel,
Territorial vs Worldwide International Tax Systems: Which is Better for the U.S.?, 8
FLA. TAX REV. 283, 285 n.3 (2007) [hereinafter McDaniel, Territorial vs Worldwide]
(same); Michael J. McIntyre, Guidelines for Taxing International Capital Flows; The
Legal Perspective, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 315, 321 (1993) (opining that capital import
neutrality is "a spending principle, not a tax principle"); Joel Slemrod, Competitive
Advantage and the Optimal Tax Treatment of the Foreign-Source Income of
Multinationals: The Case of the United States and Japan, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 113
(1991); cf Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
443, 517-19 (2007) (maintaining that changes in the global economy weaken, rather
than strengthen, competitiveness arguments for the foreign earned income exclusion
in section 911).
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idea that deferral is actually effective in enhancing the
• • 336
competitiveness of U.S. multinationals.
At the end of the day, deferral is a distortive governmental
subsidy yielding dubious benefits. Consequently, deferral fails under
cost/benefit analysis as a program for providing U.S. corporations with
government assistance to make them competitive in the global
economy. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that certain
anomalies in the U.S. deferral subsidy cause its claimed benefits to be
only loosely coordinated with the supposed justifications for providing
this tax subsidy.337
First, the benefit of the deferral subsidy increases to the degree
that repatriation of CFC foreign earnings is delayed. This means that
U.S. taxpayers who can afford to postpone repatriation indefinitely
receive a much larger governmental subsidy than those who must
repatriate foreign earnings at an earlier time. Stated differently, the
size of the subsidy is determined significantly by the length of the
deferral period instead of the degree of foreign competition. The
policy reasons advanced in favor of deferral do not support this
result.338
Second, the deferral subsidy encourages retention and
reinvestment of foreign earnings by the CFC even though the CFC's
U.S. shareholders might be able to invest its earnings at higher before-
tax rates of return than are obtainable by the CFC. The tax subsidy
for deferral, thus, encourages economically inefficient behavior by the
336 With regard to the effectiveness of deferral in enhancing competitiveness, see
2007 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at 301 ("Measuring the effectiveness
of these provisions raises challenging issues."); International Task Force Report, supra
note 242, at 680 ("There is little or no empirical evidence supporting the benefits of
deferral as a justification for the competitiveness concerns raised by the availability of
deferral for foreign but not domestic income."). But see HUFBAUER, supra note 332.
There is empirical support for the proposition that investment by U.S.
multinational corporations in low-tax foreign countries is less beneficial to U.S.
competitiveness than investment by U.S. multinational corporations in high-tax
foreign countries. See Sullivan, A Challenge, supra note 324, at 956-57. Because
deferral encourages U.S. persons to shift business and investment activities to low-tax
foreign countries, deferral may in fact harm, rather than benefit, U.S.
competitiveness.
... See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 845;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
469.
338 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 845;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
469.
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CFC and its U.S. shareholders.339 It is highly doubtful that Congress
would purposely enact a government program that has this negative
behavioral effect.
Third, the deferral subsidy is fully available without regard to
whether the U.S. shareholder investing in the CFC has little
competition in the country in which the foreign income is earned or
faces intense competition in that country.34° The deferral subsidy is
available even if the U.S. shareholder investing in the CFC faces
competition primarily from individuals and corporations resident in
foreign countries that impose heavier tax burdens than does the
United States. Moreover, the deferral subsidy is fully forthcoming
even if the U.S. taxpayer's principal competitors in a particular
foreign country are other U.S. taxpayers. In other words, the deferral
subsidy is available without regard to whether, or the degree to which,
the U.S. taxpayer receiving the subsidy is actually facing a
competitiveness problem. 4' Thus, the deferral subsidy is not tailored
in any significant way to remedy the alleged competitiveness problems
that have been advanced as justification for the subsidy. This failure to
properly target the deferral subsidy is a problem shared by many
other domestic and international tax expenditure provisions.
Fourth, the deferral subsidy is available even with respect to
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals that produce goods for sale
in the United States (sometimes referred to as the "runaway plant"
problem). 342 In this case, the deferral subsidy creates a competitive
advantage for such foreign subsidiaries over purely domestic
competitors that sell the same goods in the United States. This feature
is even less defensible than other aspects of the subsidy3 and fails to
serve either fairness or efficiency concerns. Any sensible reform of the
U.S. international tax rules should at a minimum eliminate this
element of the deferral subsidy.
339 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 845;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
469.
740 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 845;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
469.
341 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 845;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
469.
342 See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 312, at 585.
343 See id. at 585. Attempts to fix this defect in the U.S. international tax rules
have been unsuccessful over the years.
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Fifth, the deferral subsidy is fully available regardless of the
extent to which it actually ameliorates other alleged defects in the
U.S. international tax rules, such as the supposed over-restrictiveness
of the foreign tax credit limitation and the interest expense allocation
rules, which are said by deferral advocates to help create a
competitiveness problem for U.S. multinational corporations.344 This
argument in favor of deferral was difficult to sustain even before the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 eviscerated the foreign tax credit
limitations in section 904(d) and changed the interest allocation rules
in a way favorable to U.S. multinational corporations (the latter
change effective for tax years ending after 2008). 345 Whatever strength
this argument in favor of the deferral subsidy ever had has been
dissipated by this 2004 legislation. In fact, in many cases, the effective
U.S. tax rate on foreign-source business income is quite low or even
346
negative, so no competitiveness problem can be shown to exist.
3" See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 846;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
469-70.
345 See Fleming & Peroni, ETI Repeal, supra note 316. For another spirited
critique of the international tax provisions in the 2004 legislation, see Charles I.
Kingson, The Great American Jobs Act Caper, 58 TAX L. REV. 327 (2005). For a
contrary view that characterizes the international tax component of the 2004
legislation as consisting of "mostly justified simplification measures," see Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, The Silver Lining: The International Tax Provisions of the American Jobs
Creation Act - A Reconsideration, 59 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 27
(2005); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 334 (2005).
34 See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler & T. Scott Newlon, The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy
on the Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 77, 90-92 (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel
Slemrod eds., 1993) (finding that the average U.S. tax rate on the foreign-source
income of a large sample of U.S. multinational corporations was only 3.4% in 1986);
Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxing Multinationals in a World with Portfolio Flows
and R&D: Is Capital Export Neutrality Obsolete?, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 439, 451-
52 (1995) [hereinafter Grubert & Mutti, Taxing Multinationals] (using 1990 tax return
data, the authors calculated a residual effective U.S. tax rate of about 2.7% on active
foreign-source income and an effective tax rate of only about 1.9% if the deferred
income of foreign subsidiaries is taken into account; the authors calculated a negative
effective tax rate of about 2.6% if certain misclassifications of U.S.-source income as
foreign-source income under current law are taken into account); Stephen E. Shay,
Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 29, 38 (Mar. 2004); Martin A. Sullivan,
Economic Analysis: Data Shows Dramatic Shift of Profits to Tax Havens, 104 TAX
NOTES 1190 (Sept. 13, 2004) ("The profits of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
in 18 tax havens soared from $88 billion in 1999 to $149 billion in 2002."); see also
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note
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Thus, as is true of most tax expenditure provisions in the federal
income tax system, the deferral subsidy provides more governmental
relief than is necessary to achieve its claimed objectives and,
therefore, is quite wasteful. Congress would not likely enact a direct
governmental program having this effect.
Sixth, the availability of, and amount of benefit received from, the
deferral subsidy is unrelated to whether the subsidy furthers a specific
foreign policy or economic assistance objective of the United States
by encouraging the taxpayer to operate in the low-tax foreign
country.347 Thus, deferral is a poorly targeted tax incentive program,
which may work at cross-purposes with other tax and nontax U.S.
governmental policies.
In sum, TEA demonstrates that deferral is a costly and ineffective
tax subsidy - namely, a tax expenditure which cannot pass muster
under any serious cost/benefit scrutiny. Accordingly, as we and
another co-author have argued in a series of articles, the deferral
subsidy should be eliminated by taxing U.S. shareholders currently on
their pro rata shares of a CFC's net income, whether or not
distributed, and allowing them a foreign tax credit for any foreign
income taxes imposed on such income (subject to a properly designed• • • 348
foreign tax credit limitation). Repealing deferral in the way we
15, at 104 (noting that under the current U.S. international tax system, some U.S.
multinationals are taxed at a lower rate on their foreign-source income than they
would be under an explicit exemption system and that some other multinationals are
taxed at a negative rate on their foreign-source income); International Task Force
Report, supra note 242, at 655-56 ("The effective rate of U.S. and foreign income
taxation of foreign income is understood to be materially lower than the effective rate
on domestic income.").
347 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 846;
Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at
469.
34 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315, at 850;
Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 989-92; Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting
Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133, at 523-24. For Treasury
Department discussions of various alternatives to the current Subpart F regime, see
U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 216, at 86-95; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 41-53. For other commentary recommending
termination of the deferral privilege, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral As
We Know It: Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219 (Jan. 13,
1997); Asim Bhansali, Note, Globalizing Consolidated Taxation of United States
Multinationals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1996); Green, supra note 39, at 74-80; Joseph
Isenbergh, Perspectives on the Deferral of U.S. Taxation of the Earnings of Foreign
Corporations, 66 TAXES 1062 (1988); Stephen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral
Rules, 74 TAXES 1042 (1996). For a critique of proposals to end deferral, see Reuven
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propose in these articles would enhance the competitiveness of U.S.
multinationals by removing the distortions of economic behavior
occasioned by the current deferral subsidy, combined with the
incoherent Subpart F and passive foreign investment company anti-
deferral regimes. U.S. multinationals would then be free to make
locational decisions and earnings repatriation decisions based on the1 49
highest and best use of the funds involved. If, despite this change,
the effect of U.S. taxation on the competitiveness of U.S.
multinational corporations in the global economy is demonstrated to
be an actual and serious problem, the first remedy that should be tried
is an across-the-board reduction in the corporate tax rates in section
11, not a distortive regime that effectively exempts only one type of
income (foreign-source business income) from U.S. income tax.350
B. Cross-Crediting
To mitigate international double taxation and attempt to prevent
such double taxation from discouraging economically efficient cross-
.. 351
border transactions, the United States grants U.S. citizens, resident
S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1329 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Structure of International
Taxation].
349 See also Edward D. Kleinbard, Throw Territorial Taxation from the Train, 114
TAX NOTES 547 (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Territorial Taxation] (making a
similar claim with respect to his full-inclusion "business enterprise income tax"
proposal). Kleinbard's business enterprise income tax proposal first appeared in print
in bare-bones outline form in 2005. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Business
Enterprise Income Tax: A Prospectus, 106 TAX NOTES 97 (Jan. 3, 2005).
350 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF
PRESENT-LAW RULES AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 57 (Joint
Comm. Print 1999) ("A policy that reduces all tax rates (applied to domestic and
foreign source income equally) is superior to a policy of equal revenue cost that
reduces tax rates only on foreign source income. With a broad reduction in rates,
there is a comparable increase in the rate of saving with no distortion of the allocation
of capital."); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE,
FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 123 (2008) ("In my view,
the most important corporate tax change Congress could enact - both to stimulate
our domestic economy and to increase the competitiveness of U.S. companies
throughout the world - would be to lower our corporate tax rate substantially.");
Sullivan, A Challenge, supra note 324, at 959; see also Peroni, End It, Don't Mend It,
supra note 311, at 1619; Peroni, The Proper Approach, supra note 315, at 1592. For
the reasons discussed earlier in this article, see supra text accompanying notes 189-
209, such an across-the-board tax cut would not constitute a tax expenditure program
and would not have to undergo TEA.
351 See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 277; OWENS, supra
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aliens, and domestic corporations a foreign tax credit.352 The foreign
tax credit is in the form of a dollar-for-dollar offset of qualifying
foreign taxes against the taxpayer's pre-credit U.S. tax liability, but
has long been subject to limitations of various types. Under the
overall limitation in section 904(a), the taxpayer's foreign tax credit
for the year is limited to the taxpayer's pre-foreign tax credit U.S. tax
liability on the taxpayer's foreign-source taxable income (i.e., foreign
source gross income minus the allowable deductions that are allocable
and apportionable to such income).353 The purpose of the overall
limitation is to prevent the foreign tax credit from offsetting U.S. tax
liability on U.S.-source taxable income.354 Under current law, section
904(d) breaks down this overall limitation into two categories, or
"baskets," which prevent the excess foreign tax credits from one
basket of foreign-source taxable income from being offset (cross
credited) against the U.S. residual tax liability on low-taxed foreign-
source taxable income in the other basket.3" Note, however, that a
taxpayer may freely cross credit the foreign tax credits generated on
high-taxed foreign income against the U.S. residual tax on low-taxed
foreign income within the same limitation category or basket.356
note 322, at 2-3.
352 See I.R.C. §§ 901-903.
353 I.R.C. § 904(a).
3m See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 3-4, 18; U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 45; GUSTAFSON, PERONI &
PUGH, supra note 133, at 372; OWENS, supra note 322, at 198. The foreign tax credit
limitations in section 904, including the overall limitation, conflict with a strict
application of efficiency objectives because these limitations may discourage U.S.
persons from investing in high-tax foreign countries. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 18; Ault & Bradford, supra note 133, at 40.
However, concern with preservation of the U.S. tax base from inappropriate erosion
overrides these efficiency objectives and, accordingly, Congress has imposed some
form of limitation on the foreign tax credit since 1921. See id. Stated differently,
allowing an unlimited foreign tax credit would amount to a U.S. tax subsidy of high-
tax foreign countries and "would encourage foreign countries to impose
discriminatorily higher taxes on U.S. persons." Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note
133, at 978; see Frisch, supra note 312, at 583; Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax
Credit and Its Critics, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 56 (1991) [hereinafter Kingson, Foreign
Tax Credit]. Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the foreign tax credit is to
mitigate international double taxation and this is accomplished if a foreign tax credit
is allowed to the extent of the pre-credit U.S. tax on the U.S. taxpayer's foreign-
source income. See, e.g., AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 135, at 362.
355 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 34, 377-87; 2 ISENBERGH,
supra note 133, ch. 57; 1 KUNTz & PERONI,supra note 133, B4.16.
356 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 18; GUSTAFSON,
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Proponents of cross-crediting typically argue that the U.S. tax
system should allow liberal cross-crediting because such cross-
crediting enhances the competitiveness of U.S. multinational
corporations in the global economy.357 These claims, however, suffer
from many of the same defects as do the competitiveness arguments in
support of the deferral subsidy discussed above, including, most
358importantly, a paucity of empirical support for such claims.
To determine whether cross-crediting represents a departure from
a normative baseline and, therefore, a tax expenditure provision, we
must first identify a baseline. In this context, we can articulate the
baseline in two alternative ways - a per-item (i.e., per-transaction)
foreign tax credit limitation or a per-country foreign tax credit
limitation.
Per-item foreign tax credit limitation. Because the income tax
system is based on transactions and the fundamental purpose of the
foreign tax credit is to mitigate international double taxation, a
theoretically pure foreign tax credit limitation would be applied on an
item-by-item (i.e., transaction-by-transaction) basis.35 9 An item-by-
item foreign tax credit limitation would ensure that a taxpayer's
foreign tax credit is limited to the actual amount of foreign income tax
imposed on the taxpayer's foreign-source income and would greatly
minimize, if not completely eliminate, the subsidy aspects of the
PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 373-75, 383-85; SCHOLES, WOLFSON, ERICKSON,
MAYDEW & SHEVLIN, supra note 23, at 318-22; Ault & Bradford, supra note 133, at
18.
357 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 22; GUSTAFSON,
PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 375-76; 1 NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL,
THE NFTC FOREIGN INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY - PART Two: RELIEF OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION 301-09
(2001) [hereinafter NFTC, RELIEF OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION], available
at http://www.nftc.org/default/tax/fip/NFl'Cla% Part %20Volumelpart2Chapl-5.pdf.
358 See supra text accompanying notes 332-47.
359 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE
CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 386 (1985) [hereinafter
U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS], available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/tax-reform/pres85index.shtml
("Double taxation would be fully relieved if income derived from each separate
transaction were treated separately for credit purposes and the U.S. tax were offset by
a credit for the foreign tax paid with respect to that income."); ALl, INTERNATIONAL
TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 318-21 ("[Ilt is believed that an item-by-item approach
provides the correct theoretical starting point for considering the credit
limitation .... "); Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 996; see also AULT &
ARNOLD, supra note 135, at 362; Kingson, Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 354, at 17.
But see McClure & Bouma, supra note 332, at 1403 n.192.
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foreign tax credit.36 Any foreign tax credit limitation other than the
per-item approach allows some degree of cross-crediting, which in
effect subsidizes a U.S. taxpayer's business and investment activities inS• 361
low-tax foreign countries. A per-item approach has not been
adopted, however, because it would impose substantial administrative
costs on both taxpayers and the government that would exceed its
362benefits. Nevertheless, because such an approach represents the
limitation that most fully implements the mitigation of double
taxation purpose underlying the foreign tax credit, it is appropriate to
use the per-item limitation as a benchmark for determining whether
cross-crediting is a tax expenditure.
Per-country foreign tax credit limitation. A per-country limitation
allows a U.S. taxpayer to credit foreign taxes only to the extent of the
pre-foreign tax credit U.S. tax liability on the taxpayer's income from
sources within a particular foreign country.363 This approach,
therefore, does not allow the taxpayer to cross credit or average high
foreign taxes above the top U.S. tax rate on foreign-source income
earned in one foreign country against the taxpayer's residual U.S. tax
liability on foreign-source income earned in a different low-tax or no-
360 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note
359, at 386-88; ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 318-19.
361 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note
359, at 386-87 ("Any departure from a transactional approach to crediting foreign tax
will permit some averaging of foreign taxes and will therefore involve some surrender
of the residual tax imposed by the United States on foreign income that is taxed by
foreign countries at rates below the U.S. rate."); ALl, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY,
supra note 133, at 318-19.
.362 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at
388 ("[T]he technical complexity of such a system would make it unworkable."); ALl,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 319-20; Yariv Brauner, An
International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 286 (2003).
363 See 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 360-63; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 385-96; Peroni, Back to
the Future, supra note 133, at 995-96; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. &
Stephen E. Shay, Reform and Simplification of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 101
TAX NOTES 103, 121 (Oct. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Reform of
Foreign Tax Credit Rules]; see also ALl, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133,
at 321, 323-26; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 376-77. For critiques
of the per-country foreign tax credit limitation, see Alan W. Granwell, Calculating the
Foreign Tax Credit Limitation on a Per Country Basis, 28 TAX NOTES 567 (July 29,
1985); John P. Steines, Jr., Foreign Tax Credit Reform: A Response to Peroni, et al.,
101 TAX NOTES 134 (Oct. 6, 2003); David R. Tillinghast, International Tax
Simplification, 8 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 187, 216-17 (1990).
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tax foreign country.364 Instead, the per-country limitation restricts a
U.S. taxpayer's cross-crediting opportunities to high-taxed and low-
taxed foreign-source income within the same foreign country. As a
practical matter, this approximates the theoretically correct per-item
result because tax haven countries will rarely impose tax in excess of
the U.S. rate on any significant amount of income and, consequently,
cross-crediting opportunities will be minimal. Accordingly, unlike the
overall limitation or even a multi-basket foreign tax credit limitation,
the per-country limitation eliminates double taxation without creating
a significant incentive for U.S. taxpayers to shift investments from the
• 365
United States to low-tax countries. Thus, the per-country limitation
366promotes economic efficiency.
The cross-crediting allowed by the current two-basket system in
revised section 904(d) (which was enacted in 2004 and became
effective in 2007) is a clear departure from either the per-item or per-
country baseline.16' Thus, cross-crediting operates as a subsidy for
foreign investment by allowing a U.S. person to credit foreign taxes
higher than the U.S. rate on some types of foreign-source income
against the U.S. residual tax on other types of low- or zero-taxed
foreign-source income, which is the equivalent of the U.S. government
giving the U.S. person a grant in the amount of the U.S. residual tax
eliminated.368 Moreover, cross-crediting enhances the benefit of the
364 See, e.g., OWENS, supra note 322, at 198-200.
365 See 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 360-61, 363; U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 386-88, 394-95;
Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 995-96; Peroni, Fleming & Shay,
Reform of Foreign Tax Credit Rules, supra note 363, at 121; Shay, Fleming & Peroni,
Source Rules, supra note 39, at 153.
36 ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 323; Fleming & Peroni,
ETI Repeal, supra note 316, at 1405. But see 1 NFTC, RELIEF OF INTERNATIONAL
DOUBLE TAXATION, supra note 357, at 296-97.
367 Even the nine-basket system enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
allowed a good deal of cross-crediting and therefore was a clear departure from either
baseline because one of the baskets in that system, the general or residual basket,
contained a significant majority of the foreign-source income earned by U.S. persons.
See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 20 (stating that
"approximately 75 percent of all foreign source income falls within the general
limitation category" of former section 904(d)(1)(I), before its amendment in 2004).
For the authors' critique of the foreign tax credit limitation changes made by the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, see generally Fleming & Peroni, ETI Repeal,
supra note 316.
368 As we have discussed in an earlier article, cross-crediting remains a serious
problem notwithstanding the nominal worldwide decline in corporate tax rates. See
Fleming & Peroni, ETI Repeal, supra note 316, at 1403-04; see also Simeon Djankov,
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deferral subsidy by eliminating or reducing the U.S. residual tax on a
CFC's foreign-source income when the income is eventually
repatriated. 369 To the extent that the U.S. residual tax is eliminated,
the U.S. system of worldwide taxation with deferral is converted into a
"self-help" elective exemption system, which is more generous to
taxpayers than a properly designed, nonelective exemption system for
taxing foreign business income37° and which is inconsistent with the
ability-to-pay and SHS principles underlying an income tax system.
The cross-crediting subsidy does not survive a cost/benefit
analysis because it has the inefficient effect of encouraging U.S.
persons with high-taxed foreign-source income to shift some of their
business and investment activities to low-tax foreign countries even if
the pre-tax return in those countries is lower than in the United
States.371 Congress would not likely enact an equivalent direct
Tim Ganser, Caralee McLeish, Rita Ramalho & Andrei Shleifer, The Effect of
Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship (2007), available at http://
www.nber.org/confer/2007/pefO7/shleifer.pdf (graph entitled "Effective Corporate
Tax Rate on Business Density," which identifies approximately twenty countries with
effective corporate tax rates higher than that of the United States). For a contrary
view arguing that probably cross-crediting or averaging should be ignored by U.S. tax
policymakers and an overall foreign tax credit limitation should be adopted, see AVI-
YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 312, at 158-62.
36 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., THE IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. BUSINESSES 64
(Joint Comm. Print 2006) ("[B]ecause excess foreign tax credits cannot be carried
forward indefinitely, deferral expands the opportunity for cross-crediting (if effective
foreign tax rates vary across years or across jurisdictions) by not deeming high foreign
taxes to be paid until a year when the U.S. taxpayer chooses also to repatriate low-
taxed foreign source income."); James R. Hines, Jr. & R. Glenn Hubbard, Coming
Home to America: Dividend Repatriations by U.S. Multinationals, in TAXATION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 161, 178 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) ("[Tlhe
combination of the credit system and deferral can diminish substantially the revenue
raised by the United States from the taxation of overseas operations of U.S.
multinationals."); see also Kingson, Coherence, supra note 315, at 1270 ("[E]nding
deferral without changing the overall foreign tax credit limitation might have only
limited revenue impact .... ).
370 See GRUBERT & MUTrI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME, supra
note 317, at 12-13, 27-28, 42; Peroni, The Proper Approach, supra note 315, at 1586;
Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 39, at 153; see also U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, supra note 307, at 57 (describing how the current
U.S. international tax system allows U.S. multinational corporations to engage in
"self-help territoriality").
371 See, e.g., Ault & Bradford, supra note 133, at 40-41; James Kvaal, Removing
Tax Subsidies for Foreign Investment, 111 TAX NOTES 1299 (June 12, 2006). But see 1
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expenditure program that provided government grants to encourage
U.S. taxpayers to shift their business and investment activities in this
way.
C. Example Illustrating the Effects of Deferral and Cross-Crediting
These points concerning the effects of deferral and cross-crediting
as tax subsidy programs can be illustrated with the following example.
USCo is a U.S. domestic corporation that is about to build a new
manufacturing plant and is debating whether to locate this facility in
the United States or in Country X, a tax haven with no business
profits tax, no withholding tax regime, and no branch profits tax.372
USCo pays U.S. federal income tax at a 35% rate. Regardless of
where USCo's new plant is situated, it will produce a $1 million
before-tax profit in Year 1 that will be reinvested at a 10% rate of
return in the new manufacturing operation and then extracted and
repatriated to USCo at the end of Year 2. The interest and discount
rates are 10% per annum.
The following columns show the results of four different
scenarios. To be specific, in column (1), the new factory is located in
the United States and current law applies. 113 In column (2), the new
factory is Country X property of USCo's wholly owned Country X
subsidiary and the United States employs a worldwide income tax
system with deferral but with effective barriers to cross-crediting. In
column (3), the facts are the same as for column (2) except that USCo
is allowed to eliminate U.S. tax on repatriated Country X income by
cross crediting high foreign taxes on manufacturing income earned in
Countries Y and Z, two developed foreign countries with income tax
systems that have applicable tax rates above the top U.S. rate. In
column (4), the new factory is located in Country X and the United
States employs an exemption (territorial) tax system for foreign-
source active business income.374
NFTC, RELIEF OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION, supra note 357.
372 The example expressly assumes that Country X is a tax haven. Accordingly, if
these taxes were imposed by Country X, they would have a very low rate and would
be fully eliminated through foreign tax credits against USCo's U.S. income tax
liability. Thus, all these taxes would likely be inconsequential and, to simplify this
example, we assume that Country X does not impose them.
371 Column (1) also shows the results if USCo located the factory in Country X
and made the investment through a Country X subsidiary, but U.S. tax law were
changed to (i) end deferral completely and (ii) effectively prevent cross-crediting.
374 For the authors' tax policy critique of two similar proposed U.S. exemption
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systems, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a
Proposed U.S. Exemption (Territorial) Tax System, 109 TAX NOTES 1557 (Dec. 19,
2005) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a Proposed U.S.
Exemption System] (critiquing proposals by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, OPTIONS, supra note 333, at 186-97, and
by President Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 105, 132-35). For
other commentary on these two exemption proposals, see Lawrence Lokken,
Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals May Be Less Than Enthusiastic
About the Idea (And Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59 SMU L. REV. 751 (2006);
McDaniel, Herman Goldman Lecture, supra note 335; McDaniel, Territorial vs
Worldwide, supra note 335; Peter Merrill, Oren Penn, Hans-Martin Eckstein, David
Grosman & Martijn van Kessel, Restructuring Foreign-Source-Income Taxation: U.S.
Territorial Tax Proposals and the International Experience, 111 TAX NOTES 799 (May
15, 2006); James R. Repetti, Will U.S. Investment Go Abroad in a Territorial Tax: A
Critique of the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 303
(2007); George K. Yin, Reforming the Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment by U.S.
Taxpayers, 118 TAX NOTES 173 (Jan. 7, 2008). For other critiques of exemption
proposals for taxing foreign-source income, see U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985
TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 383; Hugh J. Ault, Commentary, 9 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 61 (1991); Kingson, Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 354, at 52-55; Kleinbard,
Territorial Taxation, supra note 349. For commentary generally supporting one form
or another of an exemption system for taxing international income, see GRUBERT &
MuTrI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME, supra note 317; Terrence R.
Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 835
(2000); Michael J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for
Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 771 (2001) (taking the position
that enactment of an exemption system would provide significant opportunities for
simplification of U.S. international income tax law); Kvaal, supra note 371 (arguing
for a partial exemption system); H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing
the Income of Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1525, 1544
(2001); Klaus Vogel, World-wide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and
Reevaluation of Arguments, in INFLUENCE OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 117 (1990). For an earlier Treasury report that
compares a modified exemption system with a current inclusion regime as alternative
tax reform proposals, see U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 41-
53.
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Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4)
U.S. Country X CFC, Same as Country X
Location, Worldwide Taxation Column (2), Location,
Current with Deferral, But But with U.S.
Law No Cross-Crediting Cross- Exemption
Crediting System
Year 1
Net Profit $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Year 1 U.S.
Tax @ 35% -350.000 0376 -0- -0-
Invested in
Year 2 @ 10% $ 650,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Year 2 Return + 65,000 + 100,000 + 100,000 + 100,000
Year 2 35%
U.S. Tax on
Year 2 Return - 2 2 ,750  -0- -0- -0-
Distribution to
USCo
Headquarters $ 692,250 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000
Dividend Tax
@35% -0- -385,00 -00- -
After-Tax Net
to USCo $ 692,250 $ 715,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000
375 There is no U.S. dividend tax in this column because the distribution to U.S.
headquarters is either an intracorporate payment from a U.S. branch or a distribution
by a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary that is not taxable under either the consolidated
return rules or section 243(a)(3). Alternatively, if USCo located the factory in
Country X and used a Country X subsidiary to make the investment, but deferral
were ended completely and cross-crediting were prevented, the distribution by the
Country X subsidiary to USCo would be exempt from U.S. tax because the earnings
of the Country X subsidiary out of which the distribution was made would have
already been subject to U.S. tax in the hands of its U.S. shareholder, USCo, in Years 1
and 2. See I.R.C. § 959.
"6 The Country X income is income from manufacturing within Country X and,
therefore, Subpart F does not apply a Year 1 U.S. tax, regardless of whether or how
much foreign tax is imposed on such income and regardless of whether the
manufactured products are sold to related parties or to customers in other countries.
See I.R.C. § 954(d). Thus, Subpart F does nothing to prevent deferral in this example;
consequently, the $350,000 tax in column (1) is deferred in columns (2) and (3), and
eliminated by exemption in column (4) and the investments in those columns are
scaled up from $650,000 to $1,000,000.
177 Cross-crediting effectively eliminates the U.S. dividend tax.
378 Under a U.S. exemption system, both dividend distributions from a foreign
subsidiary's foreign-source active income and repatriations from a foreign branch's
foreign-source active income likely would be exempt from U.S. tax. See generally
Fleming & Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a Proposed U.S. Exemption System,
supra note 374.
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Note that the difference in after-tax net between columns (1) and
(2) is $22,750,"79 which equals USCo's tax incurred in column (1) on
the Year 2 investment return when the factory is built in the United
States. In other words, the consequence of deferral in column (2) is to
eliminate a $22,750 Year 2 U.S. tax that USCo would have paid if it
had built the factory in the United States. Thus, USCo effectively
receives a Year 2 $22,750 subsidy from the U.S. tax system for locating
the new factory in Country X instead of in the United States. This
subsidy can be enjoyed annually in different amounts depending on
USCo's profits and reinvestment decisions for Year 3 and beyond.
In addition, note that because cross-crediting eliminated the
dividend tax in column (3), columns (3) and (4) produce identical
bottom-line results. Stated differently, as mentioned earlier, loosely
restrained cross-crediting, as is commonly allowed under the present
U.S. system of worldwide taxation with deferral and an unrestrictive
foreign tax credit limitation, effectively converts the U.S. international
tax system into a poorly designed 380 and elective exemption regime
381that is more generous than a traditional exemption system.
Finally, note that the difference between USCo's after-tax net
income in column (1) and in columns (3) and (4) is not merely the
$22,750 difference between columns (1) and (2). Instead, it is a
dramatically larger amount - namely, $407,750.382 The explanation is
quite simple. In order to make the $350,000 Year 1 U.S. tax in column
... $715,000 - $692,250 = $22,750.
380 Among the reasons it is poorly designed is that unlike the exemption systems
of countries that are international trade competitors of the United States, the U.S.
system allows foreign-source losses to be deducted against U.S.-source income and
effectively allows exemption treatment for foreign-source royalties.
381 See authorities cited supra note 370. In fact, some leading U.S. multinational
lobbying groups have come to understand that a properly designed exemption or
territorial system would be less generous than our existing incoherent international
tax system. See National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., The NFTC's Report on
Territorial Taxation, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 687, 707 (Aug. 5, 2002) (arguing that
Congress should "reform" the U.S. international tax system by revising the Subpart F
and foreign tax credit rules rather than by enacting a territorial system). This fact
helps explain why many U.S. multinational corporations and their lobbying groups
were opposed to the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation's and the Presidential
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform's 2005 exemption proposals, cited supra note
374. Moreover, because a combination of certain defective features of the current
U.S. international tax rules can result in a negative effective tax rate on some types of
foreign-source income, see, e.g., Grubert & Mutti, Taxing Multinationals, supra note
346, at 451-52, the current system, in some respects, may be more generous to
taxpayers than would a properly designed cash flow consumption tax system.
"" $1,100,000- $692,250 = $407,750.
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(1) comparable to Year 2 amounts in columns (3) and (4), the
$350,000 Year 1 tax must be "grown" for one year at 10% (we are
using a 10% interest assumption) so that it becomes $385,000... at the
end of Year 2. When we add this $385,000 amount to the $22,750 Year
2 tax in column (1), the sum is $407,750, which equals the difference
between USCo's after-tax net in column (1) and in columns (3) and
(4). In other words, the effect of the U.S. taxing regimes in columns
(3) and (4) is to relieve USCo's foreign-source income from both the
Year 1 tax and the Year 2 tax that USCo would have incurred if it had
built the factory in the United States.
Stated differently, the U.S. regimes of deferral with very loosely
restrained cross-crediting (column (3)) and exemption (column (4))
provide USCo with a $407,750 tax subsidy over Years 1 and 2 for
building the new factory in Country X instead of in the United States.
This subsidy can be enjoyed in future years in different amounts
depending on USCo's profits and reinvestment decisions for Year 3
and beyond. For the reasons discussed above, this tax subsidy would
not survive the rigorous cost/benefit analysis under which all tax
expenditure provisions should be analyzed. Consequently, TEA lends
significant support to reform proposals to end or significantly curtail
deferral and tighten the foreign tax credit limitation to bring the credit
provision in line with its fundamental purpose of mitigating
international double taxation.384
D. The Export Sales Source Rule
Under the current statute, income from the sale of purchased
inventory is treated as arising in (i.e., sourced to) the place of sale 381
and, under the regulations386 and case law,387 the place of sale is treated
383 $350,000 + ($350,000 x 0.10) = $385,000.
38 For examples of proposals to substantially curtail deferral, see Fleming,
Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 315; Kleinbard, Territorial Taxation,
supra note 349; Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 989-92; Peroni, Fleming
& Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral, supra note 133; see also
International Task Force Report, supra note 242, at 731-35. For examples of proposals
to substantially reform the foreign tax credit limitation rules to restrict cross-crediting,
see Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 994-1002; Peroni, Fleming & Shay,
Reform of Foreign Tax Credit Rules, supra note 363, at 113-23; see also International
Task Force Report, supra note 242, at 772-76.
385 See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 865(b).
386 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1960). The regulations, however, provide that the
place where the substance of the sale occurred, instead of the place where title passed,
will be treated as the place of sale if the "sales transaction is arranged in a particular
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as the place where the rights, title, and interest of the seller of the
inventory passes to the buyer (often referred to as the "title-passage
test"). In situations where the U.S. seller is also the manufacturer of
the inventory, the income is treated as partially
production/manufacturing income and partially sales income,3 8 with
the production component sourced to the location of the seller's
production assets3 89 and the sales component generally sourced under
the title passage test.390 The current regulations allocate the income
between the production and sales functions by applying an arbitrary
formula that treats 50% of the income from an export sale as sales
income, which generally will be characterized as having a foreign
source if title to the inventory is passed to the purchaser outside the
United States.391
The result is that 50% of the U.S. seller/exporter's income from
the export sale of inventory manufactured in the United States can be
treated as foreign-source income without regard to whether the U.S.
seller/exporter has a sales office or sales employees abroad, without
regard to whether the purchaser of the inventory is a CFC in which
the U.S. exporter/seller owns a significant interest, and without regard
manner for the primary purpose of tax avoidance." Id.; see also United States v.
Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298, 306 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957). The
government has been generally unsuccessful when litigating the application of this
tax-avoidance exception. See 3 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 311, at 73-42, -43;
GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 133, at 90; PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE &
SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
46 (4th ed. 2003). Accordingly, the title passage test essentially determines the place
of sale for inventory property, with few exceptions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 865(e)(2).
117 See, e.g., A.P. Green Exp. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960);
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-18 (1990).
'8' See I.R.C. §§ 863(b), 865(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(a), (b) (2006). See generally
3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 311, ch. 73; 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 133, $$ 19.9-
19.26; 1 KuNTz & PERONI, supra note 133, A2.03[9][d].
"'9 See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(c)(1) (2006).
390 See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 863(b), 865(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.863-3(c)(2)
(2006), 1.861-7(c) (1960).
'91 See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(1) (2006). A taxpayer may instead elect to
determine the amount of production income by using the so-called "independent
factory or production price" if the taxpayer can establish that such an independent
factory or production price exists. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(2) (2006). A third,
rarely used alternative allows a taxpayer to allocate the income from export sales
between the production and sales function based on the taxpayer's books of account,
but only if the taxpayer has received advanced permission from the Service district
director and if certain other requirements in the regulations are met. See Treas. Reg. §
1.863-3(b)(3) (2006).
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to whether any foreign country is likely to impose any tax on the sales
392income. In fact, income from export sales of inventory by a U.S.
seller/exporter usually bears little or no foreign income tax, unless the
U.S. seller/exporter has a sales office or other fixed place of business
or sales employees in the foreign country of sale.393 This means that if
a U.S. seller/exporter manufactures inventory and sells it to a foreign
customer, which may be the seller's CFC, and passes title to the goods
sold abroad, the result is zero-foreign-taxed income, half of which is
characterized . as foreign-source sales income for foreign tax credit
limitation purposes.3 94 This result occurs even though most of the
income producing activity occurred in the United States. If the U.S.
seller/exporter also has high-taxed foreign-source income from other
transactions (i.e., income taxed at foreign tax rates in excess of the top
U.S. rate), the excess credits on the high-taxed income can be offset
(cross credited) against the U.S. residual tax on the zero-taxed export
sales income and thereby reduce or eliminate the U.S. income tax on
the export sales income.3 9 Consequently, export sales activity is
subsidized by effectively reducing the U.S. income tax on the export
391
sales income.
Export sales source rule is a tax expenditure. Rules for determining
the geographic source of a taxpayer's income and deductions are
essentially legal concepts that have no independent economic
significance.39 Instead, they work with other rules in the tax code to
define the scope of the U.S. taxing jurisdiction over foreign persons
with respect to their activities within the United States and over U.S.
398persons with respect to their activities outside the United States. In
392 See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(1) (2006).
393 See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE SALES
SOURCE RULES 1 (1993) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, SALES SOURCE RULES
REPORT].
394 See, e.g., Donald J. Rousslang, The Sales Source Rules for U.S. Exports: How
Much Do They Cost?, 62 TAX NOTES 1047 (Feb. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Rousslang,
Sales Source Rules].
391 See, e.g., International Task Force Report, supra note 242, at 703-05; Kingson,
Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 354, at 20-22; Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Reform of
Foreign Tax Credit Rules, supra note 363, at 118. The effect of cross-crediting in
reducing U.S. income tax is illustrated with the example supra Part VI.C.
396 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, SALES SOURCE RULES REPORT, supra note 393, at 13;
Rousslang, Sales Source Rules, supra note 394, at 1047.
39 See Ault & Bradford, supra note 133, at 12, 30-31; see also Graetz, Taxing
International Income, supra note 213, at 317.
398 See, e.g., 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, 364; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399.
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the context of U.S. taxation of the foreign business and investment
activities of a U.S. person, including a U.S. multinational corporation,
the source rules serve the function of defining (through the foreign tax
credit mechanism) the circumstances under which the United States is
willing to give its residents a foreign tax credit and thereby cede
primary taxing jurisdiction to a foreign country because the income in
question is determined to have its source in that country.399 As a first
principle, source rules "should allocate income to the place where the
economic activity generating that income occurs.''400 In addition, in the
context of the foreign tax credit limitation, it makes sense that the
source rules be designed to prevent erosion of the legitimate U.S. tax
base through taxpayer manipulation of the source rules and the
foreign tax credit limitation.4°' To achieve these objectives of
appropriate U.S. tax base preservation and accurate determination of
a U.S. person's foreign tax credit limitation, the source rules should
generally treat an item of income as having a U.S. source when that
income item has a "reasonable economic nexus" with the United
402States. In addition, because the primary purpose of the foreign tax
credit is to mitigate international double taxation, the source rules
that apply for foreign tax credit purposes should treat items of income
as having a U.S. source if they are not generally subject to foreign
taxation .403
"9 See, e.g., 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, 364; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399.
400 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 365; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399; see also U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 1-2 ("[S]ourcing rules for both income
and expense must permit accurate measurement of the taxable income generated by
economic activity in the United States and by the foreign activities of U.S.
investors."), 30; Graetz, Taxing International Income, supra note 213, at 317 ("[The
source rules] should be overhauled to be better linked to the location of real
economic activity, the location of customers, workers, or assets."); see also ALI,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 19.
40' 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 365; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 1-2 (stating that properly designed source rules
should help safeguard the U.S. tax base from inappropriate erosion), 4, 30 (noting the
relationship between properly designed source rules and the appropriate scope of a
taxpayer's foreign tax credit limitation).
402 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 30; see also ALl,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 348.
40' See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 4, 30.
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The export sales source rule does not attempt to actually associate
the income source with the economic activity giving rise to the
income.4° Nor does it treat income from an export sale as having a
U.S. source if that income is free of foreign tax. Instead, this rule
arbitrarily allows 50% of the U.S. manufacturer's income from the
export sale to be treated as foreign-source income even it bears no
foreign tax and even though the bulk of the taxpayer's economic
activity giving rise to the income (the production and sale of goods)
may take place within the United States.45 This rule arbitrarily treats
50% of the export income as sales income, regardless of the actual
relative contributions of the U.S. exporter's production and sales
activities to the earning of the income, and then allows the exporter to
use the title passage test to source the artificially characterized sales
component of the income as foreign-source income. The place where
title passes typically will have little or no economic connection with
the earning of the income from the export sale and is subject to great
manipulation by taxpayers for tax-avoidance purposes.4 6 Moreover,
most foreign countries would not tax inventory sales income merely
because title to the inventory property sold passes within the
country. 40 7 Instead, an office or fixed place of business to which the
inventory sale is attributable is a prerequisite to taxation of suchS• 408
income in most foreign countries. Thus, the title passage test for
determining the source of the sales portion of the income from the
export sale effectively allows a U.S. taxpayer to artificially create low-
or zero-taxed foreign-source sales income that expands the taxpayer's
See id. at 31 (concluding that the export sales source rule of current law "can
reach results that depart significantly from the 'economic nexus' principle"), 32
(stating that the export sales source rule of current law "can source income in a
manner that departs significantly from the 'economic nexus' principle"); 1
ISENBERGH, supra note 133, $$ 19:46-19:47.
405 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 365-67; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399.
406 See 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 365-67; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399-400; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 32; cf ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY,
supra note 133, at 21-22; 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 133, $$ 16:9-16:10; OWENS, supra
note 322, at 220.
407 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399;
U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 32; ALI, INTERNATIONAL
TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 354.
See 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 365-67; see also U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 399.
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foreign tax credit limitation and increases the opportunities for cross-
crediting. °9
This rule is designed to promote a particular type of economic
activity - namely, the manufacture of goods for export abroad. 40 The
export sales source rule is a subsidy because it enhances the deferral
and cross-crediting subsidies by artificially creating foreign-source
income, much of it low- or zero-taxed. 4 ' This increases the utility of
foreign tax credits by increasing the numerator of the foreign tax
credit limitation fraction and often permits the U.S. exporter to credit
the high foreign taxes on other foreign business income against the
U.S. residual tax on the low- or zero-taxed export sales income and
412thereby reduce or eliminate the U.S. residual tax. In analyzing
whether the export sales source rule is a subsidy, an appropriate
baseline needs to be used to determine how much of the income from
409 See 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 9, at 365; U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 359, at 350-51, 399-400; ALl,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 354. Concerns with the manipulability
of the sales source rules for business income are longstanding. For example, Thomas
Sewell Adams, an early 20th Century economist and consultant to the Treasury
Department, whose work was influential in creating the U.S. rules for taxing
international income, objected to an early version of the export sales source rule on
the grounds that "such a rule denied the United States authority to tax much income
that was, in essence, produced domestically and that such a rule was open to taxpayer
manipulation." Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 312, at 1057.
410 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, SALES SOURCE RULES REPORT, supra note 393,
at 1; 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 133, 19:47 (noting that the purpose of the export sales
source rule "is to confer a tax benefit on the export of manufactured goods from the
United States"); Graetz, Taxing International Income, supra note 213, at 317; see also
U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 32 (concluding that the
export sales source rule of current law "can create a tax preference for exports over
domestic sales"). One leading commentator has argued that the export sales source
rule is a "more potent" tax subsidy than the dedicated export subsidies such as the
now-repealed FSC provisions and extraterritorial income exclusion provisions. 1
ISENBERGH, supra note 133, 19:47.
41 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 32; ALI,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 32.
412 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 32; Peroni,
Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 1007; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BACKGROUND
PAPER, supra note 1, at 48 ("[T]he shielding of export income is an export incentive
for corporations with excess foreign tax credits."). In fact, the export sales source rule,
when combined with the cross-crediting opportunities in the general category
limitation basket, may create a negative effective U.S. tax rate on the foreign-source
income from an export sale of inventory property under certain circumstances. See
Rousslang, Sales Source Rules, supra note 394; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DEFERRAL
STUDY, supra note 216, at 46.
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the export sale should properly be treated as foreign-source income.
One appropriate baseline would be arm's length apportionment
of the type used in the independent factory or production price
413
method in the current regulations. Under this approach, the
production portion of the export sales income would be determined
by using the price at which the manufactured product would exchange
hands between an unrelated manufacturer and unrelated distributor
applying the principles of the transfer pricing regulations under
section 482.414 This production portion of the income would then be
sourced in accordance with the location of the exporter's production
activities, which means that this portion of the income will be entirely
or predominantly U.S.-source income in the usual case. The
remainder of the income would be treated as sales income and usually
foreign-source income if the title passage test is used to determine the
source of the sales income.
A second appropriate baseline for determining the U.S.-source
portion of the export sales income would be the amount of sales
income that is determined under a formulary apportionment method
using an appropriate multi-factor test.4" This baseline approach avoids
the administrative difficulties of using an arm's length approach and
recognizes that there are a significant number of situations in which an
arm's length price is unavailable or not obtainable at a reasonable
413 See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(2) (2006). For a sampling of critiques of the use
of the arm's length standard as the method for allocating the taxable income of
multinational enterprises among different countries, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International
Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89 (1995); Avi-Yonah, Structure of International Taxation,
supra note 348, at 1339-52; Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of
Arm's Length, 30 TAX NOTES 625, 669-70 (Feb. 17, 1986); Dale W. Wickham &
Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution of the International Transfer
Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 56 TAX NOTES 339,
344-55 (July 20, 1992).
414 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 32; ALl,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 133, at 33, 353-54; 1 ISENBERGH, supra note
133, 19:46; see also OWENS, supra note 322, at 221 ("The independent factory price
establishes a constructive selling price for the purpose of determining the
manufacturing income from sources in the United States and a constructive cost of
goods sold for determining the sales income from sources in the foreign country.").
This baseline would be generally consistent with the rules of the trading partners of
the United States for the taxation of export income and with the rules for taxing
export sales income in U.S. tax treaties. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 309, at 33.
415 See, e.g., Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 1008.
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cost.
416
A third appropriate baseline would be to treat the export sales
income as entirely U.S.-source income under a residence of the seller
approach, unless the U.S. exporter could show that the export sales
income had some significant foreign nexus - namely that the income
was attributable to a foreign office of the exporter that materially
participated in the sale and/or was subject to a minimum amount of
foreign income tax (e.g., a 10% foreign income tax).417 Under this
third baseline, only the portion of the export sales income shown to
have the requisite foreign nexus would be foreign-source income; the
418
remainder of the income would be treated as having a U.S. source.
Regardless of which of these three baselines is used, the arbitrary
50% allocation approach in the export sales source rule of current law
departs from the baseline in a significant way and does so for the
purpose of promoting export sales activity by expanding cross-
crediting opportunities. Thus, the export sales source rule of current
law is an export subsidy effected through the tax system and is
properly classified as a tax expenditure. Consistent with this analysis,
the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Office of
Management and Budget/Treasury have both consistently treated the
rule as a tax expenditure provision and attempted to quantify the cost1 419
of the tax subsidy.
Cost/benefit analysis of export sales source rule subsidy. This tax
subsidy would not survive a cost/benefit analysis. The costs of the
subsidy in terms of revenue loss and domestic welfare loss outweigh
any benefits that the subsidy provides in terms of increased domestic
investment and U.S. exports. To be specific, this tax subsidy distorts
some U.S. taxpayers' economic behavior by creating a tax incentive
416 Cf U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 33.
417 See id.; Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133, at 1007; Robert J. Peroni, A
Hitchhiker's Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV.
391, 396 (2003); Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Reform of Foreign Tax Credit Rules, supra
note 363, at 118, 132; Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 39, at 150-52;
see also Lokken, supra note 374, at 769. This baseline would more closely reflect the
approach of the trading partners of the United States and the taxation of export sales
income under U.S. tax treaties than does the export sales source rule of current law.
See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 33.
418 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 33.
419 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 2007 ESTIMATES, supra note 13, at 24
(estimating the total revenue cost for fiscal years 2007-2011 from the inventory
property export sales source rule as $34.0 billion); 2008 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 29, at 287 (estimating the total revenue cost for fiscal years 2008-2012 from
the inventory property export sales source rule as $12.577 billion).
[Vol. 27:437
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis
for taxpayers in an excess foreign tax credit position to shift
investment from other domestic business activities to domestic export
activities, even if the domestic export activities have a lower pre-tax
economic return.42° This rule also has an adverse effect on the U.S.
terms of trade, resulting in an overall negative effect on domestic
421
economic welfare. In addition, the rule seems to do little to increase
U.S. exports and the revenue gain from replacing the rule with an
economic activity-based rule may raise at least slightly more revenue
than the reduction in exports that would result from such change. 422 It
seems reasonably clear that the effect on exports from repeal of the
• • •423
rule would likely be minimal.
In any event, the export sales source rule is a strangely designed
program for subsidizing U.S. export activity. This rule generally
benefits U.S. exporters/sellers who have excess foreign tax credits in
the general limitation income category (i.e., more foreign tax credits
in the category than available limitation) so that the exporter bears no
net U.S. residual tax on its high-taxed active foreign business income
in the general limitation category and must generate additional low-
424taxed foreign income to absorb the excess credits. By contrast, this
rule does not benefit U.S. exporters/sellers who are in an excess
foreign tax credit limitation position (i.e., the foreign tax credit
limitation exceeds the U.S. exporter/seller's creditable foreign taxes
or, stated differently, the exporter's U.S. tax on its active foreign
income is greater than its foreign tax payments so that it cannot obtain
a U.S. tax benefit from the creation of additional low-taxed foreign
420 See Rousslang, Sales Source Rules, supra note 394, at 1051-53; see also STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., FACTORS AFFECTING THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES 256-57 (Joint Comm.
Print 1991); Donald J. Rousslang, Comments on Hufbauer and DeRosa, Costs and
Benefits of the Export Source Rule, 76 TAX NOTES 541, 543-45 (July 28, 1997). But see
Gary C. Hufbauer & Dean A. DeRosa, Costs and Benefits of the Export Source Rule,
75 TAX NOTES 1401, 1412 (June 9, 1997) [hereinafter Hufbauer & DeRosa, Costs and
Benefits]; Gary C. Hufbauer & Dean A. DeRosa, The Costs and Benefits of the U.S.
Export Source Rule: A Rejoinder, 77 TAX NOTES 103 (Oct. 6, 1997).
421 See GRUBERT & MUTrI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME, supra
note 317, at 46-47 (using a general equilibrium model and estimating that this export
sales source rule results in a total tax benefit of about $315 million and a welfare loss
to the United States of about $115 million).
422 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, SALES SOURCE RULES REPORT, supra note 393, at 2,
23-25. But see Hufbauer & DeRosa, Costs and Benefits, supra note 420.
423 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, SALES SOURCE RULES REPORT, supra note 393, at 2,
23-25.
424 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 309, at 32-33.
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income). 42' Thus, the amount of the subsidy provided varies with the
amount of a U.S. exporter's excess foreign tax credits and with the
taxpayer's ability to use them in a foreign tax credit carryover year.426
Moreover, this rule does not benefit U.S. exporters/sellers who are in
an excess credit position in a number of situations by reason of other
complex and specific aspects of the U.S. exporter's foreign tax credit
limitation position.427 It is not immediately apparent why Congress
would want to enact an export subsidy program that applies so
arbitrarily because it is tied to the U.S. exporter's foreign tax credit
•• 428
limitation position.
Finally, this rule creates an incentive for U.S. exporters to shift
investment to high-tax foreign countries because the resulting high
foreign tax can be cross credited against the U.S. residual tax on the
low-taxed foreign-source income created through application of the
export sales source rule.42' This causes the U.S. Treasury to relieve
high-tax foreign countries of some of the negative tax competition
consequences that would otherwise result from their fiscal policies.
Such an incentive effect bears no relationship to a rationally designed
export subsidy program. If the export sales source rule were recast as
a direct expenditure program with these characteristics, it would have
little or no chance of being enacted into law.
One last point bears mention here. Given the obligations of the
United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it
probably could not replace this tax subsidy with a direct government
grant to encourage exports.43° In applying TEA to the export sales
source rule, this consideration arguably would be a factor in favor of
using the tax system to deliver an export subsidy if one could conclude
that such a governmental program should be enacted in the first place.
425 See id.
426 See id. Under section 904(c) of current law, a taxpayer may carry back excess
foreign tax credits to the immediate prior tax year and carry them forward to the
succeeding ten tax years.
427 First, the U.S. exporter/seller will not receive a benefit if the U.S.
exporter/seller would have an overall U.S.-source loss under an activity-based source
rule. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, SALES SOURCE RULES REPORT, supra note 393, at 13-14.
Second, the U.S. exporter/seller will not receive a benefit if the U.S. exporter/seller
would have an overall foreign loss under an activity-based source rule. See id. at 14.
428 See id. at 16.
429 See id. at 14.
430 See also Michael J. McIntyre, Collecting Current Tax From U.S.-Resident
Individuals and U.S.-Based MNEs on Income Earned Through Foreign Entities, 11
TAx NOTES INT'L 440 (Aug. 14, 1995); cf. Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 133,
at 1006.
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This is a dubious proposition under traditional economic theory,
however, because such a program would be protectionist in approach
and run counter to the economic theories supporting free trade. As a
general matter, export subsidies distort resource allocation and are
economically inefficient."' Thus, export subsidies generally are not
sensible government programs.
In sum, TEA helps demonstrate that the export sales source rule
is an inappropriate and ineffective subsidy for U.S. export sales
activities. Accordingly, this element of the U.S. international tax
system should be repealed and the source rules in the Code amended
to provide that the source of the income from export sales will be
determined using one of the baseline approaches discussed above, all
of which more clearly reflect the location of the economic activities
giving rise to the income than does the export sales source rule of
current law.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis in this article supports the propositions that TEA is
grounded in the ability-to-pay and neutrality concepts, is unaffected
by the implicit tax concept, and has a settled core that makes it an
important and useful analytical tool of tax policy, despite the many
criticisms that have been leveled at it over the years. In our view, the
principal purpose and justification of TEA is to serve as a triggering
mechanism for mandatory recasting and cost/benefit analysis of
governmental programs accomplished through the federal income tax
system. Stated differently, TEA's central focus is on transparency and
accountability concerning governmental programs delivered through
the tax system. It is meant to have a salutary restraining effect on the
strong impulse by many members of Congress to engage in
obfuscation by enacting governmental programs in the form of tax
incentives that they would never advocate as direct expenditure
programs. This potential restraining effect of TEA is even more
important in today's policy climate where it is difficult for Congress to
spend money openly by enacting new direct expenditure programs.
In the context of the U.S. international taxation rules, TEA helps
expose serious defects in the existing framework for taxing income
derived by U.S. persons from foreign activities. To be specific, when
431 See, e.g., Andrew Green & Michael Trebilcock, Enforcing WTO Obligations:
What Can We Learn From Export Subsidies?, 10 J. ECON. L. 653, 660-64 (2007). Some
commentators, however, have argued that export subsidies can promote economic
efficiency under certain circumstances. See id. at 62-64.
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three important features of the U.S. international tax rules - deferral,
cross-crediting, and the export sales source rule - are recast and
analyzed as direct governmental programs, TEA shows that these
rules are inefficient subsidies that do not survive a cost/benefit
analysis, are inappropriate from a tax policy standpoint, and should be
significantly modified or repealed. Thus, TEA should play an
increasingly important role in the analysis of legislative proposals in
the international tax area.
